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I argue that our modern ethical conceptions suffer by largely divorcing 
ethics from the rest of human life and treating it as just one possible concern among 
others.  Rejecting a strong distinction between moral and non-moral spheres, an 
ethics of honor instead embodies a holistic conception of human excellence based 
in worthiness and a functional moral identity in which virtues and duties proceed 
from who and what we are.  In part by examining warrior codes through history 
and literature, such as Chivalry, Bushido, and those surrounding groups such as 
Homeric fighters, the Crow Indians, and the Marines, we can see a common pattern 
of ethical demands arising from a conjunction of pride, integrity, social role, and 
reputation.  The links between these concepts form the basis for honor, which I also 
identify as belonging to the realms of heroism and the perfectibility of human 
nature.  Whether in terms of warriors or other domains, what characterizes heroism 
in this sense is the conception of one’s self as both character and author of a 
narrative in which one’s being is self-consciously a statement of what it is to be 
excellent.  The person of honor understands his life in terms of achieving human 
greatness from within a particular role in a larger, interconnected story.  As an 
ethics of being, honor offers a superior conception of morality both in general and 
in terms of moral motivation, and provides a crucial framework for the realization 
of individual virtue intertwined with the good of a community.  By reunifying the 
fractured pieces of honor, I argue that we restore lost connections between 
morality, self-worth, and the good human life as a whole. 
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Chapter 1: Why Honor? 
 
What would a world without honor be like?  Before answering such a 
question, it is of interest to note that the way in which it is posed suggests two 
underlying presumptions.  First, that we have a clear concept of what honor is, and 
second, that it is present in the world in which we do live.  Thus we might similarly 
ask what a world without religion would be like, or without science, or a particular 
style of painting—or indeed, without any one of a great many things that have 
affected the shape and history of human existence.  The question seems to be a 
counterfactual, inviting a comparison between how life is versus what it might 
otherwise have been.  While the form of our question above is the same, however, 
to pose it about honor specifically is dissimilar in an important respect, namely that 
it is unclear what the status of honor is.  That is, unlike religion, science, schools of 
art, and so on, with an absence of honor it is not entirely clear what has been taken 
away.  This is not to say, of course, that nothing is taken away, as would be the 
case with various fictional concepts.  To ask: “What would a world without magic 
be like?”, for instance, would yield the answer “Just like this one” (perhaps with a 
caveat explaining the distinction between the kind of magic referred to in fairy tales 
versus card tricks and sleight of hand).  Honor is not of this sort, but neither is it 
such that modern society has a clear conception of what it is.  Something would be 




How then should we analyze the original question posed above?  In at least 
some of its domains, honor has been an ethical concept.  To say “he is an honorable 
man” is clearly a statement of praise, and moral praise at that.  However, such a 
statement likely also strikes most of us as archaic; to speak of a person’s moral 
worth in that way is uncommon, and using the word “honor” at all is not a typical 
part of most people’s everyday discourse.  When it is used, its meaning may vary 
from the moral context above to other seemingly non-moral contexts, such as 
“honoring” someone meaning to commend or celebrate him, or gaining “honor” in 
the sense of achieving glory for oneself.  I say “seemingly non-moral contexts” 
because, as I shall go on to describe, they have more connection to morality than 
may be immediately apparent.  In any case, because honor is in whole or in part a 
moral concept, a world that lacks it must have a different conception of morality 
than one in which it was present, and all the more so than one in which it is a 
primary or fundamental concept.  As alluded to above, our own world is neither 
one in which honor is wholly absent nor one in which honor plays a key role in our 
ethical framework; it is a concept which we have for the most part abandoned as an 
artifact of history.  The question to ask, then, is whether we were right to abandon 
it.   
 I believe that we were not.  In broad strokes, this view can be located within 
a larger claim in the spirit of Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard Williams, that a 
move away from virtue-centered theories of ethics is overall a mistake and a 
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detriment to human well-being.1  Although a full discussion of the works of either 
of these thinkers is beyond the scope of this project, I believe that they are 
essentially correct in their assessment of modern ethical theory.  Namely, that it 
suffers from disarray for which the remedy must be a return to older, more classical 
conceptions.  More narrowly, I am convinced that the loss of honor as a primary 
ethical concept has bereaved us of a number of important connections between 
morality, self-worth, and society.  Beyond this, our surviving concepts of honor are 
fractured pieces of what was once a unified whole.  To reunite those fragments and 
restore honor to its proper place in morality is a project of immense benefit both to 
moral philosophy and human prosperity. 
 But why harbor such high hopes for a largely forgotten concept?  
Alternatively, it might be asked, if indeed the idea of honor has been largely 
abandoned, does this not suggest that some better formulation of ethics was found 
to replace it—or, at the very least, that the replacing formulation could address 
crucial weaknesses in its predecessor?  There are two responses to such concerns.  
First, it is perhaps a happy illusion that when an idea or movement in history 
succeeds what came before it, the transition is unmixed progress.  This is true of 
ethical theory to a greater degree than in most fields.  Kant, for instance, in many 
ways anticipated the weaknesses of utilitarianism, while Mill’s praise of utilitarian 
thought in part comprised its avoidance of many of the counter-intuitive 
implications of deontology.  Both believed modernity to have produced a superior 
                                                 
1 See especially MacIntyre’s After Virtue and Williams’ Shame and Necessity. 
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alternative to the classical conception of ethics, and as I and others are suggesting, 
that belief is largely in error. 
 Secondly, while there have been negative aspects to how honor has been 
conceived and applied, I am convinced that this stems largely from the misuse of 
what is otherwise a crucial and valuable concept.  History has seen a myriad of 
similar cases.  From concern for the souls of the departed came the deplorable 
exploitation of indulgences; from a call for equality for the lower classes of France 
rose Robespierre and the Reign of Terror; and in more modern times—although its 
effects are perhaps not as pronounced as television dramas might suggest—from a 
concern for the rights of the accused comes the guilty being freed for purely legal 
technicalities.  That a thing may be misused does not entail its inherent lack of 
goodness, and in the case of honor, there are quite a few babies still left in the 
bathwater.  The other source of honor’s defects is conceiving of it in a fractured 
sense, rather than a unified whole.  There are four main aspects that we can identify 
as comprising honor: Pride, Integrity, Social Role, and Reputation.  When these are 
considered jointly, honor is properly understood as a type of morality.  To excise or 
forget some of these components, however, may all too easily lead to moral failing.  
Honor, then, may have need of some reform. However, much of this reform lies in 
correcting our mistaken ways of thinking about it, rather than in an alteration of the 
concept itself.  As I will go on to argue, this reform will further extend to our ideas 
about ethics in general, as the loss of a clear picture of honor has seriously injured 
our moral ideas. 
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The Scope of Ethics 
What is the extent of this injury?  To begin, modern thought has in certain 
respects divorced ethics from human life.  By this I do not mean that ethics is 
ignored—rather, it has lost its centrality.  People tend to see ethics not as 
interwoven with all that they do, but as simply one area of life among many 
possible others.  Part of the effects of this shift can be seen in education.  Colleges 
offer ethics classes which students may elect—or not—to take, and on some 
occasions, such a course might be a requirement, such as a “Business Ethics” class.  
Ethics is not the focus, however, but merely one aspect of such a course of study.  
Now, the point is not simply that we ought to require more ethical training of 
students, although that is a claim with which I would certainly agree.  The problem 
is that ethics is portrayed as merely one possible course of study, rather than as an 
essential part of what students should learn and care about.  In part this is 
unavoidable—there is, after all, a limit to what can be taught in any given time 
period or class, and thus separate courses for ethics become a necessity.  The 
danger, however, lies in the subject matter of such courses becoming perceived as 
peripheral to other concerns.  When Socrates considered whether virtue could be 
taught, his question was not whether one could present ethical issues in a formal 
setting.  He wondered whether people could be taught to be morally good in all of 
their undertakings.  Thus the problem with the sons of Pericles, Themistocles, 
Aristides, Thucydides, and other such men was likely not they had no exposure to 
ethics as a possible area of inquiry.  Rather, they viewed such inquiry as an 
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ignorable alternative to their pursuit of skill in wrestling, horseback riding, and the 
like, instead of as a necessary part of their endeavors.2       
 A poignant example of this problem in our day is offered by Harvard’s 
Robert Coles.  He describes a student who came to him in tears, finally at the 
breaking point because of callous mistreatment by her fellow students.  In relating 
their offenses, she focuses on one young man in particular, who is not only rude 
and demeaning, but has repeatedly approached her with unsolicited lewd advances:   
That guy gets all A’s.  He tells people he’s in Group I [the top academic 
category].  I’ve taken two moral-reasoning courses with him, and I’m sure 
he’s gotten A’s in both of them—and look at how he behaves with me, and 
I’m sure with others.”  
 
Her frustration and outrage with this and other students leads her to an incisive 
question:  “I’ve been taking all these philosophy courses, and we talk about what’s 
true, what’s important, what’s good.  Well, how do you teach people to be good? 
...What’s the point of knowing good, if you don’t keep trying to become a good 
person?”3  Coles initially has no answer to this question, and the disillusioned 
student soon leaves the university.  Of course, one cannot make a student care 
about ethics, any more than one can make a student care about, for instance, 
calculus or French poetry.  Notice, however, that the mere way in which that 
preceding sentence is constructed indicates a part of the problem.  Ethics is not the 
same sort of subject as calculus or French poetry.  Those and other subjects are 
areas in which one might, or might not, have an interest, and thus which one might 
decide to study.  But ethics concerns how we ought to live—which is of such 
                                                 
2 Meno 93-94. 
3 Robert Coles, “The Disparity Between Intellect and Character”  A68. 
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fundamental importance that it should be of interest to everybody.  In a very strong 
sense, we shouldn’t have to make students (or anyone else) interested in ethics.  
And yet, we do—or so it would seem.  In analyzing what has gone wrong in the 
case of the young man described above and others like him, we can see that part of 
the problem is viewing ethics as simply one more subject among others.  Just as 
calculus to an English major, or French poetry to a Business major, ethical inquiry 
may be seen as just another general education or elective subject which, as non-
essential to the student’s course of study, “I’m never going to use.”  Thus what 
seems important is not actually learning to be ethical, but simply learning various 
materials for the sake of a grade.     
 Should we say, then, that the student just didn’t care how he ought to live?  
Perhaps, although some qualifications are in order.  In a sense he did not, as 
evidenced by his failure to apply the ethical reasoning that he ostensibly learned to 
his actual behavior.  In another sense, he may have cared quite a bit, just not about 
morality.  It was clearly important enough to him to excel academically, and 
presumably the eventual results of such an ivy-league education were something 
upon which he placed a great deal of value.  Thus in his mind, the question of how 
he ought to live may well already have been answered—but answered in a way 
which excluded moral concerns either entirely, or insofar as they appeared 
irrelevant or counterproductive to the fulfillment of his own desires.  In discussing 
ethical problems with my own students, many of them will offer a statement like 
one of the following:  “Well, the right thing to do would be x, but y is what I would 
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do;” or “Well, the right thing to do would be x, but y would be the best thing to do.”  
By these admissions they are not typically engaged in a noble abdication of  
self-deception in favor of self-knowledge, nor offering an allegedly insightful 
distinction between the concepts of “right” and “best”.  Rather, the point is usually 
that if you want things to go well for yourself—in the situation in question if not in 
general—doing the right thing is often a poor strategy.     
 This sentiment, along with the related failure to be ethical, is not limited to 
education, of course, and part of the difficulty in teaching morality stems from a 
much wider problem in how it is typically viewed by modern society in general.  In 
that vein, it is not the case that formal ethics classes are the only source of our 
ethical development; certainly people form ethical views prior to and even in the 
complete absence of taking a class in such.  Students enter college with a more or 
less comprehensive set of moral beliefs, just as any typical adult possesses, student 
or not.  Generally, barring some crisis, these beliefs will not be subject to 
examination, nor still less to change.  One answer to whether the student above 
cares about ethics, then, is that he does—but under the subtext that he believes 
them to be already adequate.  After all, in many ways he excelled as a student. 
 Consider, then, a different kind of example.  During his second term of 
office, President Bill Clinton was accused of sexual impropriety with a White 
House intern.  While the charge was true, he denied it, and a large, time-consuming 
investigation ensued.  Eventually, incontrovertible evidence was discovered, and he 
was impeached for lying under oath.  During the attendant media circus it was easy 
 
 9
to be confused on the actual issue:  Was he being impeached for illicit behavior?  
Illicit behavior in the White House?   For lying under oath?  Further, a number of 
accompanying questions were raised:  Did his conduct warrant the amount of time 
being spent on the investigation, let alone impeachment proceedings?  Should he be 
impeached?  Did the President’s personal conduct truly matter in the first place?  
My point in bringing up this example is not primarily to answer most of these 
questions—excepting the final one—but to note the motivation behind many of 
them.  A common viewpoint among political pundits and lay persons alike was that 
the entire proceedings involved in this case were pointless.  The president’s 
personal behavior, it was argued, had nothing to do with whether he was a good 
leader, and as such, was entirely irrelevant to evaluating him in that role.  Most 
people were willing to say that he was in some sense a bad man—he cheated on his 
wife and lied about it.  But many people also believed that for most purposes, it 
didn’t matter what kind of man he was personally. After all, he was in many ways 
an effective president. 
 At this point, I want to raise the following question of both the student at 
Harvard and President Clinton: were they successful?  In one sense, the answer 
seems obviously to be “yes”.  The student reached the top echelon of academic 
achievement;  Bill Clinton was the President of the United States.  From at least 
one kind of standpoint, it would be implausible to say that they weren’t successful.  
In another, important sense, however, I want to suggest that these men were quite 
unsuccessful, because of a specific type of failing.  Consider first the student.   In 
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terms of his ethics classes, we might judge him successful due to having received 
‘A’s.  However, despite being able to satisfactorily explain various moral concepts 
and theories, he typically acted immorally (I am taking for granted that his behavior 
as described in Coles’ article warrants this judgment).  Thus, he arguably learned 
nothing at all.  By way of analogy, suppose that a student of drawing performed 
excellently on all of her formal exams, describing in perfect detail the method and 
techniques of various styles.  Suppose also, however, that the student was unable to 
exhibit those techniques in her own works.  We should rightly judge that she had 
not learned the techniques in question, and that she was by that standard 
unsuccessful as an artist, however apt her descriptions might be.  Whether it is 
feasible to similarly grade students in ethics classes at least in part on their behavior 
is a topic which deserves further attention.  For now, however, note that the 
problem is not simply one of earning an ‘A’ without truly learning the material.  
What should strike us as much more disturbing is that the material in question is 
moral concerns, and thus that the student exhibits a certain kind of attitude toward 
those concerns.  As such, whatever success we might ascribe to him, it is tainted 
and unworthy of pride. 
 
The Illusory Moral/Non-Moral Divide 
This view, that one’s moral standing affects the value of one’s ostensibly  
non-moral success, runs directly counter to the aforementioned claims that were 
made in light of President Clinton’s scandal.  Those claims were based upon a 
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conceptual separation between one’s performance in a given role—in this case, the 
presidency—and one’s overall moral worth.  I am suggesting that such a separation 
is a mistake.  Still further, I submit that to make a sharp distinction between moral 
and non-moral spheres of life in general is largely misguided.  Among other things, 
one question we must ask is what this distinction is supposed to be and whether it is 
ultimately sustainable.  As Williams remarks: 
It is said that we make a lot of the distinction between the moral and the 
nonmoral and emphasize the importance of the moral.  But how far, and in 
what ways, is this really true of our life, as opposed to what moralists say 
about our life?  Do we even understand what the distinction is, or how far it 
goes?  There is perhaps no single question on which an understanding of the 
Greeks can join more helpfully with our own experience.  We paralyse both 
that understanding and that reflection if simply we take it for granted that 
the distinction is at once deep, important, and self-explanatory.4 
 
Williams’ comments here relate specifically to the concept of shame (and guilt as a 
counterpart), a subject which I will address more specifically in later chapters.  
Presently, however, I want to focus on the more general notion that the domain of 
the moral cannot be so easily partitioned.  In a similar vein to Williams, Steve 
Gerrard addresses the putative distinction in “Morality and Codes of Honour.”  
After beginning with the question of what makes something specifically a moral 
issue as opposed to a nonmoral one,  he attempts his search for an answer by way 
of a contrast with codes of honor: “I consider my grand question so difficult, that I 
am going to approach it indirectly, seeing if a look at morality’s cousin, codes of 
honor, can help shed light on the real thing.”5  Now, as Gerrard acknowledges, he 
discusses one code of honor in particular, relating to the practice of dueling in the 
                                                 
4 Williams, Shame and Necessity 92. 
5 Gerrard, “Morality and Codes of Honor” 69. 
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antebellum American South.  Nevertheless, many of his observations are applicable 
to honor codes in general, and I will here discuss them as such.  More importantly, 
note the depiction of honor as perhaps a cousin of, but not really, morality.  Even 
some of its practitioners, for example, ex-governor of South Carolina John Lyde 
Wilson, “apparently saw morality and honour as distinct institutions although not 
sharply distinct institutions but ones that were perfectly consistent with each other, 
if not with law and Christianity.”6 (Wilson, Gerrard notes, was the author of The 
Code of Honor or, Rules for the Government of Principals and Seconds in 
Duelling.)  Along with the aforementioned perception of archaism, that portrayal 
also likely exemplifies a typically modern view of honor; that it is a component of 
our history which appeared and operated as something like morality, but which we 
have since wisely moved beyond.   
 In fact, however, Gerrard argues that it is not at all clear that honor and 
morality are truly different, a fact which comes out in attempting to delineate the 
boundaries of morality.  Citing W.K. Frankena’s “The Concept of Morality,”7 he 
notes four putative criteria intended to distinguish moral from non-moral action-
guides: 
(A) X takes it as prescriptive. 
(B) X universalizes it. 
(C) X regards it as definitive, final, over-riding, or supremely authoritative. 
(D) It [that is X’s action guide] includes or consists of judgments (rules, 
principles, ideals, etc.) that pronounce actions and agents to be right, 
                                                 
6 Gerrard 71.   
7 Frankena, “The Concept of Morality” 688. 
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wrong, good, bad, etc. simply because of the effect they have on the 
feelings, interests, etc. of other persons… 
 
The Southern honor code in question (and, I would add, other codes as well) satisfy 
all of these criteria.  Hence, Gerrard concludes that it “is, at least according to 
Frankena’s rather standard criteria, indistinguishable from a moral system.”8  
Further to that observation, he provides a scenario to illustrate the practical 
difficulty of trying to strongly distinguish the moral and the non-moral, based on an 
example of Amélie Rorty’s: 
“We do not just tend to our elderly parents: we do so tenderly or 
exasperatedly, respectfully or resentfully.”  I would add (and this is part of 
Rorty’s point): gracefully or clumsily, stylishly or crudely.  Some dinners 
are arranged in an artistic manner, with attention to colour and symmetry, 
and some are not.  Both dinners can be served to your invalid father; 
whether the gracefulness of the serving is included or excluded from the 
moral domain is not a question that can be answered apart from a specific 
moral theory, even though it might make all the difference in the world to 
your father how the plate is served.9 
 
He then elaborates: 
 
I want to return to my amplification of Amélie Rorty’s example.  
Remember, I pointed out that one could take care of one’s father gracefully 
or clumsily, stylishly or crudely, and I wrote that the gracefulness of serving 
dinner might make all the difference to your father.  Here is what I had in 
mind: suppose your father is undergoing chemotherapy, and finds eating 
extremely unappealing.  All the good Kantian intentions in the world, all the 
so-called moral virtues, such as courage or charity, to begin a traditional 
list, will not help your father eat unless you have enough skill, enough sense 
of style, perhaps even enough sense of humour, to make the dinner 
attractive.  On what basis do we draw the line between charity and humour, 
and call one part of the moral domain, a virtue, and call the other part of the 
non-moral domain, a talent, or even a gift?10 
 
                                                 
8 Gerrard 74. 
9 Gerrard 75; quoted text from Amélie Rorty, “Three Myths of Modern Theory.” 
10 Gerrard 83. 
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Now, there is a danger here of taking this point too far, and I do not see Gerrard as 
suggesting that there are no attributes which may be properly described as non-
moral.  Certainly it would be fallacious to conclude that the difficulty of drawing a 
distinction in some cases entails the impossibility of drawing a distinction in any 
case.  Perhaps in the example above, an argument could be made for why what 
appears to be merely (non-moral) humor and creativity are really a manifestation of 
(moral) charity and beneficence.  But that would support, rather than counter 
Gerrard’s point: the distinction between moral and non-moral is not only often 
unclear, but also largely irrelevant in terms of human excellence.  More 
importantly, the lack of a separate realm of the moral does not reduce the 
importance of morality, but reinforces it: “What we are left with is a world without 
a separable moral domain, not because morality has disappeared, but because it is 
spread out over the world, absorbed in every gesture and style.”11  There is no 
domain, no separable part of human life, where our virtue or lack thereof; our 
manner of achieving its ends, ceases to be important.   
  
The Fallacy of “Too Moral” 
Furthermore, even when the one making such a division does possess an 
appreciation for the importance of morality, the result seems inevitably to be its 
diminishment.  For instance, such a gulf between the moral and non-moral spheres 
of life is explicitly assumed by Susan Wolf in Moral Saints, where she argues that 
                                                 
11 Gerrard 84. 
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it is detrimental to human welfare to be too focused on being moral.  A moral saint, 
she claims, will be  
too good—if not too good for his own good, at least too good for his own  
well-being.  For the moral virtues, given that they are, by hypothesis, all 
present in the same individual, and to an extreme degree, are apt to crowd 
out the non-moral virtues, as well as many of the interests and personal 
characteristics that we generally think contribute to a healthy, well-rounded, 
richly developed character.12 
 
While she does concede that “this is not to say that moral value should not be an 
important, even the most important, kind of value we attend to in our world”,13 she 
states nevertheless that “our values cannot be fully comprehended on the model of 
a hierarchical system with morality at the top”.14  Now, clearly Wolf does not mean 
to suggest that at times we ought to be immoral, and in that sense her view is 
dissimilar in an important respect to the examples I have cited earlier.  She would 
presumably not, then, argue that the Harvard student would have himself suffered 
from not being demeaning and disrespectful toward others, or that Clinton’s well-
being would have been compromised had he not engaged in scandal.  Nevertheless, 
the idea that one can be too moral is problematic in at least two ways.  Its pull 
depends on a flawed (and at times, underspecified and vague) understanding of 
morality, and it lends itself to supporting the kind of destructive attitude that lies 
behind the examples above, despite not advocating such explicitly. 
 As regards the first issue, it is telling to note that when Wolf considers what 
counts as being morally perfect, she does so almost exclusively from the 
                                                 
12 Wolf, “Moral Saints” 421. 
13 Wolf 438. 
14 Wolf 438. 
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standpoints of utilitarianism and deontology, with virtue-based theories receiving 
little mention.  Some of her remarks, then, I take to show not a difficulty in being 
too moral as such, but an inadequacy of modern ethical theory in comparison to 
older traditions.  I will later discuss specific ways in which modern ethical theories 
so fail, but at present I wish to focus on the second issue.  An important difficulty 
in regarding one’s moral standing as separable from other areas of life is that it 
depends upon a fragmented view of the self.  Suppose I think that I should not be 
too moral, where “being too moral” is understood as meaning “acting morally when 
it would be to my advantage to not act morally”.  The consequence seems to be that 
I should act morally only when it is convenient—or, more generally, that I should 
avoid adhering to any ethics which could potentially modify my behavior.  Now, it 
might be objected that this is an unfair characterization of the view.  It was not to 
say that one can simply do whatever one pleases, but rather that one should not 
become so consumed with doing what is right that it renders one unable to live a 
full, rich life which includes important non-moral goods.  The problem is, to 
interpret the view in this way gives rise to the following question:  Does it matter 
how we obtain and enjoy those non-moral goods?  That is, Wolf and others are 
concerned with whether we enjoy certain things, but morality is concerned with 
how we ought to live.  Let us grant that there are many important goods for a 
human life; let us also grant, for the time being, at least, that some of these are non-
moral.  Either it matters how we use these goods, the manner and conditions in 
which we acquire them, and so forth, or we will be committed to saying that what 
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is important is simply that our lives contain them.  If the former, then we must 
admit the existence of normative standards governing the supposedly non-moral 
goods, which undermines the notion of being too moral.  If the latter, then the 
alleged tension between morality and moral goods must be a fear of simple 
exclusion.  If that is the case, however, then it seems unavoidable that the call to 
not be too moral is in fact as I “unfairly” described it above—that in many cases 
one should not be moral for the reason that doing so would interfere with the 
achievement of one’s desires. 
 And indeed, that does seem to be Wolf’s aim, to caution us against a life 
where morality dominates and so precludes our non-moral achievements.  In light 
of Gerrard’s arguments and others which will be shortly forthcoming, however, I 
think we must view this emphasis of non-moral achievements as beset with 
significant problems.  To that end, two additional quotes from Moral Saints may be 
illuminating (the following italics are mine): 
The moral point of view, we might say, is the point of view one takes up 
insofar as one takes recognition of the fact that one is just one person 
among others equally real and deserving of the good things in life as a fact 
with practical consequences, a fact the recognition of which demands 
expression in one’s actions and in the form of one’s practical deliberation.15 
 
From the moral point of view, we have reasons to want people to live lives 
that seem good from outside that point of view.  If, as I have argued, this 
means that we want people to live lives that are not morally perfect, then 
any plausible moral theory must make use of some conception of 
supererogation.16 
 
                                                 
15 Wolf 436 – 437. 
16 Wolf 438. 
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The question we should ask now is: in light of the first quote, what is the italicized 
sentence supposed to mean?  Given Wolf’s explanation of the moral point of view, 
the sentence becomes: “From the point of view that our actions and deliberations 
ought to be guided by the recognition that other people also deserve the good things 
in life, we have reasons to want people to live lives that seem good from outside 
that point of view.”  Whatever that ends up meaning, what is clear is that it serves 
to render morality itself as basically devoid of content.  What the good things in life 
are is determined in an unspecified, completely external way, and morality is 
reduced to merely the point of view—provided one elects to take it up—that one is 
not the only person to whom such goods should belong.  Aside from the problem 
that it can then offer no reason why one ought to take up that point of view, it 
would also seem to entail that there are no specifically moral goods.  “Non-moral 
goods” would be redundant on this scheme, because all goods would be non-moral.  
Morality, by contrast, would be a system of thought to which these goods are not 
essentially connected. 
In this observation we can find the beginnings of an answer to a number of 
ethical questions.  In asking why many people act immorally, it must be noted that 
such can only be expected in light of a view that ethics is just one source of value 
among others—not only one with no special status among them, but one which is 
not essentially connected to the others and may well inhibit their acquisition.  If this 
is the case, then—like the Harvard student who acted cruelly toward his peers 
while prospering academically—a person may well decide that ethical failings need 
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not detract from his value as a person.  Or, perhaps less insidiously, but harmful 
nonetheless, one may simply fail to consider that her ethical views are in need of 
scrutiny in the first place.  To return to the earlier collegiate analogy, most people 
recognize that a certain amount of mathematical knowledge is necessary to be 
successful in modern life.  After a certain threshold is reached, however, there is 
generally no need to be, say, a math major; greater knowledge may be useful for 
certain types of employment or if one simply enjoys math, but one who does not 
choose that path has no reason to expect that his general well-being will be 
threatened.  In the same way, one might believe that his ethical views are good 
enough, and focus in a largely amoral sense on other objects of desire.  To extend 
the comparison still further, just as someone who is very interested in mathematics 
may be seen as a nerd, and thus as missing out on certain important goods in human 
life, one who devotes herself too much to ethical concerns may be seen, as Wolf 
worries, to exclude herself from the enjoyment of other important values.  I would 
suggest that this view is quite common—that the ethical views of most people are 
rarely seen as being an integral part of their careers, hobbies, or other daily 
activities.  Rather, they are seen as either a set of generally minimum obligations, 
or as something often in tension with overall well-being, as my students who “think 
x is right but would do y” can attest.  If such is the case, then the explicit or implicit 
posing of the question “Why should I be moral?” is both rational and inevitable.     
 More than anything, this type of view leads to the idea that ethics can be 
separated from the rest of one’s life.  In its most extreme form, this is a conscious 
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process which results in a complete compartmentalization of values, such as 
occurred in the minds of many Nazi officers.  Less egregiously, although still 
destructive, is the effect of such a process on us in our everyday lives.  When we 
begin to believe that those lives can be sharply separated into various domains, and 
that our evaluation along one can be achieved independently of reference to the 
others, we damage not only our self-concept, but our moral capacity.  It is one and 
the same Clinton who engaged in scandal and fulfilled the role of President; one 
and the same student who prospered academically and demeaned and disparaged 
his peers.  A person is not just a collection of disparate axes of values, but a unitary 
being whose beliefs and actions not only constitute, but jointly determine, a life.  
All of those beliefs, actions, and values, then, are relevant to whether such a life is 
well-lived.   
  
Roles, Persons, and the Unity of a Life 
At this point, however, an objection must be addressed.  For we can 
imagine someone saying: ‘Even if it is true that in the cases you describe it is one 
and the same person who performs the acts in question, that does not in itself entail 
that their moral failings detracted from their other accomplishments.  For instance, 
would Clinton have been a more effective president had he not engaged in sexual 
misconduct and subsequent lying?  Would the Harvard student have been a better 
student if not for his treatment of others?  If the answer is ‘no’, then we have an 
explanation for why people—legitimately—view the different spheres of life as 
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separate.’  However, I believe that both this view and the motivation behind it rest 
on a mistake.  A strong case can be made that these individuals and others are made 
worse through their moral failings, not only in an overall sense, but in their 
particular roles.  Additionally, this fact will be due to intrinsic, not merely 
instrumental, reasons.  As aforementioned with the drawing analogy, in an 
important sense the student was very unsuccessful because he did not truly learn 
anything about the ethics he studied.  Nevertheless, while this observation is correct 
and important, it is not specific to ethics in the sense that the same point could be 
made in regard to any subject.  It is a particularly striking and ironic example due to 
the gross immorality shown by one who made ‘A’s in moral reasoning, of course.  
But we could similarly fault him for contriving to “earn” an ‘A’ in any subject in 
which he could not thereafter demonstrate proficiency.  My argument, however, is 
that there is something particular about a failure of ethics that precludes real 
success, above and beyond the mere basic failing of hollow reward for an unlearned 
subject.     
 Similarly, one could argue that the scandal with Monica Lewinsky 
negatively affected Bill Clinton’s presidency, because he was spending on 
lecherous carousing time which should have been spent presiding over the country.  
While this is of course true, it again is not specific to the wrongdoing in question.  
The president could in principle be faulted for wasting time on any number of 
activities if they prevented him from performing the duties of his office.  
Additionally, there are presumably some activities for which we would not fault 
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him even if the time could otherwise have been spent attending to matters of 
state—for instance, a certain amount of necessary leisure.  Once more, I take it that 
there is something about the actual events in question which taint his presidency.  
In that vein, there are of course actions for which he would have been convicted on 
impeachment charges—if he had, for instance, embezzled money while in office, 
then likely he would not have remained president.  Is the difference merely that one 
action is actually illegal while the other is just non-criminal sleaziness?  I do not 
think so, because it is easy to imagine a sentiment similar to one given above, that 
despite a certain amount of hypothetical criminal activity, on the whole he was still 
a good president.  And that is where our attention must turn then.  The view against 
which I am arguing seems to be the following: that one is not rendered a worse 
student, a worse president, a worse x, through being a worse person.17  Implicit to 
this view is that there are evaluative criteria upon which it is determined whether 
one has well fulfilled the purpose of a given role.  Hence, the questions which must 
be answered are then what these criteria are, and whether it is truly plausible to 
view them as operating separately from overall moral judgment.   
 In considering Clinton, then, we must ask: What is the function of a 
president?  At its most basic, the answer would seem to be that a president’s 
purpose is to ensure the well-being of a country’s citizens, to the extent that his or 
her actions are capable of bringing about that end.  A good president will act in 
ways which improve the lives of the citizens, and a bad president’s actions will 
                                                 
17 With apologies to L. Frank Baum: “Oh no, my dear; I’m really a very good Wizard—I’m just a 
very bad man, I must admit.”  Adapted from The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, 189. 
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detract from the citizens’ welfare.  Suppose, then, that one were to argue as 
follows: By having an affair, Clinton wronged his wife, brought emotional turmoil 
and humiliation to her and to his daughter, and made a disgrace of the woman 
involved.  By lying about it, he embroiled the country in a lengthy time- and 
resource-consuming investigation which inhibited the resolution of other issues, 
and furthermore diminished his own credibility, damaging his capacity to lead.  As 
such, he harmed citizens of his country both individually and collectively, acting 
directly contrary to his function.  Therefore, the scandal did indeed make him a 
worse president.  What are we to make of this argument?  I suspect that the 
objectors may not find it convincing—at least at first.  Why is that?   The type of 
worries which concerned Wolf above do not come into play.   Nor is there any sort 
of utilitarian issue—it is not as if the scandal somehow harmed a few people in 
order to ensure a greater good for the country overall.  In fact, if there is an unease 
regarding the above argument, I think the motivation has to be a feeling that I am 
somehow “cheating” by interpreting Clinton’s private indiscretions in terms of his 
public responsibilities.  After all, wasn’t that the original contention—that his 
personal life had little to do with whether or not he was a good president?  But that 
perceived separability is a mistake.  Clinton could not “turn off” his presidency so 
that only the man committed a scandal; nor likewise can any of us insulate who and 
what we are in one part of our lives from the rest of it.  The fallacious notion that 
our lives can be so neatly divided is in effect a denial of personhood; a systematic 
failure of integrity in terms of our own self-authorship.   
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 Our student likewise is not two individuals—the demeaning antagonist and 
the diligent academician—switching between their distinct domains.  He is a 
singular entity, writing the life story of one who abuses other people as he 
completes his schooling.  For this and one other reason, we can see both why 
immorality does make one a worse student, and why other types of roles which 
may initially seem problematic are in fact still susceptible to the same argument.  
The function of a student is to learn and move toward fuller mastery of various 
subjects.  However, it is important to notice that this is not the end of the story; it is 
perfectly reasonable to ask what the point of that learning is.  Presumably we take 
the learning to be valuable—but for what?  MacIntyre gives an example of a child 
who plays chess in order to win candy from his teacher: 
…so long as it is the candy alone which provides the child with a good 
reason for playing chess, the child has no reason not to cheat and every 
reason to cheat, provided he or she can do so successfully.  But, so we may 
hope, there may come a time when the child will find in those goods 
specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of 
analytic skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of 
reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a particular occasion, but for 
trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess demands.  Now if the 
child cheats, he or she will be defeating not me, but himself or herself. 
There are thus two kinds of good possibly to be gained by playing 
chess.  On the one hand there are those goods externally and contingently 
attached to chess-playing and to other practices by the accidents of social 
circumstance—in the case of the imaginary child candy, in the case of real 
adults such goods as prestige, status and money.  There are always 
alternative ways of achieving such goods, and their achievement is never to 
be had only by engaging in some particular kind of practice.18 
 
If the claim is that the student’s viciousness is irrelevant to his academic 
achievement, then we are committed to saying that the learning and knowledge 
                                                 
18 MacIntyre, After Virtue 188. 
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itself is unconnected to the human good.  That is, either: the student is essentially 
“playing for candy” with regard to his education, valuing the external good of the 
eventual degree but not the internal ones of the subjects in question.  Or, education 
itself is not related to human  
well-being, and the purpose of acquiring knowledge and understanding is not the 
improvement of self and society.  The former disjunct is assuredly true, given the 
student’s aforementioned attitude to (at least) his moral reasoning classes.  The 
latter, however, is false, and probably even absurd.  Learning and education can be 
coherently defined only in relation to the end of improved well-being.  Hence if 
there is value in the role of ‘student’, it lies in the goods internal to education, and 
entails the improved capacity to thrive as a human being.  The claim that a 
student’s immorality does not render him a worse student must also deny the 
existence of non-external goods in education. 
 But surely this isn’t true of all roles?  Even granting that presidents and 
students are such that their function is defined in relation to human welfare, aren’t 
there many others for which success can be defined independently of such 
considerations?  Part of the response to this criticism will come in the next chapter, 
after a discussion of honor as an ethics of being.  Presently, however, I note that the 
more we recognize both the unity of a life, and the extent to which its ‘moral’ and 
‘non-moral’ spheres are really intertwined, the less plausible that objection will 
seem.  The great failure of modern ethics has been the tendency to try to define 
morality in a way which renders it merely one, conceptually separable component 
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of human activity.  Unless matters of ethics are properly viewed as encompassing 
one’s entire life, and as fundamental to the value thereof, we will always face the 
problem of ethics seeming ignorable.  In an ethics of honor, such is 
incomprehensible.  As mentioned above, honor comprises pride, integrity, social 
role, and reputation, unified such that a person’s value and well-being are 
conceived in terms of his moral worthiness.  To be honorable is to reject the idea 
that a life well-lived is simply one in which an individual achieves some amorally 
evaluated desires.  It is to hold oneself to a standard of moral uprightness, both in 
desiring the right things, and in achieving those desires in the right ways.  Still 
further, it is to conceive oneself as both part of, and as partially defined by, one’s 
role within a community of persons for whom the achievement of a good life is a 
common project.  Above all, it is to cultivate within oneself a commitment to 
virtue, to take pride in a good life just insofar as one’s moral worth makes the 
achievement of happiness deserved.  To the extent that such a conception of ethics 
seems foreign to us, we live in a world without honor.  By studying past traditions 
of which we are the inheritors, however, we can—I submit—recapture a superior 
framework of ethics, happiness, and well-being.  To that end, I turn now to an 
inquiry in the domain with which ideals of honor are most readily associated: the 
ethical realm of the warrior.   
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Chapter 2: The Way of the Warrior 
 This chapter’s title is a direct translation of the Japanese word Bushido, the 
name for the code of conduct to which the samurai were bound.  These Bushi 
shared with medieval knights, the ancient Greeks, and the warriors of many other 
societies, a certain conception of what it is to be a warrior.  That is not to say that 
their codes were all identical, although there are many similarities.  Rather, it is to 
say that in all of these cases, a warrior was defined not simply by reference to his 
fighting for duty or pay, but to how he conducted himself both on and off the 
battlefield.  One who did not exemplify the right qualities in both areas was to that 
extent simply not a true warrior.  The code of a warrior, then, is a specific kind of 
ethics, and it is primarily an ethics of being.  One way in which we can understand 
this is to look at cases of failure to be a warrior—not in the sense of a non-warrior 
being incapable or unwilling to become one, but in that of an established warrior 
falling from grace.  In history and literature, through multiple societies, we find 
cases where a warrior’s ignoble deeds make it impossible for him to continue to be 
what he was.  Perhaps he has directly engaged in wickedness, or through an act of 
folly has made himself into something ridiculous.  The sanctions may come from 
society at large, or be self-imposed.  Whatever the particulars may be, each case 
stems from a common ethical core: an ethically elevated station in life prescribing 
both virtues and duties, as well as the requirements of embodying such a role. 
 This core survives today to at least some degree in the modern military.  For 
example, Mark Osiel cites an incident from the Vietnam War in which warrior 
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ethics are applied to a concrete moral dilemma.  A Marine officer who finds a 
recruit with his gun to the head of a Vietnamese woman simply tells him: “Marines 
don’t do that.”1  The charge is not for the soldier to follow an external standard of 
behavior, but to maintain himself as the thing that he is.  Osiel sees this conception 
as ethically superior to its alternatives: 
This statement is surely a simpler, more effective way of communicating 
the law of war than threatening prosecution for war crimes, by the enemy, 
an international tribunal, or an American court-martial.  Faced with a hard 
case, officers are more likely to do the right thing if they ask themselves: 
“What is required of honorable soldiers, here and now?” rather than “what 
does international law require?” or “What would the theory of justice 
require of anyone facing such a problem from behind a veil of ignorance?”  
The appeal is as much to their professional pride as to universalistic ideals.  
Martial honor “means doing nothing to tarnish that proud heritage” of one’s 
unit, regiment, or branch of service, according to a recent study of Marine 
basic training.2 
 
Shannon French, citing Osiel’s words, adds: 
A warrior’s code of the type advocated by Osiel cannot be reduced to a list 
of rules.  “Marines don’t do that” is not merely shorthand for “Marines 
don’t shoot unarmed civilians; Marines don’t rape women; Marines don’t 
leave Marines behind; Marines don’t despoil corpses,”, even though those 
firm injunctions and many others are part of what we might call the 
Marines’ Code.  What Marines internalize when they are indoctrinated into 
the culture of the Corps is an amalgam of specific regulations, general 
concepts (e.g. honor, courage, commitment, discipline, loyalty, teamwork), 
history and tradition that adds up to a coherent sense of what it is to be a 
Marine.  To remain “Semper Fidelis”, or forever faithful to the code of the 
Marine Corps is never to behave in a way that cannot be reconciled with 
that image of what it is to be a Marine.3 
 
What is suggested by this way of thinking is that a Marine—or, in a more general 
sense, a true warrior—is incompatible with moral taint.  Had the soldier in the 
                                                 
1 Osiel, Obeying Orders 23. 
2 Osiel 23 – 24. 
3 French, The Code of the Warrior 15. 
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example above not come to his senses at the admonition but killed the Vietnamese 
woman, it would not have been a case of a Marine behaving immorally—rather, it 
would have been a case of a man failing to be a Marine.  “Marines don’t do that”, 
and thus anyone who does do that is not a Marine.  Such a man would be given a 
dishonorable discharge from military service, just as warriors throughout history 
have been reduced to non-warriors, or even been driven to suicide, because of the 
shame that they brought upon themselves. 
 Medieval Japan was rife with such occurrences, where a failure of duty was 
treated with extreme gravity.  Robert Samuel relates a number of such cases, 
among them that of Sakanoue no Haruzumi.  Having encountered what appeared to 
be a group of mounted nobles, Haruzumi and his men acquiesce to their demands 
that they lower their weapons and lie down in the road—only to discover that the 
“nobles” were in fact armed brigands.  Although the thieves leave their victims 
alive, they steal all of the soldiers’ weapons, clothing, and horses, leaving 
Haruzumi and his underlings naked, defeated, and humiliated.  The text does not 
relate what sort of penalty Haruzumi might have suffered at the hand of his lord, 
but Haruzumi imposes one upon himself, feeling that “he had no choice but to 
renounce his warrior status and demote himself to a mere side-runner.”4  A more 
serious occasion, both in offense and in consequence, concerns one Taki 
Zenzaburo: 
“I was the one—no one else—who unjustifiably gave the orders to fire on 
the foreigners at Kobe and then a second time when they attempted to 
                                                 
4 Samuel, The Samurai: The Philosophy of Victory 119. 
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escape.  Because of this crime, I will disembowel myself.  I hope you will 
all do me the honor of witnessing my action.”5 
 
The foreign delegates relating the tale proceed to describe in detail how Zenzaburo 
slices open his stomach and is finally decapitated, and conclude with praise for the 
deceased: 
There was absolute silence in the hall.  The only sound that could be heard 
was the sickening gush of blood from the dead man’s crushed body, which, 
only moments before, had belonged to a courageous and dignified man.  It 
was a horrible sight.6 
 
The description of Zenzaburo as “courageous and dignified” flies in the face of the 
ignoble actions which necessitated his suicide.  Because of his willingness and 
demeanor in the face of death, his shame is lifted.  It was yet impossible for him to 
live honorably after what he had done, but through seppuku the honor of his former 
life could be restored.  Thus his death was not only punitive, but in some way also 
redemptive.  Such was not always the case, however, whether in Japan or 
elsewhere.  The Hagakure, for instance, relates the story of a thieving pageboy 
named Shozaemon who faced his impending execution calmly only until he 
realized that the executioner was not the man he had expected.  That was “the end 
of his dignified behavior, and he displayed great cowardice.”7  After being forcibly 
pinned down, he died as he lived—shamefully. 
Somewhere in between these two cases (but certainly closer to the latter) we 
find Sophocles’ Ajax.  Although he arguably does neither, he prefaces his death 
with the pronouncement that “a truly noble man must either live with honour/ Or 
                                                 
5 Samuel 78, citing Mitford’s Tales of Old Japan. 
6 Samuel 80. 
7 Samuel 132, citing the Hagakure. 
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die with honour.”8  Hence, his motives for suicide are essentially similar to 
Zenzaburo’s.  There is a common thread shared by the two men and their societies, 
and it is easy to imagine Ajax’s words above having instead been uttered by a 
samurai.  Where Ajax is more akin to Shozaemon than to Zenzaburo, however, is 
that there is no suggestion that his death is redemptive, either in his mind or those 
of his peers.  Odysseus may feel pity for him,9 and all of Greece may mourn for 
him (again, according to Odysseus),10 but there is no indication that Ajax’s status 
has been restored.  Bernard Williams sees his plight as essentially having become 
absurd, but warns that this does not entail that the problem is one merely of 
perception:  
The image of himself that led Ajax to conclude that he could not live as a 
man who had done these things is indeed founded on values that put a great 
weight on how you are seen... But what is already clear, I hope, is that it 
need not be merely some exaggerated sense of looking ridiculous, or any 
other value that turns simply on appearances, that leads someone to think 
that he or she cannot live as someone who has done a certain thing, even 
though it was done unintentionally or with an intention dissociated from a 
person’s usual self.  People do not have to think that they could not live in 
that situation; they do not have to think any such thing, and this is a type of 
thought as far removed as may be from the concerns of obligation.  But they 
may sensibly think it if their understanding of their lives and the 
significance their lives possessed for other people is such that what they did 
destroyed the only reason they had for going on.  Still more, they may 
recognise that what they unintentionally did, if it did not destroy their lives, 
changed them radically, and changed them because they did that thing, not 
just because of what happened to them.11 
 
An Ajax who slays foes in battle in service of his cause and comrades, is a mighty 
warrior.  An Ajax who slays foes in battle, helpless herdsmen, and livestock, in 
                                                 
8 Ajax 479-80.  
9 Ajax 122-126. 
10 The Odyssey Bk. XI. 
11 Williams 73 – 74. 
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service of a delusional vengeance, is a killer and a buffoon. The perception of 
others, then, while certainly negative, is not the true gravity.  He can no longer be 
what he was, but he cannot abide what he is.  Hence, there can be no Ajax. 
  
Art Thou a Knight at All? 
Perhaps surprisingly, a similar kind of tragedy befalls even the much-lauded 
Lancelot.  Popularly (and erroneously) deemed “greatest” of King Arthur’s knights, 
in the end he fails in chivalry.  Lancelot experiences two deaths—one metaphorical, 
and one literal—respectively due to separation from Guinevere, and later her death.  
No mere result of depression, these events were precipitated in large part by 
Lancelot himself. Because of his love for Guinevere, Lancelot is caught one day in 
the queen’s chambers and the two are accused of adultery and treason.12  As a 
result, a chain of events is set in motion, the culmination of which sees the end of 
Camelot.  Lancelot battles with King Arthur’s knights and makes off with the 
queen to prevent her from being burned at the stake.  Not only does this encounter 
ignite a war between Arthur and Lancelot, but during its course he slays two 
knights who were both unarmed and his own friends.  (In fact, one of the victims, 
Sir Gareth, had been knighted by Lancelot himself).  The fellowship of the Round 
Table is broken, and while Arthur leads an army across the sea to fight with 
Lancelot, his villainous son Mordred sets himself upon the throne under pretense of 
Arthur’s death.  Thus Lancelot (with Guinevere) not only causes a civil war that 
                                                 
12 Le Morte DArthur 745.  Interestingly, the text is ambiguous as to whether a tryst between them 
actually takes place at this particular point.  However, the charge was in fact accurate concerning 
their relationship in general, as they had consummated their passion on other, prior occasions. 
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ravages England, but ends King Arthur’s reign (and ultimately his life, as Arthur 
and Mordred slay each other.)13  Furthermore, his blame is compounded by the fact 
that during his quest for the Holy Grail, he had been warned of the wicked nature 
of his love for Guinevere.  Having arrived at a chapel with the Grail inside, he finds 
himself unable to enter its presence: 
And as he marvelled, he heard a voice saying, “Sir Lancelot, thou art 
unworthy, go thou hence, and withdraw thee from this holy place.”  And 
when he heard that, he was passing heavy, for he bethought him of his sins.  
...and then he called himself the wretchedest and most unhappy of all 
knights, and said, “My sin hath brought me unto great dishonour: for when I 
sought earthly honours, I achieved them ever; but now I take upon me holy 
things, my guilt doth hinder me, and shameth me; therefore I had no power 
to stir or speak when the holy blood appeared before me.”14 
 
Later, having sought out a holy man, Lancelot “confessed to him, and told him all 
his sins, and how he had fourteen years served but Queen Guinevere only, and 
forgotten God, and done great deeds of arms for her, and not for Heaven, and had 
little or nothing thanked God for the honour he had won.”15  Having repented of his 
sin, he takes an oath to avoid Guinevere’s company whenever possible.  That oath, 
of course, is soon broken—leading to the evil and destruction described above.  In 
the end, his knighthood dies along with Guinevere’s favor, as she repents of their 
role in the tragedy: 
Through this man and me hath all this war been wrought, and the death of 
the noblest knights of the world; for through our love that we have loved 
together is my most noble lord slain.  ...Therefore, Sir Launcelot, I require 
thee and beseech thee heartily, for all the love that ever was betwixt us, that 
thou never see me more in the visage; and I command thee, on God’s 
behalf, that thou forsake my company, and to thy kingdom thou turn again, 
                                                 
13 Le Morte DArthur 789. 
14 King Arthur and His Knights 294. 
15 King Arthur and His Knights 295. 
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and keep well thy realm from war and wrack; for as well as I have loved 
thee, mine heart will not serve me to see thee, for through thee and me is the 
flower of kings and knights destroyed; therefore, Sir Launcelot, go to thy 
realm, and there take thee a wife, and live with her in joy and bliss; and I 
pray thee heartily, pray for me to our Lord that I may amend my 
misliving.16 
 
Guinevere sends him away, and Lancelot instead becomes a hermit—despite being 
as powerful as he ever was, with a war-filled England in which to prove his mettle.  
The man might have remained, but the knight had nothing more to live for, because 
what he should have lived for he had already destroyed.  He betrayed his king, he 
betrayed his God, he betrayed his friends, he betrayed his own oath, entwining his 
knighthood and all his acclaim with a woman who could not be his.  He was not, in 
the end, what a knight truly is, and the loss of his false idol in Guinevere merely 
removed the last vestige of the illusion.  He does penance as a holy man, and finds 
redemption before his passing,17 but as a knight he could no longer live. 
 Other chivalric tales were similarly replete with the idea that the station of 
knight must at least in part be constituted morally.  Thus we see the sentiments of 
Sir Tristram in an adventure shared with a knight named Dinadan.  Journeying 
together, the two knights meet a series of encounters in which Tristram must 
continually upbraid Dinadan to persuade him to join the battle.  First, having 
learned of a plot by Morgan Le Fay to set thirty men in ambush to kill Sir Lancelot, 
Tristram intends to ride to their location and kill the men before they can commit 
their wicked deed.  Dinadan, however, will have none of it: 
                                                 
16 Le Morte DArthur 796 – 797. 
17 Le Morte Darthur 798 - 802. 
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“It is not possible for us to meet with thirty knights!  I will take no part in 
such a hardihood, for to match one or two or three knights is enough, but to 
match fifteen I will never assay.” 
 
“For shame,” replied Sir Tristram, “do but your part.” 
 
“That will I not”, said he; “wherefore, I pray ye, lend me your shield, for it 
is of Cornwall, and because men of that country are deemed cowards, ye are 
but little troubled as ye ride with knights to joust with.”18 
 
Tristram refuses, however, and rebukes Dinadan: 
  
“Nay,” said Sir Tristram, “I will never give my shield up for her sake who 
gave it to me; but if thou wilt not stand by me to-day I will surely slay thee; 
for I ask no more of thee than to fight one knight, and if thy heart will not 
serve thee that much, thou shalt stand by and look on me and them.” 
 
“Would God that I had never met with thee!”19 
 
So Dinadan is shamed into remaining with Tristram, and upon seeing Tristram’s 
valor, he even joins the fight himself: 
Anon they came to where the thirty knights lay waiting, and Sir Tristram 
rushed upon them, saying, “Here is one who fights for love of Lancelot!”  
Then he slew two of them at the first onset of his spear, and ten more 
swiftly after with his sword.  At that Sir Dinadan took courage, and assailed 
the others with him, till they turned and fled.20 
 
Nevertheless, Dinadan’s newfound courage is short-lived.  Having arrived at a 
castle where a knight may lodge only after jousting with two others, Dinadan 
protests Tristram’s desire to stay there, prompting another rebuke: 
 “Shame on thee!”  said Sir Tristram, “art thou a knight at all?”21 
 
                                                 
18 And in fact, just prior to this scene, Sir Bors had refused to joust with Sir Tristram, having 
believed him for that reason to be unworthy. 
19 King Arthur and his Knights 259. 
20 King Arthur and his Knights 259. 
21 King Arthur and his Knights 259. 
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Here, as in the aforementioned examples, the call to action and the moral duty is a 
function of the kind of thing that a knight is.  If Dinadan is a knight, the implication 
would be, then his decision has already been made.  To refuse is not merely to shirk 
his duty, but to fail to be a knight after all.  These considerations also inform the 
frequency in which knights were called “upon their knighthood” to aid or battle 
someone, as well as the common epithet “false” being used to describe a knight that 
was wicked.  For his part, the poor Sir Dinadan eventually manages to extricate 
himself from the company of Sir Tristram, after a rather comical scene where he 
bemoans both this and a previous, similar misfortune: 
And when Sir Tristram prayed him to fight, “I will not”, answered he, “for I 
was wounded by those thirty knights with whom we fought this morning; 
and as to you, you are in truth like one gone mad, and who would cast 
himself away!  There be but two knights in the world so mad, and the other 
is Sir Lancelot, with whom I once rode forth, who kept me evermore at 
battling so that for a quarter of a year thereafter I lay in my bed.  Heaven 
defend me again from either of your fellowships!”22 
 
So Dinadan casts his judgment upon Tristram and Lancelot.  Yet the reproof of his 
words follows soon thereafter, as Sir Tristram, joined by Sir Gawain, learns of yet 
another ambush set by Morgan le Fay, now designed to ensnare both Lancelot and 
Tristram.  Unlike Dinadan, Gawain unhesitatingly sets off to fight the would be 
ambushers (in fact, he himself suggests the course of action to Tristram) and thus 
exemplifies true chivalry.  Literarily, the real judgment falls upon Sir Dinadan, who 
chose not freedom from a madness that he supposed shared by but two men, but 
rather cowardice and a failure of knighthood.  Is he a knight at all?  In an important 
sense, that is up to him.  Later tales depict him in a more favorable light, as he is 
                                                 
22 King Arthur and his Knights 261. 
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generally brave and even spends further time in the company of Sir Tristram. At 
this point in the story, however, it would seem that he is not. 
  
The Warrior Set Apart 
Citing a first-day exercise she gives to students in her military ethics course 
at the U.S. Naval Academy, Shannon French notes the students’ own insistence on 
the distinction between a true warrior and a false one, and the passion with which 
they regard it.  Given a list of five putative synonyms for the word “warrior” 
(murderer, killer, fighter, victor, and conqueror), nearly every student rejects all 
five: “The reasons they give to account for why they wish to dismiss each of these 
as synonyms for warrior consistently stress the idea that that a true warrior has to 
be morally superior in some way to those who might qualify for the other suggested 
epithets.”23  The students take particular care to distinguish warriors from 
murderers, for whom their remarks are “filled with contempt.”24  By contrast, a 
warrior is one who—while killing if necessary—does so with “honor”, “a moral 
reason”, “a noble reason”, “when it is unavoidable”, and never with “malice” or a 
way that would “take advantage of the weak.”  Both categories fight, and perhaps 
even kill.  But where the murderer is despicable and evil, the true warrior is not 
only ethical, but set apart by his or her code of honor.  This setting apart may apply 
not only between a warrior and a mere killer or murderer, but between the warrior 
and the rest of the society:  
                                                 
23 French 1. 
24 French 2. 
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In many cases this code of honor seems to hold the warrior to a higher 
ethical standard than that required for an ordinary citizen within the general 
population of the society that the warrior serves.  The code is not imposed 
from the outside.  The warriors themselves police strict adherence to these 
standards, with violators being shamed, ostracized, or even killed by their 
peers.25 
 
The code comes from within, and is generated by the kind of being that a warrior 
is.  As such, it not only produces its own demands, but ties those demands 
inextricably to the moral sanction of its adherents. 
 An interesting modern example of such a code comes from what may at 
first seem an unlikely source—the character of Batman.  Bruce Wayne had 
dedicated his life to fighting crime after his parents were gunned down in front of 
his eyes.  As such, his heroics were motivated not only by saving others from 
suffering the same fate, but also specifically by fighting against the use of guns as a 
means of imposing one’s will.  This background informs the first episode of the 
animated series “Batman Beyond,” in which an aging Batman who suffers from 
heart problems is fighting a group of criminals who were about to kill their ransom 
victim.  During the combat, he begins to suffer a heart attack and is nearly beaten to 
death, until in desperation he grabs one of the kidnappers’ dropped guns and points 
it at his assailant.  The criminal flees and is captured by the now-arrived police, the 
kidnapped woman is freed, and all seems well.  Batman, however, has not survived.  
True, he was not killed by the criminals (and thanks to his efforts neither was their 
intended victim) and he manages to slip out a side door as the criminals are 
rounded up and order is restored.  But as Bruce takes off his mask and stares at the 
                                                 
25 French 3. 
 
 39
weapon in his hand, his expression is not of triumph, but horror.  By employing a 
gun in battle now, he has in some way become that which he hates and has sworn 
to destroy.  Faced with this truth, he drops the gun, and we can see in his visage the 
inevitable result:  the next scene sees him shutting down power to the Batcave, 
uttering the words “Never again.”26 
 This example is particularly intriguing, because in an important sense, 
Bruce has done nothing wrong.  He saved a woman’s life and subdued a group of 
criminals, all without bloodshed.  Essentially, he has done what a police officer 
would do.  In fact, Batman often works with the police, and certainly does not view 
them as morally lacking for using firearms in the service of their position.  Even a 
fatal shooting, though regrettable, would not necessarily be viewed as immoral in 
his eyes.  What, then, is the problem?  To answer this question, we will find it 
helpful to ask another: Whence comes Batman’s moral sanction?  That is to say: 
what makes it moral for a man to put on a costume and operate outside of the law, 
interfering in police business by taking it upon himself to fight criminals?  I suggest 
that Batman’s moral sanction comes from a kind of greatness.  The existence of 
Batman is justified fundamentally because the effect of his (super)heroism is 
something that the police cannot achieve.  It may be unavoidable that an officer of 
the law shoot a criminal.  But provided that it is done for the protection of the 
public good, such an act will be, though not ideal, morally permissible.  Batman, 
however, operates on a higher level.  His heroism consists not only in life-saving 
and crime-fighting, but in doing so in a way that preserves all life, and never 
                                                 
26 “Rebirth”: Batman Beyond ep. 1.  Warner Bros. Pictures, 1998. 
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depends upon the use or threat of a deadly weapon.  Unlike the police, he can live 
in the ideal, and what is morally permissible for them is unthinkable for him.  
Likewise, for Batman, the supererogatory is the obligatory.   
 Imagine, then, a Batman who continues to operate after that fateful night—
perhaps one who simply carries a gun, lest the same heart condition threaten his 
mission again.  Aside from the problem of whether he could actually pull the 
trigger if needed, the question must arise: What, now, is he?  Certainly not the Dark 
Knight.  Essentially, he would be just like another police officer, with the notable 
difference that, unlike them, he is unlicensed by the state, unsanctioned by the 
people, and unaccountable to anyone.  Now, to be sure, he was none of those things 
before, either.  But neither was he before simply replicating what a police officer 
does.  Rather, as aforementioned, he was achieving something greater.  By virtue of 
that achievement, he creates his own moral justification.  Once he is no longer 
capable of maintaining that excellence, in an important sense the moral legitimacy 
of his vigilantism vanishes as well.  A warrior may heroically operate on a higher 
level than the general populace, and the end of that service is a literal or 
metaphorical death.  In that way, we can see why Tsunetomo begins the Hagakure 
in the way that he does:  “I have found the essence of Bushido: to die!”27  A 
samurai must “die every morning in advance”28 in the knowledge that his worth 
depends on his ability to conduct himself according to his duty.  The choice for a 
samurai is between either the execution of his duty or the execution of himself.  
                                                 
27 Tsunetomo, Bushido: The way of the Samurai 13.   
28 Tsunetomo 93. 
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Even in cases where the man may go on living, such as Haruzumi’s above, the 
samurai has “died”, having lost both the ability and the right to continue to be a 
true warrior. 
 As should be clear from preceding examples, a similar conception pervades 
all of the warriors above.  What we can see in their analysis is that to a large extent, 
to fail to be a warrior is not only to lose one’s moral worth, but in many ways one’s 
worth in general, and indeed, to lose the very sense of self.  This self can be 
understood only in terms of its relationship both to other warriors and the tradition 
which surrounds them, and thus the warrior’s morality is grounded in living up to 
the demands of that tradition.  What drives a warrior’s moral life, then, is a 
particular sort of integrity—a necessity of action founded in an unwillingness to 
make of himself less than he is.  Thus the warrior possesses a singularly powerful 
answer to a question that has vexed philosophers and laymen alike: “why should I 
be moral?”  Before discussing more fully why the warrior possesses a superior 
answer, however, let us first examine why the question has been and remains so 
problematic for moral philosophy. 
  
The Challenge of Moral Justification 
We may first note that it can be intelligibly rendered in at least two ways, 
which are not necessarily equivalent.  “Why should I be moral?” and “Why should 
I be moral?” are distinct, albeit related, questions.  The first rendition springs from 
a view of morality as an external system which is essentially superimposed onto 
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one’s existence from outside.  That is, the view entails that there exists on one side 
the individual, and on the other any number of projects, values and systems—
including systems of ethics—which he or she may variously choose to incorporate 
or refrain from incorporating into him- or herself.  The task of any particular moral 
system then, is to construct itself in such a way that the individual will be disposed 
to adopt and adhere to it.  The problem, of course, is that in such a conception there 
must always be the suspicion that the individual need not adhere to the system, 
because it cannot in itself provide a sufficient reason to do so.  That is to say, the 
morality may be internally consistent (if not entirely then at least in most important 
respects), and an agent may even be predisposed to embrace the idea that human 
beings ought to act in some ways and not in others.  Those two factors are not 
necessarily enough, however, to establish either: that I should accept a particular 
scheme of values over some other, competing scheme; nor in a more specific sense 
that in this particular situation, here and now, I should continue to adhere to a 
scheme I have followed heretofore.  MacIntyre identifies the first of these concerns 
as part of a fundamental defect within contemporary ethics.  Since the 
enlightenment, he argues, moral philosophy has been concerned with an impossible 
task—that of attempting to rationally justify moral rules for a human being 
conceived of as having no essential nature.  On this view, the moral agent comes 
into the world as a blank slate, and an individual is “the real me” to be discovered 
once we have gotten underneath all the accidental contexts and relations attaching a 
person to the world and his society.29  However, he insists, this view of a human 
                                                 
29 MacIntyre 33.   
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being is not only misleading, but a core cause of why moral debate erroneously 
appears to be interminable and unjustifiable. 
 Consider first that it is unclear what reasons could be given to such a being 
to establish that he must act in a (purportedly) moral way.  Many thinkers have 
tried, of course, and MacIntyre sees them as all advancing a variation on what is 
essentially the same argument: 
1. Begin with premises regarding some feature of human nature. 
2. Identify rules of morality based on what a being with that nature could 
be expected to accept. 
Thus we see the pattern for Kant, Kierkegaard, Hume and others attempting to 
justify morality, each with a different point of origin.  Hume tried to locate the 
basis of morality in the passions, citing the impotence of reason to motivate action.  
Kant abjured the passions for their contingent character, looking to reason to be 
universally binding.  Kierkegaard, likewise, saw a failure in both passion and 
reason to provide the requisite basis, and sought to locate it in a mere act of choice 
in the individual.30  As MacIntyre notes, “the vindication of each position was 
made to rest in crucial part upon the failure of the other two, and the sum total of 
the effective criticism of each position by the others turned out to be the failure of 
all.”31  He goes on to argue that they had to fail because they were all indebted to a 
line of thinking which had given up the notion that ethics is goal-based: 
the general form of the moral scheme which was the historical ancestor of 
both conceptions... is that which Aristotle analyzed in the Nicomachean 
                                                 
30 MacIntyre, esp. chapter. 4. 
31 MacIntyre 49 – 50. 
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Ethics.  Within that teleological scheme there is a fundamental contrast 
between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-
his-essential-nature.  Ethics is the science which allows men to transition 
from the former state to the latter.  Ethics therefore in this scheme 
presupposes some account of potentiality and act, some account of the 
essence of man as a rational animal and above all some account of the 
human telos.  The precepts which enjoin the various virtues and prohibit the 
vices which are their counterparts instruct us how to move from potentiality 
to act, how to realize our true nature and to reach our true end.  To defy 
them will be to be frustrated and incomplete, to fail to achieve that goal of 
rational happiness which it is peculiarly ours as a species to pursue.  The 
desires and emotions which we possess are to be put in order and educated 
by the use of such precepts and by the cultivation of those habits of action 
which the study of ethics prescribes; reason instructs us both as to what our 
true end is and as to how to reach it.  ...Each of the three elements of the 
scheme—the conception of untutored human nature, the conception of the 
precepts of rational ethics and the conception of human-nature-as-it-could-
be-if-it-realized-its-telos—requires reference to the other two if its status 
and function are to be intelligible.32 
 
Having lost one part of this conception, MacIntyre argues, the resulting moral 
conceptions could not any longer be intelligible.  If there is no essential human 
telos, then ethics cannot be seen as transformative in the way that it had been.  Thus 
in the way that I have stated before, ethics must come to be conceived as something 
external to a human being, and no ultimate reason can be given for me to accept 
ethical precepts.  As long as the view prevails that nothing of what a human being 
ought to do can be derived from what a human being is, the attempt to justify rules 





                                                 




MacIntyre’s proposed remedy for this failure—the rejection of the “no ought from 
is” principle and a return to the conception of ‘human being’ as a functional 
concept—is precisely what a warrior ethics encompasses.  What a warrior 
possesses, and what most modern systems of ethics lack, is a sense of moral 
identity.  To be a warrior is a source of both moral duty and self-worth.  The two 
are intertwined and inextricable, which means also that the concept of a good life 
for a warrior is intrinsically concerned with a morally good life.  The chief problem 
with ethics that I identified in the previous chapter was the separability of ethics 
from human identity.  The mistreated college student’s lament that her classmate 
had learned about ethics without becoming ethical was just of that sort.  That 
callous young man undoubtedly conceived of himself just as MacIntyre argues is 
the inevitable result of post-virtue ethics: as an individual with no inherently 
defining attachments, and for whom ethical considerations connect in no essential 
way to happiness or success.  My argument against that student’s view of self 
depended on the understanding of the function of a student, and the connection of 
that role to human welfare.  A warrior, likewise, could not coherently have such a 
conception, because the notion of a good warrior is inherently both functional and 
constitutive of identity.  As such, the question of why one should be moral also 
cannot arise—morality for the warrior is the process by which one achieves the true 
greatness of the kind of being that he is.   
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Let us revisit our marine from the beginning of the chapter.  Osiel and 
French assert that reminding him of what marines do and do not do is more 
effective a moral injunction than other sorts of ethical appeals, and we are now in a 
position to see why.  He may rationally question whether, here and now, he should 
accept a putative demand of morality—especially if, as MacIntyre claims, 
contemporary ethics must ultimately terminate in unjustified assertion of 
preference—but he cannot in the same way ask whether he ought to live a 
worthwhile life.  What it is to be a warrior is inseparable from what it is to be a 
good warrior, and what it is to be a good warrior is constituted in large part by the 
embodiment of virtues necessary to be worthy of martial power.  Our marine’s 
identity thus includes the notion of the thing that he is as a source of value.  To 
reject morality, then, is to reject that value, and to fail to meet the ideals of his role 
is in an important sense to destroy his very being, as we have seen with Ajax, 
Batman, Shozaemon, and other such examples above.  As long as ethics are 
external to what a person is, then the case in which one finds himself may always 
be the competing maxims for which no truly rational proof is deducible; the split of 
incommensurable sources of utility for which no ultimate preference can be 
justified; the act of mere choice for which no non-arbitrary rationale can be given.  
An internal ethics, however, which connects integrity with identity and moral worth 
with self-worth renders the question of whether one ought to be moral 
unintelligible.  Warrior ethics, then, connect what one ought to do intrinsically with 
what one is, and this particular type of integrity is the first component of honor.  
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The other components, as well as a more general application of this type of ethics 
(i.e. to realms aside from that of warriors per se) shall follow later.  First, however, 
I want to discuss some specific aspects of many martial codes, and discuss why 
they are independently worthy of emulation. 
 For at this point it may be objected: “You have argued that an ethics of 
honor is superior in that it possesses greater motivating power than types of ethics 
which you call ‘external’.  That may be so, but in grounding ethical motivation in a 
certain kind of identity, couldn’t this be applied equally to identities which we 
would deem thoroughly immoral?  Rather than the picture you are drawing of the 
‘ideal warrior’, could one not specify conditions for being a terrorist, say, or a 
philanderer, and derive “moral” strictures from what it means to be that sort of 
thing as well?  Instead of stories of knights and samurai, could not one just as easily 
seek to emulate the mobsters in The Godfather?”  This objection is answerable, 
however, and part of that answer relates to an aspect of warrior codes which at first 
seems paradoxical.  I will later argue that we all are—or should be—‘warriors’ in a 
certain morally relevant sense.  For now, however, I will begin by pointing out that 
the objection has force only if each of the roles involved is conceived as 
intrinsically of equal value.  But why think that is so?  We can see the 
implausibility of this claim by way of a kind of analogy.  In Norton Juster’s classic 
story The Phantom Tollbooth, protagonist Milo and his friends Tock and the 
Humbug must journey through the lands of Ignorance to rescue the imprisoned 
princesses Rhyme and Reason.  Seeking to bar their way are the numerous demons 
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of ignorance, among them the Terrible Trivium—an initially friendly-seeming 
fellow who asks the three companions for assistance: 
“Firstly, I would like to move this pile from here to there,” he 
explained, pointing to an enormous mound of fine sand, “but I’m afraid that 
all I have are these tiny tweezers.”  And he gave them to Milo, who 
immediately began transporting one grain at a time.   
“Secondly, I would like to empty this well and fill the other; but I 
have no bucket, so you’ll have to use this eye dropper.”  And he handed it 
to Tock, who undertook at once to carry one drop at a time from well to 
well.   
“And lastly, I must have a hole through this cliff, and here is a 
needle to dig it.”  The eager Humbug quickly set to work picking at the 
solid granite wall.33 
 
Eventually, however, Milo begins to feel uneasy about the tasks, and expresses his 
concerns to the Trivium:    
“Pardon me,” he said, tugging at the man’s sleeve and holding the 
sheet of figures up for him to see, “but it’s going to take eight hundred and 
thirty-seven years to do these jobs.” 
 “Is that so?” replied the man, without even turning around.  “Well, 
you’d better get on with it then.” 
 “But it hardly seems worthwhile,” said Milo softly. 
 “WORTHWHILE!” The man roared indignantly. 
 “All I meant was that perhaps it isn’t too important,” Milo repeated, 
trying not to be impolite. 
 “Of course it’s not important,” he snarled angrily.  “I wouldn’t have 
asked you to do it if I thought it was important.”  And now, as he turned to 
face them, he didn’t seem quite so pleasant. 
 “Then why bother?” asked Tock, whose alarm suddenly began to 
ring.34 
 
The interest of this scene lies in the fact that, perceptively, Juster does not have the 
Terrible Trivium try to persuade his interlocutors that yes, in fact, the tasks are 
worth doing.  The demon unabashedly admits that they are not worthwhile, the 
reason being most probably because no one could possibly believe that they were.  
                                                 
33 Juster, The Phantom Tollbooth 209 – 210. 
34 The Phantom Tollbooth  212. 
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Simply stated, there are limits on what anyone could believe is a good use of time.  
It is a similar sentiment, then, that we find behind a comment by Foot in Natural 
Goodness.  Arguing against strong subjectivism in ethics, she writes: 
Thus these early theories were radically subjectivist, allowing the 
possibility even of bizarre so-called ‘moral judgements’ about the 
wrongness of running around trees right-handed or looking at hedgehogs in 
the light of the moon, and so opening up limitless possibilities of 
irresolvable moral conflict.  Nowadays it is commonly admitted, I believe, 
that there is some content restriction on what can intelligibly be said to be a 
system of morality.35 
 
The putative dictates of morality are not just arbitrary commands or proscriptions 
on action; they must be at least believed to pertain in some fashion to human life 
and welfare.  Hence, a crucial dimension of the question whether just any role 
could be the basis for a moral identity, is that it depends upon the concept of a 
whole life characterized and constituted by a certain kind of activity.  Now, to be 
fair, the injunctions Foot mentioned could serve as legitimate moral commands—
but only as part of a larger system which was itself meaningful, not by themselves.  
For example, a people who believed that to view a hedgehog by moonlight was 
offensive to the spirits of nature and therefore liable to endanger the success of its 
farmers, might well produce “Do not look at hedgehogs by the light of the moon” 
as a moral stricture, and possibly have people whose duty it was to ensure that no 
one did so.  Such could potentially be a source of moral identity and motivation 
because it is defined by a connection to human and communal well-being, whether 
or not there are really any spirits of nature, hedgehog-sensitive ones or otherwise.  
That is, “Guardian of the Crops” could be an identity in a way that  
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“Moon-illuminated-hedgehog Concealer” could not be—even if in a practical sense, 
the two roles were in fact equivalent. 
 This observation is significant for two reasons.  First, as exemplified above, 
there are some kinds of lives for which no real value could possibly be believed.  
The only appeal the Trivium makes for the life that he offers is based upon ease—
as mentioned, there is no claim of any intrinsic worth to the tasks involved.   
“But why do only unimportant things?” asked Milo, who suddenly 
remembered how much time he spent each day doing them.   
“Think of all the trouble it saves,” the man explained, and his face 
looked as if he’d be grinning an evil grin—if he could grin at all.  “If you 
only do the easy and useless jobs, you’ll never have to worry about the 
important ones which are so difficult.  You just won’t have the time.  
…Why, if you stay here, you’ll never have to think again—and with a little 
practice you can become a monster of habit, too.”36 
 
To choose that sort of a life, then, would be to consciously define oneself in terms 
of what is fundamentally and obviously worthless.  While at a particular moment it 
might seem tempting to just do something mindless and unimportant, one would 
never aspire to live a life which was characterized by pointless activity.  Viewed in 
that way, the question becomes: ‘What is a good life for human beings?’, and there 
are clearly limits on what the answer could be.  Furthermore, insofar as some types 
of lives are constituted by worthlessness, it is also possible to be mistaken in the 
value that we attribute to certain lives.  The classic example is of course Plato’s 
allegory of the cave, and the feature of it on which I want to focus right now is the 
former cave-dweller who has since been freed: 
And if there had been honors, praises, or prizes among them for the 
one who was sharpest at identifying the shadows as they passed by and who 
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best remembered which usually came earlier, which later, and which 
simultaneously, and who could thus best divine the future, do you think that 
our man would desire these rewards or envy those among the prisoners who 
were honored and held power?  Instead, wouldn’t he feel, with Homer, that 
he’d much prefer to “work the earth as a serf to another, one without 
possessions,” and go through any sufferings, rather than share their opinions 
and live as they do? 
 I suppose he would rather suffer anything than live like that.37 
 
Glaucon basically takes the point for granted, but I think it is important to note why 
it is the case.  Once the truth about the cave has been learned, no amount of 
potential acclaim and rewards could entice someone to return, because shadow-
guessing is no longer something in which one can take pride.  That is to say, it is 
seen to express no real excellence in light of true human potential.  Remember that 
the objection above concerned moral motivation and whether just any specified 
identity could theoretically provide it.  By now I think it is clear that some cannot.  
In order for a role to motivate action in this way, it must be seen as comprising a 
kind of life that is itself worthwhile.  Some roles obviously do not do so—it might 
be possible to specify the conditions for being a maximally proficient “Carrier of 
Grains with Tweezers,” but such could never  also seem a potentially good 
description of what I am.  Further to that point, there are some kinds of identities, 
like “Shadow-Guesser,” which we cannot continue to view as doing so once we can 
see them clearly. 
 It is in these categories, then, that I place the examples given above.  To be 
a philanderer could be said to require some measure of skill, i.e. successfully lying 
to many women in order to lie with many women.  But the effort involved is no 
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assurance of significance (as we have seen with the Trivium’s tasks), nor is it proof 
against the essential hollowness of a life based on dishonesty and animal urges.  
Someone may indeed become caught up in such a life, but viewed as a whole, to 
say “This is the defining attribute of my existence; my worth is expressed through 
deception and copulation” must ultimately seem absurd.   
 Terrorists are a more complicated case—they seem to share similarities 
with warriors, and are even typically motivated by a cause.  However, as French 
argues, while there are of course those who engage in terrorism and perhaps take 
pride in terrorist activities, they do not do so while conceiving of themselves as 
terrorists:   
The second part of my “Why are you different from a terrorist?” assignment 
required my students to try to get inside the heads of those who commit 
terrorist acts.  It forced them to consider how easy it might be to rationalize 
crossing the line between warrior and murderer in the interest of what you 
believe to be a noble cause.  As most of them recognized, terrorists do not 
see themselves as murderers.  They believe that they are warriors.  They 
often consider themselves “freedom fighters”, struggling against those they 
have dubbed their “oppressors.”38   
 
Hence, “terrorist” is not itself a model of aspiration and motivation; those who are 
terrorists undoubtedly portray themselves as something else.  Like any other role 
which is taken as a putative defining identity for a person, I am representing to 
myself and others that what I am is a mode of human flourishing; that the things I 
do are indicative of a well-lived life.  But if this representation is itself dependent 
upon beliefs about the world—and it cannot help but be—then we can intelligibly 
ask whether I am correct or mistaken in those judgments.  For instance, it is a 
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question of fact whether the people I kill are actually oppressing anyone or are 
uninvolved civilians.  If my killing is religiously motivated, it is a question of fact 
not only whether God exists but also whether I or my leaders are correctly 
interpreting scripture.  It is even a question of fact whether my cause is noble 
insofar as my means of bringing it about may or may not include purposely killing 
the innocent.  French goes on to argue that what distinguishes a terrorist from a true 
warrior is restraint and a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets of 
violence: 
The essential element of a warrior’s code is that it must set definite limits 
on what warriors can and cannot do if they want to continue to be regarded 
as warriors, not murderers or cowards.  For the warrior who has such a 
code, certain actions remain unthinkable, even in the most dire of 
circumstances.  …However they may justify their actions to themselves, if 
they refuse to accept any rules of war, they forfeit the right to be regarded as 
warriors by the rest of the world.39 
 
Terrorist qua terrorist is not and cannot be a source of moral identity, in the sense 
that “killer of the truly innocent for ignoble causes” cannot be a source of moral 
motivation.  As I have been arguing, those who are terrorists fail to see themselves 
as they really are, and if they did see themselves correctly, they would not continue 
to view such actions as a source of pride.  Furthermore, they fail to be warriors, and 
fail to exhibit true honor, by failing to discriminate between combatants and non-
combatants.   
 What about the example of The Godfather, then?  In a sense it is the most 
difficult of the three, because not only do the mobsters follow at least a semblance 
of a code, they also do seem to operate under a conception of acceptable and 
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unacceptable targets of violence.  For example, when Sonny wants to send 
bodyguards to protect Michael on his trip into the city, Clemenza suggests that 
there’s no need: “He’ll be all right, Solozzo knows he’s a civilian.”40  (This 
designation clearly denotes not the usual meaning of non-military, since Michael 
had been in the army, but specifically that he is a non-combatant in the gang wars.)  
A later scene also has Vito Corleone note that: “I’ve spent my life trying not to be 
careless.  Women and children can be careless, but not men,” implying that women 
and children do not face the threat of attack.41  Nevertheless, these are largely 
surface appearances.  Aside from the numerous betrayals and backstabbings within 
the families themselves, by its nature mob activity involves violence or the threat of 
violence directed against non-combatant targets.  The different mob families may 
indeed distinguish between “civilian” and bellicose members of each group in their 
wars with each other.  However, through protection rackets, intimidation, and so 
forth, they necessarily sustain their livelihoods by intentionally targeting civilians.  
In a significant way, then, the code is something of a sham.  Additionally, the 
movie illustrates nothing so much as the undesirability of the type of life its 
characters live, even from the point of view of the characters themselves.   
Two telling scenes in this regard come near the very beginning of the 
movie, and the very end.  The latter focuses on the now-retired Vito Corleone, as 
he sits and talks with son Michael about his new role as head of the family.  He 
intersperses smiling questions about how Michael’s wife and children are doing, 
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with serious warnings and plans about rival Barzini’s likely imminent attempt to 
assassinate Michael.  Finally, he can no longer conceal his distress from Michael, 
who mistakenly interprets it as mere concern for his ability and safety: 
“What’s the matter?  What’s bothering you?  I’ll handle it.  I told you I can 
handle it, I’ll handle it.” 
 
“I knew that Santino was gonna have to go through all this, and Fredo, 
well—Fredo was—but I never—I never wanted this for you.  I worked my 
whole life—I don’t apologize—to take care of my family.  And I refused to 
be a fool, dancing on a string held by all those—big shots.  I don’t 
apologize, that’s my life, but I thought that, well, when it was your time, 
that, that you would be the one to hold the strings.  “Senator Corleone,” 
“Governor Corleone,” or something…  There just wasn’t enough time, 
Michael.  There wasn’t enough time.” 
 
“We’ll get there, Pop.  We’ll get there.”42 
 
But of course, they don’t get there, and despite Vito’s assertion that he hasn’t 
danced on a string, it is clear that he really has, and now Michael will too.  The type 
of life now facing him is not choiceworthy even from the standpoint of one who 
has lived it.  In Michael’s case, it is a burden that has already cost him a brother, a 
wife, friends, peace, and perhaps most significantly, the man that he used to be.  
One of the first scenes of the movie sees him reluctantly relate to his fiancée, Kay, 
a story about his father’s criminal intimidation, followed by the assurance that 
“That’s my family, Kay.  It’s not me.”43  By the last scene, however, he lies to Kay 
(now his wife) about having had people killed, is the new head of the Corleone 
crime syndicate, and is perhaps an even worse criminal than his father was.  The 
time in between shows his transformation, but one has to wonder what his reaction 
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would be if the Michael from the beginning of the movie could see him as he is 
now.  Kay makes reference to that man when she tells him: “But you’re not like 
him, Michael.  I thought you weren’t going to become a man like your father.  
That’s what you told me.”44 It is not just that Michael has become corrupted; he is 
like one who went from the light to be shackled down in the cave.  As Epictetus 
says of Paris: 
Did Paris’ tragedy lie in the Greeks’ attack on Troy, when his brothers 
began to be slaughtered?   No; no one is undone by the actions of others.  
That was the destruction of storks’ nests.  His tragedy lay in the loss of the 
man who was honest, decent, trustworthy, and respectful of the laws of 
hospitality.45 
 
Even if we view the other losses as genuine losses (departing from the Stoic view 
in that regard) it is easy to see the truth of Epictetus’ main point.  When Vito 
expresses his wish that Michael not have to enter the gangster life, it is all the more 
tragic because its detrimental nature is something that Michael himself had 
previously been able to recognize.  He is a more effective gangster now, but that 
role is akin to terrorists, philanderers, hedgehog concealers, and the like.  To select 
such an inferior role is to forsake human good and to condemn oneself in an 
important way to worthlessness.  By contrast, identities which are legitimate 
sources of moral duty and worth are those which reflect the true potential of a 
human life well-lived.  An ethics of honor is one which recognizes the greatness of 
what a human being might yet be; requires the agent to realize that end; and 
provides the framework for its realization. 
                                                 
44 The Godfather scene 17. 
45 Discourses Book I, Ch. 28, Sec. 2. 
 
 57
 This object is what informs and justifies the aforementioned “paradoxical” 
feature of most warrior codes—a commitment to fairness in battle and various rules 
of combat whereby the warrior would risk defeat by ceding a procured advantage.  
The most common type of example in Arthurian tales is the numerous occasions 
where a knight who has unhorsed an opponent would subsequently dismount 
himself, rather than fight from the advantage of horseback.  Other cases see a 
knight refusing a potential victory secured by accident, or even refusing to fight 
entirely against an opponent who is weary from other exertions.  When Prince 
Galahalt unintentionally beheads Sir Palomides’ horse, he not only ceases their 
combat but gives Palomides his own horse instead.46  Sir Tristram protests King 
Mark’s charge that he joust with Sir Lamorak, because  
...it were great shame and villainy to tempt him anymore at this time, 
insomuch as he and his horse are weary both; for the deeds of arms that he 
hath done this day, an they be well considered, it were enough for Sir 
Launcelot du Lake... ye bid me do a thing that is against knighthood, and 
well can I deem that I shall give him a fall, for it is no mastery, for my horse 
and I be fresh both, and so is not his horse and he; and wit ye well that he 
will take it for great unkindness, for ever one good knight is loath to take 
another at disadvantage...47 
 
When King Mark will not relent, Tristram follows his command, but afterward 
begs forgiveness from Lamorak and refuses to continue the battle on foot: 
I will not have more ado with thee, for I have done to thee over much unto 
my dishonour and thy worship.  ...and this that I have done to you was 
against my will, but I was required thereto; but to say that I will do at your 
request at this time, I will have no more ado with you, for me shameth of 
that I have done.48 
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The point of such examples is that victory is not the only point of combat—and 
mere victory is not the point at all.  An honorable battle not only tests mettle and 
prowess but reflects the worth of one’s opponent as a fellow practitioner of martial 
virtue.  A similar example is found in Japanese literature, at once as enlightening as 
it is startling.  Recounting a scene from Chikamatsu’s Tethered Steed and the Eight 
Provinces of Kanto, Gerstle writes: “Though Yoshikado is a “court enemy”, he is 
not painted as evil.  Men face each other in battle as matters of fate or chance.  
Later in act four when Yoshikado is captured, Yorimitsu sparingly frees him so 
they may fight again.”49  Another warrior, even an adversary, is a source of value 
no different than oneself, and hence is due the consideration attendant to that value.  
Still further, to be a warrior is not to pursue victory as such, but to restrict one’s 
wielding of power in such a manner that it recognizes that value.  The integrity of 
honor requires a moral excellence derived from the conception that both those for 
whom and against whom one fights are sources of worth in their own right.  The 
role of the warrior then is transformative in its adherents, reflecting in them and in 
others the movement from potential to actual human greatness.  To the specifics of 
this transformation, and further aspects of its application to ethics at large, I now 
turn.   
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Chapter 3: Might and Right 
 According to the author of the Hagakure, “Most of the samurais today say, 
‘It is useless,’ or ‘It is not meritorious to cut bound men,’ or ‘It is foul and dirty.’”1  
Tsunetomo goes on to criticize these sentiments, charging that  
These are all excuses.  In short, it would appear that their real intention is to 
polish their nails and keep respectability, but the truth is that they fall short 
of the practice of the military profession.  If we inquire into their 
disposition, we see that they make excuses not to kill by hiding behind a 
cloak of words.  The reason they do this is that they expect they will feel 
uneasy at the deed.  Because it is a thing for samurais to do, Naoshige 
coached his son.  I, myself, some years ago, cut at the execution grounds at 
Kase.  And I felt comfortable and enlivened.  Thinking of it as 
uncomfortable is just a symptom of inner cowardice.2 
 
In the previous chapter, I advanced the view that a warrior’s honor proceeded 
largely from his identity as a warrior, and that this conception generated a particular 
type of integrity.  However, the above passage highlights a potential difficulty with 
that view.  Namely, can a coherent picture be drawn of what a warrior is?  Or are 
we left rather with various competing conceptions of what one is (or ought to be)?  
Tsunetomo also depicts the true samurai as devoted to the military arts alone, 
asserting that “Those who are skilled in even a single art (gei) are to be termed as 
geisha, not samurai.  …It is not until you realize that arts and crafts of any kind are 
harmful to samurai that you can make the most of skills and abilities that you 
acquire.”3  But contrast these words with those of Musashi—considered by many to 
be the greatest swordsman that ever lived—that a samurai should “cultivate a wide 
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range of interests in the arts”4 and that “It is the warrior’s way to follow the paths 
of both the sword and the brush.”5 Is refusing to cut a bound man a noble mark of 
prowess and respect for one’s opponents, or a shameful rationalization of 
cowardice?  Are cunning and deception a part of a warrior’s arsenal, as Odysseus 
would charge?  Or do the truly great echo Neoptolemus in the conviction that it is 
better “to fail with honor than win by treachery?”6  For integrity to connect with 
identity in a morally relevant way as I propose, there must be a clear idea of what a 
warrior is, including what behaviors and attributes are or are not worthy of him.  
The question, then, is whether we can justifiably make such a claim—and, in a 
related sense, whether and how we can address disputes of conception.  I argue that 
we can, and I will advance that position in three primary ways.  First, a depiction of 
competing values does not entail that the author is portraying such conflict as 
irresolvable.  Cases in which a particular author seems to present contradictory 
pictures of the ideal warrior may actually be consistent when properly understood.  
Second, discrepancies between multiple authors must be viewed in light of the 
social realities informing their positions.  This context often reveals the underlying 
similarity between conceptions which may initially seem quite different.  Third, the 
related problem in virtue ethics of conflicting virtues helps to illustrate the 
coherence of warrior identities.  Not only do many putative dilemmas either 
dissolve or admit of a third way out, but even irresolvable dilemmas do not entail 
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the impossibility of full virtue, nor that of warrior excellence.  As we shall see, it is 
indeed possible to paint a consistent picture of what it means to be an ideal warrior. 
 Bouchard, writing of knights and chivalry, argues that we cannot.  Nor, she 
writes, is this merely a question of fiction versus reality.  Historians and laymen 
alike may be tempted to ask whether historical knights really followed the code of 
chivalry as they do in stories.  In her estimation, however, that very question is 
misguided because it depends on an erroneous assumption that there was a single 
code of chivalry for the historical knights hypothetically to have followed: 
It is, after all, fairly obvious that the real life of real aristocrats was quite 
different from that of the heroes of epic and romance.  What is not obvious 
is the underlying assumption that there was a single ideal to which reality 
may be compared.  It seems clear, by contrast, not only that there was no 
“real” code of behavior to which all knights and nobles adhered but also 
that there was no single “ideal” of chivalry.  ...what chivalric literature 
reveals most clearly are a host of contradictions and opposing goals.  It was 
truly impossible to be fully chivalrous, even for the glorious heroes of the 
romances.7 
 
We should understand the authors of these romances and other tales, she argues, as 
intentionally painting an incongruent picture of chivalry.  Their aim was to examine 
and expose inconsistencies within the various pictures held up of knighthood; it 
would be a mistake to view either the fiction or the reality of knightly conduct as an 
agreed upon, homogenous institution: 
It is vital to read the literature with the knowledge that the authors were 
quite deliberately indicating tensions and conflicts within even the most 
idealized vision of chivalry.  If at different times the same author holds 
quite different behaviors up as models, one should not simply assume that 
all these behaviors or attributes may be reconciled into a single vision of 
chivalry, but should look for the author’s indication—usually quite 
                                                 




explicit—that there were deep contradictions there.  The authors of the 
romances were not so much describing or even creating a single ideal to 
which their readers might measure up, as critiquing the idea that such an 
ideal was feasible.8 
 
In contrast, I will argue that she overstates the degree of conflict between various 
knightly virtues.  While she is correct in saying that literary authors were 
challenging and exposing tensions within ideals of chivalry (whether the fictional 
version or any historical ones), that does not entail that they were portraying those 
conflicts as essentially irresolvable, nor a consistent ideal of chivalry as 
unachievable. 
 
A Parallel to Virtue Ethics 
 Before examining some of the stories she cites as evidence, however, notice 
that there is an important assumption which motivates Bouchard’s claim: that the 
existence of such tensions is incompatible with a unified concept of chivalry.  But 
is this assumption in fact justified?  Any ethical theory must face cases in which its 
precepts seem to clash.  In virtue ethics specifically, we may ask: (a) Can different 
virtues conflict with each other?  (b) If the answer to (a) is “yes,” does this 
constitute a fatal defect for Virtue Ethics in terms of either its ability to provide 
action guidance or, more generally, its viability as a whole?  One reason for 
thinking that an affirmative answer to (b) must proceed from an affirmative answer 
to (a) is that if the virtues can be at odds with each other, it would seem to preclude 
the possibility of a fully virtuous agent (or, more strongly, the possibility that ‘fully 
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virtuous’ is a coherent concept).  No one could act ‘as the virtuous person would,’ 
because to do so would be to face the impossible task of acting from competing and 
jointly unrealizable character traits.  Hence, the argument would go, we would 
seemingly have to either: argue that the virtues cannot conflict; develop a  
non-arbitrary reason why one virtue could be ignored in the face of another (along 
with a decision procedure for doing so?); or conclude that full virtue is simply 
impossible.  Thus Bouchard’s argument against the possibility of a coherent ideal 
of chivalry is similar to an objection to virtue ethics considered by Rosalind 
Hursthouse: 
‘The requirements of different virtues,’ it is said, ‘can point us in conflicting 
directions.  Charity prompts me to kill the person who would (truly) be 
better off dead, but justice forbids it; so virtue ethics fails to give me any 
action guidance over the rightness or wrongness of euthanasia.  Honesty 
points to telling the hurtful, even devastating, truth, kindness and 
compassion to remaining silent or even lying; so virtue ethics fails to give 
any guidance to, for example, doctors, over whether they should or should 
not sometimes lie to their patients.  And so on.  So virtue ethics lets us 
down just at the point where we need it most, where we are faced with the 
really difficult moral quandaries and do not know what to do.’9 
 
A more specific version of the same problem arises in relation to tragic dilemmas, 
which seem to call into question the coherence of possessing all the virtues: 
Our supposedly virtuous agent is faced with a tragic dilemma.  She acts, for 
act she must, and whatever she does is wrong, impermissible; she can only 
emerge from the situation with dirty hands.  But then, how can we call her 
virtuous without contradiction?  There was, perhaps, always a slight 
suspicion that the very idea of a virtuous agent was an idealization; now we 
see that it is an impossibility.  If there are tragic dilemmas, there cannot be 
such a thing as a virtuous agent.10 
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The charge then is that the possession of full virtue is an impossible ideal—not 
merely in the weaker sense of being too perfect for anyone to realistically achieve, 
but the strong sense of containing an inherent logical inconsistency.    
  
Love and Honor in Chrétien’s Romances 
It is this same charge which Bouchard levels against knighthood as 
portrayed in medieval literature.  Chrétien de Troyes serves as her paradigm 
example that  
The creators of the medieval vision of chivalry, the authors of the romances, 
far from describing a single clear ideal, wrote their stories to indicate that 
even the most chivalrous hero would be trapped between conflicting 
ideals.11 
 
Chrétien, she argues, was purposely portraying these ideals as incompatible, such 
that 
Scholars trying to extract a chivalric code from the romances of Chrétien de 
Troyes, for example, might take the attribute of loyalty from one tale, of 
mercy from another, of generosity from a third, and of gracious love for 
ladies from a fourth, in the assumption that one can put them all together to 
create Chretien’s ideal knight.  But this procedure does violence to the very 
variety Chrétien so artfully put in his characters.12 
 
However, while she correctly notes that a conflict between love and honor is a 
common thread throughout Chrétien’s works, her interpretation of Chrétien’s 
motives and messages is in many ways suspect.  Referencing his The Knight of the 
Cart (Lancelot), she postulates:  
Here honor and love were even more irreconcilable than in “Erec and 
Enide,” and Chrétien’s eventual realization that he had gotten his hero so 
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deeply into a dilemma that he could never get out may have been his reason 
for leaving the story unfinished.13 
 
But Kibler offers an alternative and much better substantiated hypothesis: 
Chrétien never completed his romance, an indication perhaps that he was 
not in sympathy with the theme proposed to him by the Countess… love as 
it is portrayed in the other romances by Chrétien is different from that in 
The Knight of the Cart.  In all his other romances he appears as an advocate 
for marriage and love within marriage, constructing Erec, Cligés, and The 
Knight with the Lion around this theme, and showing in all the 
disadvantages of other types of relationships.14 
 
The text itself strongly supports Kibler’s interpretation.  The Knight of the Cart 
(Lancelot) begins with a long disclaimer in which Chrétien attributes the theme of 
that story to the will of his patron: 
Since my lady of Champagne wishes me to begin a romance, I shall do so 
most willingly, like one who is entirely at her service in anything he can 
undertake in this world… her command has more importance in this work 
than any thought or effort I might put into it.  Chrétien begins his book 
about the Knight of the Cart; the subject matter and meaning are furnished 
and given him by the countess, and he strives to add nothing but his effort 
and careful attention.15 
 
In no other work does Chrétien include such a passage.  (While The Story of the 
Grail (Perceval) does acknowledge Philip of Flanders’ patronage of the story, it 
does not give any indication that Chrétien is trying to distance himself from its 
subject matter.)16  Furthermore, in the service of his illicit, adulterous affair with 
Guinevere, Lancelot engages in a number of behaviors for which the term 
“buffoonery” would be generous.  In a duel with his mortal enemy Meleagant, he 
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fights behind his back so that he can keep his eyes unceasingly on Guinevere,17 and 
when he learns that she desires the fighting to stop, he merely stands by dumbly 
while Meleagant “struck Lancelot repeatedly.”18  In pulling apart iron bars which 
prevent him from entering her bedroom, he is so overwhelmed with lust that he 
fails to realize he has nearly severed two fingers, and Chrétien describes his 
approach in terms that hint of blasphemy: “He came next to that of the queen; 
Lancelot bowed low and adored her, for in no holy relic did he place such faith... 
On parting, Lancelot bowed low before the bedchamber, as if he were before an 
altar.” 19 At an earlier point in the story, he had tried to hurl himself out a window 
because Guinevere had passed out of view.20 
 I find it entirely incredible to suppose that the reader is meant to see these 
and other episodes as anything but ridiculous, or that we should view Chrétien here 
as genuinely depicting a tragic conflict between love and honor.  Rather, he is 
condemning the adulterous type of “courtly love” with which his patron Marie de 
Champagne was so enamored.  This view is further reinforced not only by his 
positive depiction of married love, but also other episodes in which his knights face 
and overcome difficulties of conflicting virtues or obligations.  Consider three pairs 
of Chrétien’s knights and ladies for whom love and honor come into tension: 
Lancelot and Guinevere, Erec and Enide, and Yvain and Laudine.  In Erec and 
Enide, Erec is a renowned knight who, upon marrying Enide, abandons adventure 
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and tournaments because he prefers to stay at home with his beloved bride.  After 
learning that other knights are speaking ill of him for no longer engaging in 
chivalry, and mistakenly thinking that Enide herself shares their diminished 
opinion, he leaves his kingdom as a knight errant, with Enide accompanying him.  
For most of the journey he treats her harshly, both to test her love and in order to 
regain his lost pride.  Bouchard cites this episode as evidence of the two ideals’ 
irreconcilability, noting that “Enide herself becomes miserable at how low her 
husband’s honor has fallen.”21 However, that assessment fails to capture the 
motivation behind Enide’s reaction, and its crucial difference from the way in 
which Guinevere is represented.  Enide overhears Erec’s subjects and peers “say 
among themselves that her lord was becoming recreant with respect to arms and 
knighthood, because he had profoundly changed his way of life.”22 Therefore, she 
laments: 
‘Wretch!’ she said, ‘unhappy me! Why did I come here from my land?  The 
earth should truly swallow me up, since the very best of knights—the 
boldest and the bravest, the most loyal, the most courteous that was ever 
count or king—has completely abandoned chivalry because of me.  Now 
have I truly shamed him; I should not have wished it for anything.’23 
 
Her concern is for Erec; rightly or wrongly she blames herself for his lessened 
renown, and her misery comes from her affection for him.  Contrast this sentiment 
with Guinevere, who instead appears entirely selfish.  After Lancelot has endured 
many trials, dangers, and the shame of riding in a cart in order to rescue her, she 
haughtily turns him away and refuses to speak to him or even be rescued (!) 
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because he had momentarily hesitated to undergo the shame.24  Later they are 
reconciled, and she asks him to act as a cowardly disgrace in a tournament, 
apparently for no other reason than to demonstrate his devotion to her:  
From this moment until dark he did the worst he could, because it was the 
queen’s pleasure… He would rather die than do anything unless he were 
sure that it would bring him shame, disgrace, and dishonour, and he 
pretended to be afraid of all those who approached him. …The queen was 
not upset by anything she heard.  On the contrary, she was pleased and 
delighted.25 
 
Guinevere, then, is presented as petty and self-serving.  Her notion of love is the 
aggrandizement of the self through the abnegation of the other.  By contrast, Enide 
is moved by desire for her lover’s well being, and regrets any part she may have 
played in shaming him.  There is also no indication given, at any point in the story, 
that she loves him any less than she ever did.  Like Erec, who is gallant and brave 
as well as handsome, Enide is not only beautiful but virtuous:  
They made still more of Enide than they did of him, for the great beauty 
they saw in her and even more for her fine character.  …She was so noble 
and honourable, wise and gracious in her speech, well-bred and of pleasant 
company, that no one ever saw in her any folly, meanness, or baseness.  She 
had learned so well the social graces that she excelled in all the qualities 
that any lady must have, in both generosity and good sense.  All loved her 
for her character; it was a cause of personal esteem to anyone who could be 
of service to her.  No one spoke ill of her, for no one could find cause to do 
so.  In the kingdom or in the empire there was no other lady of such 
quality.26 
 
Enide’s love for Erec is not at all the “love” that Guinevere has for Lancelot, and it 
is clear where Chrétien’s sympathies lie.  He is not depicting an impossible clash 
between chivalry and love.  Instead, he is contrasting the false and destructive love 
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of Guinevere, which is not compatible with knightly virtue, with the true love of 
Enide, which is.    
 
Resolvable Dilemmas in Chivalry 
 Between these two cases, a similar conflict arises for Yvain in The Knight 
with the Lion (Yvain).  His friend Sir Gawain—who Chrétien consistently depicts 
as the epitome of knightly virtue—gives a long soliloquy in which (although Erec 
is not mentioned by name) he essentially persuades him not to fall to Erec’s 
misstep: 
‘What!  Would you be one of those men,’ said my lord Gawain to Yvain, 
‘who are worth less because of their wives?  May he who diminishes his 
worth by marrying be shamed by Holy Mary!  He who has a beautiful 
woman as wife or sweetheart should be the better for her; it’s not right for 
her to love him if his fame and worth are lost.  Indeed, you would suffer 
afterwards for her love if it caused you to lose your reputation, because a 
woman will quickly withdraw her love—and she’s not wrong to do so—if 
she finds herself hating a man who has lost face in any way after he has 
become lord of the realm.  A man must be concerned for his reputation 
before all else! …I don’t say this lightly, for if I had as beautiful a lady as 
you have, my dear friend, by the faith I place in God and the saints, I’d be 
very reluctant to leave her!  I know I’d be infatuated myself.  But a man, 
unable to heed his own advice, can give good counsel to another...27 
 
Hence Yvain is urged not to forsake adventure, and he asks permission from his 
wife, Laudine, to fight in the tournaments.  She agrees, with the stipulation that he 
must return within a year or lose her love.  Yvain’s troubles begin when, strangely, 
for no particular reason he fails to return within the allotted time.  Other than a 
vague mention that Gawain “caused him to delay so long,”28 Chrétien offers no 
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suggestion that Yvain was incapable of fulfilling his promise, and Yvain is struck 
with despair when it suddenly occurs to him that he has not done so.  This failure is 
all the more striking in light of the agreement between Yvain and Laudine that he 
would not be blamed if his failure to return was due to events beyond his control: 
‘I beg God that it please Him not to let me overstay my leave.  Yet a man 
may intend to return promptly and not know what the future holds.  And I 
don’t know what will happen to me; whether illness or imprisonment will 
detain me; you are too exacting if you do not make an exception at least for 
physical hindrances.’ ‘Sir,’ she said, ‘I do make this exception.’29 
 
Thus Yvain breaks faith with his lady through no fault but his own, and much of 
the rest of the story is driven by his attempts to regain her favor. 
 Laudine’s concession in the passage above recognizes a distinction between 
a genuine failure of virtue, and failures brought on by external obstacles.  While 
fate may at times thwart the noblest of goals, Chrétien’s ideal knight (or even lady, 
in some cases) can realize multiple virtues.  On his view, part of what makes a 
person good is possessing the wisdom to recognize how to do so, and there is 
nothing in knighthood itself that is inherently contradictory.  Later in his story, 
Yvain is faced with a dilemma reminiscent of his original failing, but with some 
important differences.  He has promised to champion a maiden named Lunete, who 
has been unjustly sentenced to death, and must arrive in time to prevent her from 
being burned at the stake.  Just prior to the appointed day, however, he finds 
himself in a town facing imminent attack from a cruel giant who has besieged and 
ravaged the land.  Unless someone is found to defeat the giant in combat the next 
day, the lord of the town must choose between watching his four captured sons be 
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executed in front of him, or turning his daughter over to the giant to be carried off 
and despoiled.  Yvain agrees to face the giant, but he includes a provision: 
‘Dear good kind sir, I will gladly face the perilous adventure, if the giant 
and your sons arrive early enough tomorrow not to cause me too great a 
delay, for I must be somewhere else tomorrow at noon, as I have given my 
oath.  …There is no need to beg me further as long as the giant arrives early 
enough so that I won’t have to break my promise elsewhere; for nothing 
will prevent me from being tomorrow at midday at what is truly the greatest 
venture I could ever undertake.’  He did not want to give them absolute 
assurance, because he was afraid that the giant might not come early enough 
for him to still return in time to rescue the maiden who was imprisoned in 
the chapel.30 
 
By the time Yvain needs to leave on the next day, the giant has not yet come, so 
Yvain regretfully announces that he must depart.  Out of compassion for the 
people, however, he nevertheless delays leaving, not wanting to abandon them to 
their wretched fate.  The giant eventually arrives, and after a grueling battle Yvain 
slays him and frees the town from his terror.  Departing immediately, he reaches 
his destination just in time, and rescues Lunete as well.  As before, he was faced 
with an oath to return on one hand and a competing goal on the other.  Unlike the 
earlier situation, in this case he possessed a truly worthy reason for the conflict.  
Whereas before he merely allowed his desire for glory to keep him from fulfilling 
his promise, in the latter instance he was moved by the will to defend the helpless.  
His delay in this instance is not punished but rewarded, as not only is he able to 
fulfill both of the noble goals, but by saving Lunete he also manages to regain his 
wife’s favor.  That it was features of circumstance, and not a character flaw, that 
generate the latter conflict is a point to which I will later return.  
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 Even Lancelot, who is portrayed more positively when not directly involved 
with Guinevere, faces and overcomes a conflict of virtues.  Having defeated a 
villainous knight in combat, he must choose between the knight’s cries for mercy 
and a maiden’s (just) request to cut off his head:  
He wishes to content them both: Generosity and Compassion demand that 
he satisfy them both, for he is both generous and merciful.  Yet if the girl 
carries off the head, Compassion will have been vanquished and put to the 
death, and if she must leave without it, Generosity will have been routed.  
Compassion and Generosity hold him doubly imprisoned, with each in turn 
spurring him on and causing him anguish.31 
 
In the end, Lancelot offers to battle the knight a second time, with the 
understanding that if he is once again victorious, he will decapitate his opponent 
regardless of any new cries for mercy.  This is deemed an acceptable compromise, 
and in this way he upholds both his commitment to mercy and his promise to grant 
the maiden’s request.  Thus Chrétien portrays his dilemma explicitly in terms of 
one knightly virtue seeming to clash with another, and the result is neither inaction 
nor being forced to spurn one in favor of the other.  The knightly decision here 
comprises action which, despite the apparent tension, expresses and maintains both 
ideals. 
 In Erec and Enide, the resolution of conflict takes a different but related 
form.  Having been sternly ordered by Erec not to speak to him unless spoken to 
first, Enide faces a series of tests in which she must weigh that command against 
the need to warn Erec of an ambush.  Each time she decides to speak, and each time 
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Erec threatens not to forgive her should it happen again, while secretly being glad 
of her words: 
‘If I don’t warn him soon, this knight spurring this way will have him killed 
before he gets his guard up, for he seems full of evil intentions.  Wretch, 
now I have waited too long!  He has indeed forbidden me to speak, but I 
shall not let that deter me: I can see that my lord is deep in thought, so much 
so that he forgets himself; therefore it is quite right that I should tell him.’  
She spoke to him; he threatened her, but had no wish to harm her, for he 
perceived and knew full well that she loved him above all else, and he loved 
her with all his might.32 
 
Thus Enide chooses rightly; though she cannot fulfill both aims of protecting Erec 
and following his command not to speak, she is wise enough to recognize which 
takes precedence.  It is worth noting that both horns of the dilemma, i.e. respecting 
Erec’s wishes versus ensuring his safety, are expressions of love or beneficence, 
rather than representing a clash of two separate virtues.  One rightly solves (or 
dissolves) some dilemmas by acknowledging the possibility of events beyond one’s 
control (as in the exceptions within Yvain’s oaths to return), or recognizing what a 
virtue truly requires, as does Enide.  Thus Chrétien suggests that the force of a 
dilemma is often due to blind or extreme adherence to a goal (and here an 
additional parallel can be drawn to the common medieval theme of the hastily 
given oath).  Erec is wrong both when he forsakes chivalry entirely to be with his 
wife, and when he mistreats and ignores her to devote himself solely to prowess.  
As Bouchard rightly states: 
Chrétien was certainly not advocating such treatment of women any more 
than he was advocating that knights stay home, enjoying their wives’ 
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company and forgetting adventure, for eventually a repentant Erec asks 
Enide to forgive him for the way he has treated her.33 
 
However, her subsequent analysis that “the reader is nevertheless left, as Chrétien 
certainly intended, wondering how a man can be a renowned warrior when he has 
just told his wife he wants to live “‘entirely at her command’”34 is mistaken.  The 
conflict between love and honor is ultimately illusory, and once Erec and Enide are 
reconciled, Erec both spends time happily with her and continues to seek 
adventure.  The wise person sees his or her way through apparent dilemmas, and 
the ideal knight can and does uphold multiple ideals.     
 Nevertheless some questions remain, and one cannot help but think, for 
instance, that the aforementioned dilemma in The Knight With the Lion could have 
turned out much differently than it did.  Was Yvain truly expressing virtue in 
waiting for the giant to arrive?  The implication seems to be “yes”—after all, he 
manages to save both the town and Lunete—but is this not in some way a matter of 
luck?  Suppose that the giant had not arrived when he did, or that the battle with 
him had taken so long that Yvain could not reach the condemned maiden in time.  
Alternatively, suppose he had simply left when he said he must, fulfilling his vow 
to her but regrettably abandoning the town?  Assuming (for the moment) that the 
decision to wait was deemed virtuous in the story as written, does it remain so in 
counterfactual variations?  What does a true knight do here, qua knight?  This 
question is obviously a specific version of what can be a broader one about any 
warrior or, still more broadly, virtuous agent.  Here our questions about a warrior’s 
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identity—and, more generally, the possibility of any coherent, morally-laden 
functional identity—have brought us back to the problem of competing virtues in 
Virtue Ethics.   
 
Virtue Ethics, Emotion and Action 
What we must ask is whether the kind of triumph over dilemmas that 
Chrétien’s heroes represent is merely, as Kristjánsson says,  a “true but rare” subset 
of most conflicts of virtue.35  She argues that virtue ethics fails to solve the conflict 
problem in general, not only in terms of action-guidance, but in emotion-
guidance—traditionally thought to be one of virtue ethics’ strengths.  Furthermore, 
she alleges that failure in this latter domain undermines virtue ethics’ ability to 
address the former and, by extension, its viability as a theory altogether: 
By avoiding common examples of mundane but tragic emotional conflict, 
and concentrating on far-fetched examples of morally competing actions, 
virtue ethicists are able to lessen the thrust of the standard action-guiding 
objection.  But the force of an emotion/action-guiding objection lies exactly 
in such common examples.  … if the emotion part of the emotion/action-
guiding objection cannot be rebutted, the value of VE seems to be more or 
less reduced to that of a spectator sport.36 
 
Kristjánsson provides her own example of an everyday conflict which, she argues, 
virtue ethics is unable to deal with.  Because there are two conflicting and 
justifiably virtuous emotional reactions, along with their attendant and equally 
conflicting potential actions, virtue ethics allegedly can give us no guidance in 
solving the dilemma.  This example then is supposed to be indicative of moral 
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dilemmas in general, leading her to conclude that “‘What should I feel?’ is not a 
question that VE is fit to answer in cases of the small conflicts and minor tragedies 
of everyday life, that is, when there is more than one potentially virtuous emotion 
on the moral menu.”37  Additionally, she asserts that a tempting response to this 
problem (and one to which I have appealed in some of the examples above)—the 
idea that most such tensions are only apparent—will be irrelevant in the majority of 
cases: 
“Many of the putative conflicts under discussion are merely apparent, 
resulting from a misapplication of virtue or vice terms.”  So, for example, 
what at first sight seems like a conflict between kindness and honesty, when 
considering whether to reveal a hurtful truth to a person, may resolve itself 
once we realize that one does the person no kindness by concealing this sort 
of truth from him.  Strict adherence to a doctrine of the unity of the virtues 
would make this maneuver a compelling one.  However, most 
contemporary virtue ethicists do not embrace that doctrine; Hursthouse for 
one does not, implicitly acceding that this maneuver is only of minor 
importance.38 
 
If such conflicts cannot generally be dissolved in that way, then virtue ethics is left 
in need of a solution for how to adjudicate between the incommensurability 
generated by conflicting virtues, in terms of both emotion and action.  Given my 
portrayal of warrior identity as holistic and generative of moral duty, integrity, and 
motivation, Kristjánsson’s objection also speaks to the heart of my project.  Contra 
her objections, I argue that virtue ethics can indeed guide us productively in terms 
of both actions and emotions, and that Kristjánsson’s own example illustrates the 
superiority of virtue ethics to utilitarianism in this regard.  Some dilemmas can 
indeed be resolved via the proper application of virtue and vice terms.  More 
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importantly, however, the existence of irresolvable moral conflicts does not entail 
the incoherence of full virtue nor the impossibility of functional moral identities.  
In many cases what is most important, and morally useful, is the question of how a 
good person or warrior would address such a situation—not the often pointless 
search for an illusory, singular “best” state of affairs or action. 
To begin, I believe that Kristjánsson somewhat misconstrues Hursthouse’s 
view on the above maneuver.  I read her as more plausibly saying not that it is 
unimportant as such, but rather that it is incomplete: 
So far, I have described one strategy available to virtue ethics for coping 
with the ‘conflict problem’, a strategy that consists in arguing that the 
conflict is merely apparent, and can be resolved.  According to one—only 
one of many—versions of ‘the doctrine of the unity of the virtues’, this is 
the only possible strategy (and ultimately successful), but this is not a claim 
I want to defend.  One general reason is that I still do not know what I think 
about ‘the unity of the virtues’ (all those different versions!); a more 
particular, albeit related, reason is that even if I were (somehow) sure that 
the requirements of the particular virtues could not conflict, I suspect that I 
would still believe in moral dilemmas.  I have been talking so far as though 
examples of putative dilemmas and examples of putative conflict between 
the requirements of different virtues (or deontologists’ rules) coincided.  
But it may seem to many, as it does to me, that there are certain (putative) 
dilemmas which can only be described in terms of (putative) conflict with 
much artifice and lack of relevant detail.  Let us, therefore, consider the 
problem of moral dilemmas without bothering about whether they can be 
described in the simple terms of a conflict between two virtues (or two 
deontologists’ rules).39 
 
Some (though not all) dilemmas are not describable in those terms, and Hursthouse 
elsewhere argues that some dilemmas are inherently irresolvable, but that that fact 
does not count against the adequacy of virtue ethics as a moral theory.  I think that 
she is correct on both of those points.  Before addressing that argument and how 
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honor-based ethics can deal with such irresolvable dilemmas, however, I want to 
defend the above strategy in the cases where it does apply—those dilemmas which 
can fruitfully be set in terms of a conflict of virtues—as well as rebut 
Kristjánsson’s other conclusions.  Despite her claims first that virtue ethics falls to 
the conflict problem, and further that utilitarianism is a superior, “untapped source 
for the moral justification of particular emotions,”40 she fails to produce a 
convincing case and, I maintain, instead demonstrates just the opposite.  Let us turn 
then to her own “mundane and tragic” example.   
She asks us to consider a hypothetical case of a co-worker being promoted 
over oneself: 
I fail to get a promotion in my company because the high-ranking job for 
which I was vying goes to the boss’s nephew.  He was, on all accounts, a 
much less qualified candidate for the post than I, and the only plausible 
reason anyone can see for his being promoted over me is sheer nepotism.  
To complicate matters, the nephew happens to be a colleague and good 
friend of mine.  Moreover, he has recently had to cope with tragic family 
events and everyone agrees that he deserves a break.41 
 
Thus, the emotional conflict which virtue ethics is supposedly unable to address: 
 
Now, the question arises: should I be happy for the “break” he got, or 
should I be envious and resentful?  The problem is that both these emotional 
responses seem to be potentially justifiable if we look at the situation from 
different angles.  (I am assuming here, somewhat controversially, that envy 
and resentment can in certain cases constitute a proper moral reaction, and I 
ask the reader to grant me that point; if not, he can simply envisage some 
other everyday case of emotional conflict: between anger and gratitude, 
grief and joy, etc.)  Yet these responses incorporate conflicting evaluations 
and imply conflicting wishes: the former, a positive evaluation and the wish 
that the status quo be maintained; the latter, a negative evaluation and the 
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wish that the post which the nephew got be, ideally, taken away from him 
and given to me.42 
 
Now, to begin with, her claim that envy and resentment are potentially morally 
proper reactions is, by my lights, thoroughly uncontroversial.  Just as righteous 
indignation is counted among Aristotle’s virtues, there are clearly times when 
“negative” emotions are the right (even obligatory) reaction to, say, an injustice or 
outrage.  That is not the problem.  Rather, there are at least two notable difficulties 
inherent in this example and its analysis.  First, the supposed inclusion of a “wish 
that the post which the nephew got be, ideally, taken away from him and given to 
me”43 (emphasis mine) adds an additional feature to the case which is not 
necessarily entailed in the original conflict.  That is, there is a significant difference 
between wishing that I had been given the promotion instead of him in the first 
place, versus wishing that an already granted promotion be reversed, as 
Kristjánsson portrays it.  The latter causes harm to my co-worker in a way that 
simply not having been chosen to receive a promotion would not, and hence the 
two situations are not equivalent.  Even if a virtuous person (rightly) believed that it 
would have been more just had I received the promotion instead of the co-worker, 
that does not necessarily mean that it would be virtuous to retroactively undo a 
promotion that had already been granted.  Additionally, there is a lack of specificity 
in Kristjánsson’s case concerning the target of the subject’s emotions.  While envy 
might be applicable to my co-worker, in the case of resentment, at least, it would 
appear that the proper object would be the boss.  It is less problematic to imagine 
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feeling happy for one person while resentful toward another, even if the two cases 
are related or one feeling serves to mitigate the other. 
 More importantly, I maintain that there is a correct answer to the emotional 
conflict, one which Kristjánsson barely considers.  To the question “should I feel 
happy or envious and resentful about this promotion?”, the most plausible response 
may well be “both.”  Insofar as my friend and colleague received good fortune after 
a period of suffering, I am happy for him.  Insofar as I legitimately could have 
expected to receive that good fortune myself, I am envious of him and resentful 
toward my boss.  There are multiple dimensions of the situation upon which I may 
react, and I see no reason to assume that I cannot feel all of these things at once.  
The only attention that Kristjánsson gives to this response comes in the form of a 
single endnote, where she appeals to an essay by David Pugmire: 
Such emotional conflicts involve not only a psychological problem and a 
moral problem but a conceptual one as well.  D. Pugmire argues 
convincingly against the possibility of true emotional ambivalence (i.e., 
“the simultaneous focusing of opposed emotions on the very same feature 
of the same thing” in “Conflicting Emotions and the Indivisible Heart,” 
Philosophy, vol. 71 (1996), pp. 27–40.  It is hard to understand 
(conceptually) how I could rejoice at a friend’s good fortune and, in the 
midst of my rejoicing, also hope that he comes to grief; see esp. pp. 32-33.44 
 
Note again the conflation of “hop[ing] that he comes to grief”45 with merely feeling 
envious, a point about which I will later say further.  More significantly, Pugmire 
himself raises the same point about our emotions which I fault Kristjánsson for 
neglecting, regarding a crucial difference between actions and emotions: 
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The second problem bears on the relation that discordant emotions would 
have to action.  It was suggested earlier that a person’s divergent appraisals 
of a situation (and of the choices it may present) need not lend themselves 
to being weighed together and reconciled in a single verdict for the best.  
Yet while there may not always be a single verdict as to what is for the best, 
there always is but one action that can be taken.  A person cannot both do 
something and not do it or perform two alternative actions.46 
 
Unlike emotions, actions require a singular response from us.  There is an 
ontological difference between the two.  As it happens, this fact would legitimize 
any action-based “bias” in discussions of the conflict problem in virtue ethics, 
undermining Kristjánsson’s claim that virtue ethicists are somehow taking the easy 
way out by addressing actions instead of emotions.  Hence, her claim that by 
“ignoring cases of emotional conflict (or, for that matter, the conflict of more 
everyday-like courses of action), VE’s problems are systematically trivialized”47 is 
a non-starter.  Whether any such bias exists or not, however, it also justifies the 
type of response I have given to (at least some) emotion-guidance objections.  If 
actions are focused on, it is because only one of two or more possible actions in a 
dilemma can actually be taken, while it is not only possible but often proper to feel 
multiple emotions corresponding to different aspects of the situation in question. 
 But what of the claim that disparate emotions are problematic because they 
entail conflicting wishes or hopes?  Pugmire does present such a problem: 
It is hard to understand how I could rejoice at the prospect of a friend’s 
unexpected good fortune and in the midst of my rejoicing also hope that he 
comes to grief... On what basis can my emotion of anticipation count as 
rejoicing if I don’t hope for what I am supposed to rejoice at?  And how 
could my attitude to   the possibility of his coming to grief be hope if I am 
filled with joy at the thought of his prevailing and not coming to grief?  
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How could one and the same thing at once give joy and blight it?  How 
could I hope for something that I am already in a condition to rue if it 
happens?48 
 
Now, I think that this particular sentiment is correct.  However, it is important to 
realize that while Kristjánsson’s example is clearly derived from Pugmire’s words, 
it is actually changed from his such that she is unwittingly drawing a different (and 
wrong) conclusion.  While he is speaking in general terms of the impossibility of 
wishing for the same state of affairs to both obtain and fail to obtain, her example 
adds features such that, as aforementioned, there are actually multiple (but related) 
states of affairs in question.  Would the “I” in her example hope that she would not 
receive her expected promotion?  No, and certainly she could not do so while 
simultaneously wishing to receive it.  But she would presumably hope that her co-
worker receive a “break” out of friendship and concern for his welfare.  There is no 
inherent incompatibility between those two states of affairs, nor their associated 
emotional states.  What is incompatible would be for her to hope that both she and 
her co-worker receive one and the same promotion—which she obviously does not.  
The reason why there is an apparent incompatibility is because of the method in 
which, regrettably, the co-worker’s break was achieved.  At this point, then, we 
have a conflict, based (as I have argued above) upon different aspects of the 
situation.  Kristjánsson posits that now one would be torn between feeling happy-
for and envious-of the co-worker.  While she is right on that count, that does not, as 
she claims, entail that one would be torn between two conflicting wishes, nor still 
further that virtue ethics cannot tell us what emotion(s) we ought to feel in that 
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situation—which brings us back to what it would mean for envy to be potentially 
virtuous. 
 For we can ask, then: ‘Would a virtuous person hope that a friend comes to 
grief, or that a friend’s good were taken away from him?’  Obviously not, and so if 
envy is ever to count as a morally appropriate emotion, we cannot understand it as 
entailing such a wish.  If instead we define envy as something like ‘wishing for 
oneself a good that one recognizes as good in the life of another’, then we can see 
how it could be consistent with virtue.  (Which is not, of course, to preclude the 
possibility or even preponderance of thoroughly unvirtuous forms of envy.)  Once 
this fact is realized, it is clear that a truly virtuous person not only would not be 
faced with incompatible emotions, but that virtue ethics provides real action-
guidance in this dilemma as well.  Interestingly, according to Kristjánsson the same 
cannot be said for utilitarianism.  For while she cites utilitarianism’s potential for 
dealing with such conflicts, she neglects to offer any solution to her own dilemma, 
stating that: 
Even a strict decision procedure, such as the utilitarian one, would not be 
able to determine whether I should properly feel envious and resentful or 
happy for my colleague in the example as I sketched it in Section II.  
Utilitarianism would require a much richer description of the facts of the 
situation in order to guide us productively toward its solution.  However, 
such context-dependent empirical facts are what utilitarianism thrives on, 
what the utilitarian decision procedure is all about.49 
 
But specifically what additional facts would be needed for a utilitarian decision?  
Kristjánsson gives no hint of just what these would be.  Within the confines of the 
example, however, (i.e. barring additional facts like “He didn’t really deserve a 
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break after all” or “He’s actually not my friend but my sworn enemy”) it is unlikely 
that new information will really alter the fundamental conflict.  Furthermore, 
supposing that it did, there is no reason to assume that virtue ethics could not 
incorporate it just as readily.  Hence, if utilitarianism cannot handle the dilemma as 
stated, it is merely indicative of its own weakness.  By contrast, I assert that not 
only is there enough context given to (at the least) “guide us productively”, but that 
virtue ethics generates a real solution.  As stated, a virtuous person would not 
desire that a friend’s good be taken away from him and given to oneself.  That kind 
of envy is not virtuous.  Since it is this unvirtuous form of envy which generates the 
conflict, however, the dilemma in question is, ironically, susceptible to just that 
kind of response which Kristjánsson had dismissed—it depends on a 
misapplication of virtue and vice terms!  The attendant action as well—
complaining to the boss and attempting to persuade him to give the promotion to 
me instead—is of course also ruled out.  In fact, that choice reminds me of nothing 
so much as of Ajax, who vowed vengeance on Agamemnon, Menelaus, and 
Odysseus after being deemed less deserving than the last to receive Achilles’ 
armaments.  Even assuming that he truly was greater and more fit than Odysseus to 
bear the dead hero’s equipment, he did not promote but rather diminished his own 
worth in his ill-fated campaign of rectification against his “bosses” and his rival.  
What then is left?  Merely accepting the status quo?  Perhaps, but there is yet an 
even better, third alternative.  To be truly honorable is to promote one’s own worth 
while simultaneously maintaining and respecting the worth of others.  Hence, the 
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height of acting well in this dilemma would be to seek one’s own advancement in a 
way which did not depend on the denigration of the friend and co-worker.  As such, 
I posit that the best response would be to approach one’s boss with a proposal for 
the creation of a new position to which one would also be promoted—or, barring 
that, to establish one’s credentials as justifying a raise and change of title.  In such a 
way one would correct the injustice suffered by oneself, while still maintaining the 
coworker’s well-being.   
 As some final thoughts on Kristjánsson and utilitarianism, it is worth noting 
that her mistake is similar to that made by Brad Hooker in his Does Moral Virtue 
Constitute a Benefit to the Agent?  He argues that we do not regard moral virtue as 
a fundamental human good, because given a comparison between two lives which 
are identical other than either the possession or lack of moral virtue, we allegedly 
would not feel sorrier for the person who was vicious.50  There, as above, the 
argument goes astray partially because of a failure to appreciate multiple 
dimensions upon which one can experience differing emotions and evaluations, e.g. 
that we feel sorrier for ‘Upright’ in the sense that he deserves more happiness, and 
sorrier for ‘Unscrupulous’ in the sense that he is spiritually as well as materially 
bankrupt.  This unfortunate single-mindedness of perception—especially when 
coupled with a utilitarian assumption of a uniquely optimal (and  
rightness-determining) potential state of affairs—not only as Hursthouse says 
“misrepresents the texture of our moral experience,”51 but depends on a view of 
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morality as only instrumentally, not intrinsically, good.  Hooker’s argument is 
comprehensible only if morality is seen not as inseparably constitutive of a 
worthwhile human life but as merely one good among others—which, I have been 
arguing, is a fundamental defect in much of modern ethics.  Likewise, 
Kristjánsson’s misguided search for the singular, right emotion to get us to a 
putatively best state of affairs all around serves to blind her to the much more 
conceptually rich, and ethically relevant, question of what counts for our agent as 
truly living and acting well. 
 It also runs afoul of a problem that I briefly mentioned earlier, that of 
irresolvable dilemmas.  For while it turned out that Kristjánsson’s example really 
was resolvable by a correct understanding of the putative virtues involved, such 
will not always be the case, as Hursthouse convincingly argues.  Following Foot, 
she says of the claim that there are no irresolvable dilemmas: 
In fact, if the claim is put in a different, unexpected, context, few people are 
convinced of it. …Suppose I must give my daughter a birthday present; it 
would certainly be very mean not to, given our relationship, her age and 
hopes, my financial circumstances, and so on.  But I am faced with an 
embarrass de richesse; giving any one of a whole range of things is equally 
desirable and acceptable.  So there is an irresolvable dilemma—not one that 
worries us, not one where the final decision matters, but there all the 
same—providing a clear case where practical rationality simply runs out of 
determining moral grounds.  So does the conviction that practical rationality 
cannot run out hold only of the distressing dilemmas?  That does look very 
odd.52 
 
Just as there is no ultimate determining ground in a case like this between various 
good options (which does not particularly bother us), some dilemmas by their 
nature admit of no truly good decision (which does), however wise one may be.  I 
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am reminded of martial arts classes where students learn how to escape from 
various holds, when invariably one pupil will ask: “But what if they get you in a 
hold like this?” and proceed to demonstrate some particularly nasty position.  Every 
instructor that I have encountered has answered some of those queries in the same 
way: “Don’t get into that hold.”  The point is both that there are some occasions 
where excellence consists in precluding certain states of affairs from obtaining, 
and, significantly, that in some unfortunate cases there is no amount of excellence 
sufficient to achieve an ideal (or even a good) outcome. This is as true for moral 
excellence as it is for martial excellence, and henceforth I will follow Hursthouse 
and Foot, taking it as established that there are irresolvable dilemmas.  Similarly, to 
seek a uniquely “best action” for every circumstance can often lead us astray, as 
compared to the superior question of what it means for an agent to act wisely and 
well. 
  
The Coherence of Warriors, Revisited: Creation and Reformation 
 Does this realization then provide a way out of our problem of incoherent 
pictures of a warrior?  Yes and no.  A warrior who finds himself faced with an 
irresolvable dilemma is not therefore necessarily committed to incompatible 
virtues, nor for that reason does he fail to be a warrior.  Still further, it is not 
evidence that to be a true warrior or to be fully virtuous is “an impossible ideal” as 
alluded to earlier.  Rather, it may simply be impossible to achieve all such aims 
given a particular context.  Yvain, for example, could easily have been unable to 
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save both Lunete and the town, but that would have been due not to a conflict in his 
fundamental commitments, but to a conflict of time.  However, the concern with 
which we began the chapter was of the fundamental sort, that is, how we can deal 
with putative constitutive values of a warrior which are themselves incompatible.  
What we need is for the term ‘warrior’ (or, at the least, individual classifications 
like ‘knight’, ‘samurai’, etc.) to fit a functional model of the sort discussed by 
MacIntyre.  Consider both of the following arguments: 
 1. This watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping 
 2. This watch is too heavy to carry about comfortably 
 3. This is a bad watch.   
 
 1. He gets a better yield for this crop per acre than any farmer in the district 
 2. He has the most effective programme of soil renewal yet known  
 3. His dairy herd wins the first prizes at the agricultural shows 
 4. He is a good farmer.53 
 
Both of these arguments are valid because ‘watch’ and ‘farmer’ are functional 
concepts, such that the definition of what they are is inseparable from the definition 
of what is a good example of each.  If ‘warrior’ too is such a functional concept, 
then we can understand both the connection between moral worth and self worth 
attendant upon warrior identity, as well as the foundation for the “Marines don’t do 
that!” sort of moral injunction discussed in the previous chapter.  So, the problem 
we are faced with now is how to deal with cases where there is disagreement as to 
the premises.  That is, do we start with: 
 1. He serves his lady no matter what she asks; -or-  
 1. He never puts love before glory 
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1. He forsakes all arts besides the martial ones; -or- 
 1. He seeks mastery of both the sword and the brush 
 
 1. He achieves his objective through both force and cunning; -or- 
 1. He is forthright and free from all trickery 
 
to derive “He is a good knight/ He is a good samurai/He is a good Greek hero,” and 
so on.  In order to solve this quandary, we must pay attention to the fact that these 
roles were constructed, and, still further, that the conflicting conceptions took place 
in a context of creation, reformation, and social change.  Consider the time at which 
Tsunetomo wrote his Hagakure.  In the early eighteenth century, the Warring 
States period was long over, and Japan had since known more than a hundred years 
of the stability of the Tokugawa shogunate.  Thus Minoru in his introduction to the 
Hagakure tells us that the samurai: 
began to neglect their military practices and the mastery of Bushido, the 
Way of the Samurai, and gave more and more of their time and attention to 
personal accomplishments rather than the military arts and the traditional 
loyal service of their Lord.  They did this knowing they were supposed to be 
efficient bureaucrats in the service of the Lord and clan, and, as a result, 
tended to become tender and effeminate.  They began to act out of their own 
self-interests.  No definite ideal prevailed among the samurais at this time.54   
 
Musashi, by contrast, lived and wrote before and during the beginning of the 
Tokugawa state, at a time where the relative peace was much newer, and 
practitioners of various schools of swordsmanship “would often challenge a 
samurai from another school to a match, to see whose technique was better, and, of 
course, to test their blades.”55  Hence Tsunetomo’s injunction to forsake arts and 
crafts in the service of bushido must be seen in the context of reforming samurai 
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who had “gone soft” and to some degree abandoned their heritage; not necessarily 
as contrary to the holistic development of the self and the sword advocated by 
Musashi.  Callahan as well, in discussing the works of Saikaku, notes the 
difficulties generated by Japan’s changing political realities:    
Much of the morality enjoined by bushidō and giri had been forged in an 
age of warfare.  These feudal values from which the bakufu had been born 
now clashed with the regime’s altered nature, for what had started as a 
tough military administration had developed into a centralized bureaucratic 
government.  The Tokugawa period offered few opportunities for a 
dramatic display of giri, and when writing about the samurai in his Buke 
Giri Monogatari Saikaku was forced to choose a pre-1600 setting for nearly 
half his tales.  …the successful bushi in the late seventeenth century was a 
bureaucrat, and there was no arena in which the average bushi could 
sacrifice himself for giri.  The resulting frustration led to bloody fights to 
the death over trivial matters and to a dramatic increase in the popularity of 
kataki-uchi.56 
 
Hence when we examine the samurai tales that Saikaku penned, we find samurai 
life the subject of both praise and criticism.  In “A Surprise Move: The Heir’s 
Killer Replaces Him”, two teenage boys, Hachijuro and Dennosuke, fight to the 
death for no other reason than an accidental bump where “each boy accused the 
other of insulting him by jostling his sword sheath, and they drew their swords and 
dueled heroically.”57  The winner, Hachijuro, is chastised by his father and turned 
over to Dennosuke’s father Densaburo as punishment.  When Dennosuke’s mother 
tries to avenge her son, her husband stops her:  
‘You cannot just kill this boy in cold blood when his father acted so 
honorably by sending him here.  As a matter of fact, although he is only 
thirteen, he is much better at the military arts than our own fifteen-year-old 
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son was.  So I am going to ask that Hachijuro be made my heir and 
successor.  If you do not agree, I will divorce you.’58 
 
So Hachijuro is adopted by his slain rival’s parents, never again sees his original 
family, and even changes his own name to “Dennosuke”, replacing the original as 
completely as possible.  Callahan sees this as clearly a parodical exaggeration: 
“Naturally it was in a bushi’s best interest to have the best possible heir—but this 
amount of calculation strikes the reader as ridiculous, and this of course was 
Saikaku’s intention.”59  Aside from mere visceral shock at the severe coldness of 
the two fathers, the characters’ actions would be seen in light of their striking 
antipathy toward the Confucian ideal of the moral importance of familial relations.  
The bond between parent and child was the second of the five fundamental 
relationships of Confucian morality, and As De Bary and Bloom note:  
As a text emerging from the family school of Confucius in the Han period, 
the Classic of Filiality maintained quasi-canonical status down into the 
twentieth century… It became especially influential in Japanese thought of 
the Tokugawa period (1603 – 1868) and figured prominently in nationalistic 
ideologies of late nineteenth- and early twentieth century Japan.60   
 
Thus Callahan’s analysis is particularly compelling.  In addition, Saikaku 
elsewhere explicitly condemns petty duels of the sort described in “A Surprise 
Move.”  For example, “Inspiration From a Gourd” begins with a passage that not 
only directly alludes to the other play, but seems clearly intended to inspire reform 
toward what he sees as a truer expression of samurai excellence:  
                                                 
58 A Surprise Move 11. 
59 Callahan 4. 
60 De Bary and Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 1: From Earliest Times to 1600  
325 – 326. 
 
 92
The present age has brought about a drastic change in the behavior and 
attitude of samurai.  In bygone days, proving one’s mettle was the 
paramount consideration and life was held cheap.  If the sword sheathes of 
two men accidentally clashed together, they would rail at each other, and 
then begin a profitless duel which would result either in both their deaths or 
else the emergence of a victor who would stride away from his slain 
opponent.  This type of behavior was praised for it was said to reflect the 
true samurai spirit.  In fact, however, this kind of bravado is completely 
contrary to the way a samurai should live.  In order to be prepared for the 
worst eventuality, a lord bestows on his retainers a considerable stipend.  
Any man who ignores the obligation thus incurred and casts his life away 
over a selfish, personal quarrel is a villain, deaf to righteousness.  
Consequently, no matter how outstanding a samurai’s achievements may be 
in his private battles, his lord will understandably fail to be impressed by 
such exploits.61 
 
The message then is that by taking an ideal to an extreme, one actually sabotages 
one’s honor and misses the mark instead of hitting it.  Such a fate nearly befalls the 
two main characters, Takitsu and Takeshima, friends who almost fight to the death 
over a misunderstanding and an imagined insult.  By contrast, real virtue is 
exemplified by an older samurai, who correctly discerns not only who has stolen 
Takeshima’s sword, but the nature of its theft and how to retrieve it.  As payment 
for this service, he insists that the two friends abandon their quarrel and reconcile, 
which they do, describing him as a “‘man with uncanny intuition’” who “‘notices 
things that the average person misses.’”62  Hence, there is praise for the samurai as 
well, here presented in terms which contrast with a problematic degeneration 
within that class. 
 Like the elderly samurai above, whose ability coupled with age and wisdom 
make him a model of true excellence, the character of Jubei in “A Mole on the 
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Remembered Face” comes to a good end by his dedication to duty over appearance.  
Jubei had been engaged for some time to be married, but when the girl’s good 
looks are marred by smallpox, her parents secretly endeavor to substitute her  
still-beautiful younger sister for the matrimony.  Jubei, however, discovers the 
switch, and insists that it is only right that they abide by the original arrangement: 
After that, he kept away from her, not even going to see her a second time.  
When she returned to her parents’ home, Jubei sent with her a letter in 
which he related all the details, and added ‘Thus the elder sister is the one 
whom I received as a wife.  Grievous illness is a part of life, and I beg you 
to send her to me even if she is no longer beautiful.  I would have her as my 
wife even if I had to give my life in return.63 
 
Thus Jubei refuses to marry the younger sister instead of his now disfigured 
betrothed, and his integrity is rewarded.  He is not only happy but successful, as his 
wife 
had a natural sense of strategy, and she often pointed out things which had 
not occurred to Jubei.  From the beginning of their life together, she kept 
him constantly thinking about military matters, and, as a result, Jubei later 
became a famous general, and his name was praised throughout the world.64  
 
The characters who devote themselves to duty, and do not become caught up in 
appearances or petty personal vendettas, bring success both to themselves and to 
those around them.  They are truly capable of being useful to their lords, and 
maintaining the good of society.  Hence Saikaku serves as an example of critique 
and reform of warrior mores, and as Callahan states,  
That Buke Giri Monogatari is not a panegyric of giri and the bushi does not 
mean that it is a bitter social satire.  Saikaku was basically neither a didactic 
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nor a polemical writer.  …Saikaku likes to show virtue working to its 
practitioner’s advantage.  In other words, giri pays.65 
 
Similarly, I have argued above that Bouchard was mistaken to state that Chrétien 
and others were intentionally portraying chivalry as contradictory and impossible.  
Where she was right, however, is in the view that such authors were challenging 
putative ideals of knighthood.  The mistake is the conclusion that those authors 
must have been treating those conflicting views as on equal ground.  Literature has 
always been a vehicle for moral critique, and I think we must see the authors of 
stories in many cases as using their characters to argue for what truly is (and is not) 
worthy of a person.  In Chretien’s case, there was obviously a view of courtly love 
shared by Marie de Champagne and others which glorified an often adulterous and 
basically subservient form of devotion.  We should see Chrétien as saying, 
essentially, “that isn’t love,” just as we can see Saikaku’s tales as sometimes saying 
“that isn’t adhering to duty.”  As Baker remarks, “Like other aspects of chivalry, 
which were in reality frequently undermined by the corruption of their 
practitioners, courtly love eventually degenerated into an excuse for promiscuity.”66  
Such stories do not paint a picture of incommensurable virtues; instead it is the 
incommensurability of a genuine virtue with what is actually a vice.   
What about Philoctetes, then?  Can we read his tale in the same way, as a 
portrayal by Sophocles of the unworthiness of deception in achieving one’s ends?  I 
believe that we can, although here things are somewhat more complex.  Certainly 
Sophocles here and elsewhere was concerned with exploring moral conflict, but it 
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is not immediately obvious what the ultimate end of that conflict is supposed to be.  
MacIntyre, for instance, sees the central tension of Philoctetes as remaining 
unresolved: 
Odysseus behaves in the play according to precisely the same canons which 
govern his behavior in the Odyssey.  He does good to his friends, harm to 
his foes (thus satisfying one of the definitions of justice which Plato rejects 
at the beginning of the Republic).  If he cannot get the bow by open means, 
his cunning will devise deceitful means.  In the Odyssey that cunning is 
treated unambiguously as a virtue; and it is of course for his exercise of the 
virtues that a hero received honor.  But Neoptolemus sees Odysseus’ 
stratagem to deceive Philoctetes as dishonorable.  Philoctetes had been 
grossly wronged by the Greeks who had left him to suffer for nine long 
years on Lemnos; Philoctetes has nevertheless received Neoptolemus and 
Odysseus with trust.  Even though he now refuses to come to the aid of the 
Greeks at Troy, it is wrong to deceive him.  Sophocles uses Odysseus and 
Neoptolemus to confront us with two incompatible standards of honorable 
conduct, two rival standards for behavior.  It is crucial to the structure of the 
tragedy that Sophocles offers us no resolution of this conflict; the action is 
interrupted, rather than completed by the intervention of the  
semi-divine Heracles, which rescues the characters from their impasse.67 
 
Hence we are confronted once again with seemingly incommensurable virtues.  The 
bow of Heracles is necessary for victory at Troy, and thus Odysseus is willing to 
procure it from Philoctetes by any means necessary.  But Neoptolemus, despite a 
brief period of wavering, is unwilling to feign friendship and violate Philoctetes’ 
trust, seeing it as ignoble despite the importance of the aim to which it would be in 
service.  When Heracles comes to resolve the impasse, he does not condemn 
Odysseus’s methods nor his original abandonment of Philoctetes; neither does he 
paint Philoctetes’ heretofore refusal to rejoin the Greek forces as unjustified.  He 
simply commands Philoctetes to go to Troy, noting that in so doing he will also be 
healed of the affliction that led to his original exile, as well as gain glory and riches 
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for himself.  The tale comes to a close, but the question of values has not—and 
perhaps cannot—be resolved, which in MacIntyre’s view expresses what 
Sophocles takes to be an inescapable and tragic component inherent to the structure 
of human life.   
 Nevertheless, whether we accept that such was Sophocles’ view (or still 
more strongly believe that it is correct), I think that we can still read the Philoctetes 
as praising Neoptolemus’ integrity and friendship toward Philoctetes, contrasted 
with its negative depiction of Odysseus’ duplicity.  Tessitore also notes that 
Heracles’ appearance leaves the dramatic tension unresolved, “Like a statue 
temporarily lifted from the depths of the sea to sink once again,”68 but he sees the 
fundamental conflict as existing between Odysseus and Philoctetes—representing 
respectively the imperfect but necessary world of politics and the unfulfilled 
demand for divine justice.  On this view, the main drama unfolds around whose 
ideal will garner Neoptolemus’ ultimate allegiance, and both of his would-be 
mentors are partially in the right.  While Tessitore perhaps somewhat overstates the 
level of sympathy toward Odysseus’ motivations, his main point yields an 
important insight about the nature of Heracles’ appearance.  Consider that Heracles 
is, while a god, also connected to the mortal world and in particular to Philoctetes 
himself.  Originally half-mortal, he ascended to godhood in part with Philoctetes’ 
help, and so 
Sophocles creates an opportunity for Heracles to return the favor shown him 
by Philoctetes.  Whereas Philoctetes delivered Heracles from unbearable 
suffering, Heracles’ intervention brings with it the promise of Philoctetes’ 
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deliverance from affliction and reintegration into the human world of 
politics.  Every aspect of Philoctetes’ terrible predicament—initial cause, 
central action, and future resolution—is framed with reference to the gods.69 
 
Odysseus—the model of political success and (in terms of the war at Troy) the will 
of the gods—is capable of devising a scheme to procure Philoctetes’ bow, but can 
never persuade Philoctetes to leave Lemnos.  Neoptolemus, embodying justice and 
friendship, convinces him to leave his exile, but cannot effect Philoctetes’ return to 
the Greek community.  Heracles alone can restore Philoctetes to Greek society, 
because he alone represents both the friendship and loyalty of community as well 
as the prospect of divine justice.  The absence of the latter is, indeed, the chief 
obstacle toward the existence of the former: 
As we have seen, Philoctetes’ longing for a world that is clearly and 
consistently just is in some sense the wound that is wasting both his body 
and his soul.  If Heracles’ final intervention suggests divine concern for 
human justice, it is a concern that in some important sense continues to 
resist human comprehension.  The most egregious problem concerns the 
absence of any justification for Philoctetes’ protracted and unmerited 
afflictions.  …Sophocles’ deus ex machina calls for piety but provides no 
adequate answer to the human demand for justice.  Indeed, the price to be 
paid for healing includes not only the unjustified horror that makes healing 
necessary, but also return to a political world in which injustice flourishes.70 
 
An interesting parallel can then be seen with Plato’s Euthyphro.  When Socrates 
maneuvers Euthyphro into asserting that piety is a part of justice which takes the 
form of service to the gods, the problem comes with the question of what form that 
service could take.  The gods do not need anything from us and are not benefited by 
what we give them, and hence the possibility of the proposed relationship between 
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them and us does not seem to be coherent.71  The figure of Heracles can restore 
justice and its attendant failed human connections precisely because he had stood in 
that kind of relationship to (and partially as) a mortal.  He is not now benefited by 
any act of Philoctetes, but he had been, making that conception of justice between 
them comprehensible.  The human longing for justice must likewise be fulfilled by 
human agency. 
As such, I follow Tessitore in his assessment that  
Sophocles, much like his contemporary Plato, wished to encourage a 
salutatory concern with eusebia while, at the same time, suggesting that the 
human world unfolds in accord with less consoling necessities that 
constrain the problematic but necessary attempt to live together in political 
society.72 
 
The divinely-induced affliction and human-caused isolation had previously made 
Philoctetes a non-person; not only in light of his status as an outcast, but due to his 
being viewed as an expendable tool defined only in relation to victory or defeat at 
Troy.  Now with Heracles’ promise first of healing by Asclepius, and then the glory 
of winning the war, he is restored to the status of human being.  MacIntyre notes 
that “In Homer the question of honor is the question of what is due to a king; in 
Sophocles the question of honor has become the question of what is due to a 
man.”73  In that light, we can see the Philoctetes as portraying the nobility of 
Neoptolemus’ original stance over the Odyssean cunning which subordinates all 
scruples to victory.  The latter is associated with the absence of justice and the 
callous caprices of the gods, while the former represents the harmonious living of 
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citizens and communal enterprise.  Sophocles is addressing what it means to live 
well and achieve aims as one person among others, and his answer to that question 
rejects the trickery of Odysseus as a kind of weakness born of the breakdown of 
human community.  This is not necessarily to say that cunning is condemned 
wholesale—it is important that Philoctetes was undeserving of his treatment, unlike 
the Cyclops or Penelope’s suitors in the Odyssey.  Nevertheless, Sophocles is 
saying that Neoptolemus’ integrity, not Odysseus’ trickery, seeks the human good 
in a way in which one can truly take pride.   
As we have seen, a foundation for a functional moral identity can be 
maintained even in the face of competing conceptions.  An author who presents an 
apparent conflict of ideals is not necessarily thereby painting them as 
incommensurable, but rather may be distinguishing between genuine and 
counterfeit virtues.  Chrétien, Saikaku, and Sophocles can all be seen as making a 
literary statement about what true excellence entails.  Likewise, a prima facie 
tension between different sources must be viewed within the social contexts that 
inform them.  Just as Musashi’s and Tsunetomo’s true samurai appear much less 
different in light of the political realities of their days, seemingly varied portrayals 
of a good warrior may really aim at fundamentally similar models.  Finally, the 
existence of irresolvable dilemmas does not threaten the viability of virtue ethics, 
which is equipped to give us useful guidance in terms of both how to act and how 
to feel.  The realm of warrior virtue thus furnishes both moral motivation and the 
grounds for excellence as a specific kind of human being.  To be honorable is to 
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take on an identity such that one’s self is worthy of the potential of human 
greatness.  The further significance of pride, reputation, and social role as 
constituents of that identity will be the subject of our next inquiry.   
 
 101
Chapter 4: Pride and Place 
 Previously I have stated, I believe uncontroversially, that pride and concern 
for reputation are two of the integral components of honor.  What is more likely 
controversial is that these are positive features, for perhaps the most common type 
of objections to honor-based ethics relate to these aspects.  Consider the following 
historical encounter between an English knight and a French squire, Nicholas 
Clifford and John Boucmel.1  The two men had many times prior spoken of a 
jousting match between them, but as of yet had been unable to follow through.  On 
the occasion in question, Clifford was traveling with a group of knights through 
France on their way to Cherbourg, and they stopped at an inn to rest for the night.  
As it happened, John Boucmel was with a group of knights lodged at the nearby 
castle of Vannes, who came to the inn to greet the visiting English.  When he saw 
that Nicholas Clifford was among them, he approached Clifford about their past 
discussions, saying that since they at last had the opportunity to perform their joust, 
“I therefore demand from you three courses with a lance.”2  The joust does take 
place eventually, but not before Clifford three times attempts to refuse.  He says 
first that he is not in a position to stay for a joust, because the other knights with 
whom he is traveling cannot wait for him.  Boucmel counters by offering to escort 
him to his destination himself.  Secondly, Clifford notes that his company is 
traveling without weapons and armor, to which Boucmel replies that he has many 
arms at his disposal, and still further, will allow Clifford the first choice of which to 
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use.  At this point, “it became quite clear to Nicholas that it would not be honorable 
to refuse the request, so passionately was it made, and especially since the other 
knights had heard the entire conversation.”3  Nevertheless, he notes that it may not 
be possible for him to joust if the senior knights he is with do not allow it.  Thus he 
offers, if such should be the case, to joust with Boucmel as soon as possible after 
the completion of his current journey.  However, as Baker relates: 
Boucmel would not yield an inch, and replied: “Seek not for excuses: I have 
offered you such handsome proposals that you cannot in honor depart 
without running a tilt with me, according to the demand I make.”  Nicholas 
now grew angry at the young squire’s manner of speaking to him; the lad 
had clearly overstepped the mark, for although he himself had considered 
that it would be dishonorable to refuse the request, for the younger man 
himself to make such an assertion was another thing entirely.4 
 
The next morning, Boucmel and Clifford indeed had their joust, and Boucmel died 
tragically when a piece of Clifford’s lance pierced his neck.  While Clifford was 
distraught over this turn of events, the rest of the knights, including Boucmel’s 
lord, assured him that he had done nothing wrong, and had conducted himself as he 
must in jousting with Boucmel, despite its unfortunate ending. 
 Of particular interest in this account is the role played by the witness of the 
other knights.  Both Clifford and Boucmel seem to accept that, at least after his first 
two reasons for refusing are addressed, honor demands that Clifford accept 
Boucmel’s challenge.  However, Clifford also judges that the fact that the other 
knights had heard the request gives the situation additional gravity.  The 
implication is that Clifford’s reputation plays a role in determining his moral 
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obligations.  More generally, if the “demands” of honor are the demands of 
morality, what one ought to do in the moral sense depends at least in part on how 
one will be judged by other people if one engages in, or refrains from, some 
behavior.  To a large degree, this idea is likely foreign or distasteful to thinkers in 
modern times, and it seems prima facie to be vulnerable to criticism.  For many of 
us, our thoughts on this topic would first recall Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.  
Praise and reputation depend upon others and their perception of us, while our 
moral worth would seem to depend instead on our own character and actions.5  
Thus a number of objections begin to arise, located within two main clusters of 
issues:  those relating to one’s appearance (both in itself and as contrasted with 
reality), and those relating to matters of an individual’s worth and status (both in 
one’s own case and in the relative worth and status of others).   
 For example, the Hagakure relates a story of “The Loyal Samurai Cook” 
who helped preserve his lord’s reputation: 
When Lord Katsushige entertained his guest with some dishes of crane, 
Kichizaemon Fukuchi acted in the following manner: 
 A guest said: “Your honorable host, I hear that you can taste the 
difference between white cranes and black cranes, etc.  Is this true?” 
 The lord replied, “It is true.”  
 The guest went on, “Then, how have you tasted the present dish?” 
 Katsushige answered, “That was a white-naped crane.” 
 The guest replied: “I don’t understand how you can tell the 
difference.  Please send for the cook, I want to ask him.” 
 “Let Kichizaemon Fukuchi come,” the Lord said. 
 Kichizaemon, who had overheard the discussion, quickly went into 
the kitchen and drank, in succession, several big bowls of sake (rice wine).  
He was repeatedly requested to come (before the Lord).  After some time, 
he went into the presence (of the Lord and guest).  Then the guest repeated 
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his question.  Kichizaemon’s tongue tripped and he lisped in a foolish 
manner: “White-black crane, nay, pure-white crane or black crane.” 
 The Lord scolded him, “You are drunk.  Get out of my sight.”  
(Thus the Lord’s face was saved.)6 
 
Katsushige’s reputation is upheld, but in an undeserved way—his claim is clearly 
nonsense and puffery.  While Kichizaemon is portrayed positively for his loyalty, 
the result is not really the well-being of the clan or some sort of greater good, but 
merely his lord’s aggrandizement.   
We have seen also in the preceding chapter that one of Saikaku’s concerns 
was the readiness of samurai to duel each other over real or imagined insults, and 
the general quickness to violence over even trivial slights.  Similarly, Nisbett and 
Cohen offer compelling evidence that higher rates of violence and homicide in the 
American South and West, compared to other regions of the United States, are 
attributable to the historical presence of an honor culture.7  Much of the action in 
The Iliad is driven by status and complaints about it.  Agamemnon’s worry that his 
own worth is diminished if he returns his prize leads him to dishonor Achilles, who 
in turn refuses to fight and so nearly dooms the Greek expedition.  Still further, 
Thersites’ attendant criticism of Agamemnon appears to be both accurate and just: 
How shameful for you, the high and mighty commander,/ to lead the sons of 
Achaea to bloody slaughter!/  Sons?  No, my soft friends, wretched 
excuses—/ women, not men of Achaea!  Home we go in our ships!  
Abandon him here in Troy to wallow in all his prizes—/ he’ll see if the likes 
of us have propped him up or not./  Look—now it’s Achilles, a greater man 
he disgraces,/ seizes and keeps his prize, tears her away himself./  But no 
gall in Achilles.  Achilles lets it go./  If not, Atrides, that outrage would 
have been your last!8 
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7 Nisbett and Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South. 




However, Odysseus rebukes and strikes him for his words, seemingly on the basis 
of his low rank: 
What a flood of abuse, Thersites!  Even for you,/ fluent and flowing as you 
are.  Keep quiet.  Who are you to wrangle with kings, you alone?/  No one, I 
say—no one alive less soldierly than you,/ none in the ranks that came to 
Troy with Agamemnon./  So stop your babbling, mouthing the names of 
kings…9 
 
Despite the fact that Achilles had leveled almost exactly the same charge at 
Agamemnon as did Thersites, even using some of the same phrases, Thersites’ 
words are scorned because of his inferior reputation.  In this instance, at least, his 
(lack of) worth is seemingly pre-established and taken as given, regardless of any 
merit to what he has said.  Arthurian legend, too, contains depictions of relative 
worth which appear problematic.  After a battle against the Emperor Lucius, we are 
told that “the Britons returned in triumph to King Arthur, having slain more than 
ten thousand Romans, and lost no man of worship from amongst themselves.”10  
Men were indeed felled in battle, but since they were of low worship their deaths 
seemingly are treated as unimportant.  Perhaps more egregiously, consider an 
encounter between Sir Lancelot and a knight named Sir Pedivere: 
And as he rode through a valley, among many wild ways, he saw a 
knight, with a drawn sword, chasing a lady to slay her.  And seeing Sir 
Lancelot, she cried and prayed to him to come and rescue her.   
At that he went up, saying, “Fie on thee, knight!  Why wilt thou slay 
this lady?  Thou doest shame to thyself and all knights.”   
“What hast thou to do between me and my wife?” replied the knight.  
“I will slay her in spite of thee.” 
“Thou shalt not harm her,” said Sir Lancelot, “till we have first 
fought together.” 
                                                 
9 The Iliad 285 – 290. 
10 King Arthur and His Knights 141 – 142.  “Worship” is used here to mean esteem and reputation. 
 
 106
“Sir,” answered the knight, “thou doest ill, for this lady hast 
betrayed me.” 
“He speaketh falsely,” said the lady, “for he is jealous of me without 
cause, as I shall answer before Heaven; but as thou art named the most 
worshipful knight in the world, I pray thee of thy true knighthood to save 
me, for he is without mercy.” 
“Be of good cheer,” said Sir Lancelot, “it shall not lie within his 
power to harm thee.” 
“Sir,” said the knight, “I will be ruled as ye will have me.” 
So Sir Lancelot rode between the knight and the lady.  And when 
they had ridden awhile, the knight cried out suddenly to Sir Lancelot to turn 
and see what men they were who came riding after them; and while Sir 
Lancelot, thinking not of treason, turned to look, the knight, with one great 
stroke, smote off the lady’s head. 
Then was Sir Lancelot passing wroth, and cried, “Thou traitor!  
Thou hast shamed me forever!”11 
 
While he does send the wicked knight to Camelot to be punished, the fact that 
Lancelot’s first reaction involves his own reputation, and not the slain damsel 
herself, at the very least suggests a skewed sense of priorities.  While failing in his 
promise to protect her may indeed reflect badly on him as a knight, one cannot help 
but feel that the primary motivation for outrage really ought to be the fact of the 
lady’s murder.   
An emphasis on pride and reputation, then, seems liable to engender moral 
failings in a number of significant ways.  By caring too much about appearance, 
one may value illusion over truth, violence over peace, pre-established status over 
actual merit, and reputation over people’s welfare.  An additional worry is that a 
strong sense of one’s reputation may leave one compelled to engage in 
destructive—even self-destructive—courses of action, which otherwise could have 
been avoided.  A fascinating and tragic illustration of this last problem may reside 
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in Saddam Hussein and the war in Iraq.  James Bowman argues that were it not for 
the former’s concern for appearance, and the West’s failure to recognize that 
concern, the war might possibly have been avoided altogether.  By his lights, 
President Bush honestly believed that there were weapons of mass destruction in 
Iraq: 
The result was fury when the WMDs were not found, and subsequent and 
frequent repetitions of the charge that the administration had “lied” in order 
to go to war.  …Yet to believe this accusation, you would also have to 
believe that when, before the war, the president mentioned the WMDs as a 
reason for it, he already knew in fact that there were no such weapons in 
Iraq.  Not only does this seem implausible in itself, since it would have been 
a lie that he himself was about to ensure would soon be found out, but his 
claims about the WMDs were seconded not only by his own intelligence 
services but also by those of other Western countries, including France, 
Germany, and Russia, which opposed the war.  But if his belief in the threat 
of the WMDs was sincere, why, as many commentators have asked since, 
did the Western intelligence services allow such a belief to persist—George 
Tenet of the CIA reportedly told President Bush that the existence of the 
WMDs was a “slam dunk”—when there was so little evidence to support it?  
I believe the answer lies in the Western inability to understand the Arab 
honor culture and in particular the “tyranny of the face.”  Simply put, 
Saddam Hussein lied because he was part of an honor culture that 
demanded he lie.  …A better understanding of this honor culture might or 
might not have made American intelligence analysts more alert to what 
turned out to be the reality of the situation, namely that Saddam was far 
more likely to keep hidden the fact that he didn’t have WMDs than that he 
did, but there can be little doubt that the failure to understand just this was 
responsible for the West’s mistake.12 
 
Now, one might be skeptical of this interpretation.  After all, didn’t Saddam have a 
lot to lose by lying, and potentially quite a bit to gain if he had told the truth?  Dick 
Cheney expressed just these sorts of sentiments in defending his continued belief in 
the existence of the WMDs.  During a September 14, 2003 interview on Meet The 
Press, he told Tim Russert: 
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How do you explain why Saddam Hussein wouldn’t come clean and say, “I 
haven’t got a program.  Come look”?  Then he would have sanctions lifted.  
He’d [have] earned $100 billion more in oil revenue over the last several 
years.  He’d still be in power.  The reason he didn’t was because obviously 
he couldn’t comply and wouldn’t comply with the U.N. resolutions 
demanding that he give up his WMD.13 
 
However, Cheney’s conclusion is warranted only if the potential gains of “coming 
clean” were not offset by what Hussein would consider to be other, unacceptable 
losses.  Bowman argues that in fact, that was almost certainly the case: 
If this seems unlikely as an explanation for the Western intelligence failure, 
we have a concrete example of Saddam Hussein’s doing precisely this.  In 
his interview with Dan Rather just before the war, he denied that he had any  
al-Samoud missiles and denied that he would have destroyed them if he did.  
Yet he did have them and was already on the point of destroying them!  We 
can make sense of this strange reverse hypocrisy—pretending to be more 
bad and intransigent than you really are—only by understanding that to 
Saddam, it was impossible to admit that (a) he had the al-Samoud missiles 
and (b) he was willing to destroy them, even though this was in fact the 
case, since it would involve a loss of face.  Either to have acknowledged 
them, and so admitted that his enemies were right, or to have acknowledged 
their destruction, and therefore his capitulation to U.N. demands, would 
have been an unthinkable confession of weakness.  And looking strong is 
what he, like most of those brought up according to Arab and Muslim ideas 
of honor, cared about more than anything else—more even than the 
continuation of his rule or, indeed, life itself.  In other words, about his 
power and even his life he cared enough to destroy the missiles—and 
maybe, for all we know, many other weapons besides.  But he did not and 
could not say that he was going to destroy them and so do the bidding of his 
enemies.14 
 
If Bowman is right, then this example would seem to illustrate everything that is 
wrong with an ethics that gives a strong amount of weight to how one is perceived.  
Aside from the fact that it is embodied here not by a putatively noble warrior but a 
wicked dictator, we have someone who cares so much about how he appears to 
                                                 
13 Bowman 30. 
14 Bowman 29 – 30. 
 
 109
others that not only does he act against his own self-interest, so doing leads to wide 
scale destruction and loss of life which easily could have been avoided.   
 
Plato and Austen: Justice, Injustice, and Reputation 
Given these considerations, it is easy to understand the tendency in much of 
ethical theory to excise the influence of other people, which is depicted either as a 
hindrance or, at best, irrelevant.  The ideal agent is presented as essentially free of 
preconception, bringing nothing to her judgments save the universal light of reason 
applied to the situation at hand.  Bernard Williams portrays this view in terms of 
reaching convictions through the purity of one’s autonomous deliberations: 
The conception of the moral self as characterless leaves only a limited 
positive role to other people in one’s moral life.  Their reactions should not 
influence one’s moral conclusions, except by assisting reason or 
illumination.  If what others think of me plays an essential role in my moral 
determinations, then morality is thought to have skidded into the 
heteronomy that at the beginning of the chapter we recognized as a familiar 
charge against the mechanisms of shame.15   
 
Shame as applied to ethics is an appropriate contrast here.  In the context of honor, 
shame is the contrary of pride, and both concepts bear a strong connection to one’s 
worth and relation to others—whose regard is specifically given moral weight, as 
we have seen above.  Properly understood, this regard is indeed morally relevant, 
and there are crucial differences between it and the simple heteronomy with which 
it is charged in the objections we have been considering.  These differences 
illustrate the legitimate moral value of pride and concern for reputation as essential 
constituents of a virtuous character. 
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 Although the objection above is obviously at home in modern utilitarian and 
deontological theories, Williams notes that it is also found as far back as Plato, in 
the Republic especially.  While he is correct in his overall criticism of this view, 
part of the problem in Plato’s thought experiment—and a vindication of the role of 
others in our moral lives—is not for the reason that Williams lists.  Speaking of 
Plato’s just but reviled man, he writes:  
A great deal is assumed in the formulation of this thought experiment.  
When we are presented with it, we are simply told that this man is just and 
that he is misunderstood by a perverse or wicked world.  This is something 
we are supposed to understand from outside of the imagined situation.  We 
are given the convictions of the just man himself, and these are taken to be 
true and unshakable.  But suppose we decline to stand outside and to 
assume the man’s justice.  Suppose we change the terms of the solipsistic 
experiment and arrange it from the agent’s perspective, rather than from 
ours or from Plato’s; suppose we make it, in effect, an exercise in ethical 
Cartesianism.  Then we should describe the situation in these terms: this is a 
man who thinks that he is just, but is treated by everyone else as though he 
were not.  If he were merely given that description of himself, it is less clear 
how steady his motivations would prove.  Moreover, it is less clear how 
steady we think they should prove.  For given simply that description, there 
is nothing to show whether he is a solitary bearer of true justice or a deluded 
crank.16 
 
However, this last claim is not really accurate.  There almost certainly would be 
evidence available to our just but unfortunate man which would prove that he was a 
victim of circumstance, and not somehow confused about justice.  Among the 
advantages which Glaucon ascribes to the perfectly unjust man, with his reputation 
for perfect justice, are that “he marries into any family he wishes; he gives his 
children in marriage to anyone he wishes; he has contracts and partnerships with 
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anyone he wants,” and so on.17  Presuming that these very things must then be 
denied to our just man, he would undoubtedly hear: “What, shall we now buy from 
you, that you might swindle in Athens as you did in Thessaly?” and, “Ha! You had 
your fill of Luscia, and now you would despoil my daughter with a false promise of 
marriage!” and other such aspersions.  Hence, in light of other people’s words and 
explanations of their behavior toward him, he would not be left wondering in self 
doubt whether he has misunderstood justice or failed to comprehend society.  
Rather, he would surely know that he is just, but despair at his ill fortune at being 
constantly misperceived.  Quite likely, his own assessment of his situation would 
be captured by R. E. Ewin’s words in “Pride, Prejudice and Shyness:” 
It is clear that one can stand up against the multitude and be pilloried as a 
matter of honour—how can that be if honour is a matter of reputation?  
There are at least two ways that can be.  …as a matter of earning or 
deserving honour, I might have to court bad reputation—these people do 
not honour me, I might recognize, but they would honour me if they really 
knew what was going on.18 
 
And indeed, Darcy and Wickham can be seen for much of Pride and Prejudice as a 
modern embodiment of the Republic’s two characters.  As Elizabeth eventually 
remarks: “There certainly was some great mismanagement in the education of those 
two young men.  One has got all the goodness, and the other all the appearance of 
it.”19  The comparison to Glaucon’s scenario is not exact, both because the truth is 
ultimately revealed and, more importantly, because Darcy’s initial poor appearance 
in the eyes of Elizabeth and others is due at least in part to his own failings.  
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Nevertheless, it is clear both that Darcy is a good man who is misperceived as 
vicious, and—to a large extent because of that misperception (a fact whose 
significance will later be apparent)—Wickham in turn is presumed to be virtuous 
despite his actual degeneracy.  Having read Darcy’s letter of explanation, Elizabeth 
re-evaluates her opinion of Wickham, reflecting: 
His countenance, voice, and manner had established him at once in the 
possession of every virtue.  She tried to recollect some instance of 
goodness, some distinguished trait of integrity or benevolence, that might 
rescue him from the attacks of Mr. Darcy...  But no such recollection 
befriended her.  She could see him instantly before her, in every charm of 
air and address; but she could remember no more substantial good than the 
general approbation of the whole neighborhood, and the regard which his 
social powers had gained him in the mess.20 
 
Ultimately, the conclusion is inevitable: Wickham’s favorable reputation is 
undeserved, and Darcy’s unfavorable one is almost equally so:  
every line proved more clearly that the affair, which she had believed it 
impossible that any contrivance could so represent as to render Mr. Darcy’s 
conduct in it less than infamous, was capable of a turn which must make 
him entirely blameless throughout the whole.21 
 
Of her three objections to Darcy, two are exposed as unfounded; his treatment of 
Wickham is just, and his separation of Bingley from Jane was based mainly on an 
honest and well-intentioned mistake.  What remains, and that for which Darcy is 
yet blameworthy, is the rudeness and self-centeredness he had displayed at their 
first meeting.  This poor showing colored all subsequent opinion of him, masking 
and even derailing the genuine virtues of whose expression he otherwise would 
have been capable.  It is this fact which provides a key to the true moral value of 
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reputation, and points to an answer to the objections we have been considering.  It 
is not just that “had Darcy been a little more forthcoming, Wickham would have 
caused far less damage and certainly would not have eloped with Lydia and made 
the whole Bennet family vulnerable,” although that is certainly part of it.22  More 
importantly, it is the fact that a positive standing in the eyes of others is necessary 
for the exercise of excellence within a community.  As such, the loss of such a 
reputation is a real loss, both for the agent himself and for others.   
  
Daniel Lee: The Injustice of Reputation 
A recent and disheartening illustration of how a negative reputation can 
effectively ruin a life can be seen in the case of Korean rapper Daniel Lee, or 
“Tablo,” whose impressive talents and achievements were essentially dismantled 
by a prolonged and undeserved campaign of hostility against him.  Joshua Davis 
describes a meeting between Lee and one of his few remaining friends, in the midst 
of widespread animosity: 
Lim met with his old friend at an out-of-the-way coffee shop in July.  Lee 
looked exhausted and said he hadn’t been sleeping.  He was depressed and 
his emotions were getting the better of him.  Only months earlier, he had 
played sold out concerts and was besieged by requests for autographs on the 
street.  Now, he had to sneak around just to meet a friend.  “I was 
contemplating whether my life was actually worth living,” Lee says.23 
 
These were the words of a man who by a number of measures had lived a life 
replete with incredible success.  Before the age of 30, Lee had: released multiple 
hip hop albums, five of which reached number 1 on Korean charts; broken through 
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to the United States market where his group also reached number one in sales; 
wrote a best-selling collection of short stories; and married a popular movie star.  
His hard work and considerable talent had brought the Stanford graduate 
considerable blessings and, until the summer of 2010, happiness.24  The idea that a 
person in that situation could wonder whether his life is worth living seems prima 
facie to be unbelievable, or perhaps demonstrative of some kind of mental illness.  
In fact, however, it was a natural consequence of having a deservedly good 
reputation replaced by an outpouring of public disdain and hatred.  Due in part to 
his unusually rapid completion of a master’s degree, as well as an unfortunate 
confluence of bad circumstances, people began to portray Lee as a liar and a fraud:     
In the summer of 2010, Korea was reeling from a streak of fake diploma 
scandals.  It began in 2007, when the chief curator of a modern art museum 
in Seoul was found to have fabricated her Yale PhD.  (It didn’t help that 
Yale initially confirmed the degree.)  She was jailed for 18 months on 
forgery charges, and a nationwide hunt for other offenders ensued.  
Prosecutors investigated at least 120 cases of diploma fraud, ensnaring 
celebrities, politicians and even a monk.  …While this was happening, Lee 
regularly appeared on Korean television shows and was asked about his 
credentials.  He said that he had not only graduated from Stanford in 3½ 
years, but that he also had received a master’s degree in that time.  He said 
that he had written his book, Pieces of You, while he was an undergrad and 
that he had received a creative writing award for one of the stories from 
author and Stanford professor Tobias Wolff, MA ’78.25 
 
Lee was telling the truth about himself, and his educational background ought to 
have only added to his admiration.  However, many people took his claims as 
suspect, both due to wariness in light of the aforementioned scandals—and perhaps 
also because of something more ugly. 
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Many students struggled extraordinarily hard to get into a top school and 
then worked even harder to do well once they were there.  Lee appeared to 
have breezed through Stanford in a short amount of time and come away 
with a master’s on top of it.  His story had the power to make people feel 
stupid.26 
 
Mere skepticism about Lee’s time at Stanford could be seen as natural, of course, 
and if his educational claims really had been fabricated, then backlash against him 
would be both understandable and justified.  However, the fact that people may 
have felt personally inadequate in comparison to him may well explain why they 
refused to believe Lee’s claims even in spite of all the evidence in his support: 
In May 2010, a group of Internet users created an online forum titled “We 
Request the Truth from Tablo,” better known by its Korean acronym 
TaJinYo.  The group didn’t buy Lee’s story.  They started to refer to him as 
“God-blo” because only God could have accomplished as much as Lee.  
The members of the group participated anonymously and attacked Lee from 
behind user names such as Whatbecomes and Spongebobo.27  
 
Hence, due likely in part to a hatred born of jealousy, these and other attackers 
continually denied that Lee was who he said he was, regardless of what Lee said or 
did.  Among other things, Lee provided his transcript to a newspaper, and both the 
registrar of Stanford and Lee’s former professor, Tobias Wolff, confirmed his 
degrees.  Since his citizenship had also come into question, he released his 
Canadian citizenship certificate as well.  All seemed to be in vain.  Not only did the 
attacks against him continue, but they grew to include his mother, brother, and 
wife.  His record label refused to publicly support him, and he was accused of both 
forgery and identity theft.   
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 Needless to say, Lee’s music career came to a screeching halt, but that was 
a mere fraction of his sufferings.  “On the streets, strangers would shout at him, 
calling him a liar and a cheat.  ‘It was like I had stepped into the middle of a 
modern day witch hunt,’ he says.”  Even more disturbing was the threat to his 
family:  
In the midst of the controversy, Lee’s wife gave birth to their first child.  It 
was a moment of joy, but as Lee walked the corridors of the hospital, he 
saw people looking at him coldly and he panicked.  “Since my attackers 
were all anonymous, there was no way for me to know who was after me,” 
Lee says.  “I didn’t know if the doctor, who’s putting needles into my baby, 
is one of those people.  It was terrifying.”28 
 
Eventually, Lee was vindicated.  A national TV special documented a trip to 
Stanford, where he proved the veracity of both his degrees and his identity.  Korean 
courts ordered TaJinYo to divulge the real names of its members, and Lee has since 
filed suit against the ringleaders in the attacks against him.29  Nevertheless, that 
victory does not undo the torment he had suffered, nor that of his family.  Lee was 
harmed psychologically by his persecution, and in its wake, his struggles continue: 
Lee, however, still hasn’t recovered.  He’s still afraid to go out in public and 
doesn’t know if he’ll ever be able to perform for an audience again.  This 
May, he returned to Stanford to give a speech to the Asian American 
Students’ Association.  It was his first public appearance since the 
controversy erupted and even though it was a friendly crowd, Lee was 
paralyzed by stage fright, something he’d never experienced before.  He felt 
nauseated throughout the talk and periodically had to pause to catch his 
breath.  It reinforced his fear that he’d never be able to dominate a stage as 
he once did. 
 
“Honestly, I’m damaged,” he says.  “And I don’t know if I’ll ever be 
better.”30 
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Lee’s unfortunate case demonstrates the importance of reputation not only in its 
own right, but as a foundation for the expression of both moral and non-moral 
excellence.  Aside from his material losses and inability to continue performing, 
Lee’s destroyed reputation made at least three virtues impossible for him to display.  
The most obvious of these is truthfulness.  Initial doubt combined with conspiracy 
theories meant that Lee’s accurate self-descriptions were always, and increasingly, 
interpreted as puffery and boasting.  He lost not only the ability to portray himself 
as he was, but the ability to defend himself from being depicted as much less than 
he was.  Truthful self-justification was continually perverted into further 
accusations against him.  Friendliness, too, became impossible, because he was so 
distrusted and hated.  In a general sense, any disposition toward warmth and 
camaraderie must be undermined in a world where strangers met his gaze with cold 
stares or shouted invectives.  On a more personal level, his ability to make new 
friendships and to sustain existing ones was also largely demolished.  While Lee’s 
aforementioned friend Sean Lim did indeed stand by him, he describes his 
hesitation in doing so:  
Lim himself admits he struggled with the decision to help.  He had a job in 
broadcasting and relied on public goodwill.  He could endanger his career if 
he spoke out.  “I’m ashamed to say that I thought twice about helping Dan,” 
he says.  “I saw what they were doing to him and I was scared.”31 
 
While he was able to overcome that fear to support Lee, not everyone displayed the 
same strength.  His record label was wishy-washy, the Stanford Club of Korea 
would not issue a statement, and even most of the press ceased examining the 
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credibility of the accusations.  In the latter two cases, Davis notes that club 
members “were afraid their reputation as Stanford alumni in Korea would be 
tarnished if they erroneously vouched for the rapper,”32 and that  
Reporters and their managers who published stories disputing TaJinYo 
claims about Lee were flooded with outraged e-mails, calls and demands for 
the reporter’s resignation.  Nobody wanted to be threatened so, according to 
[TV Producer Ki Yeon] Sung, reporters stopped adequately questioning the 
validity of the claims.  As the story became one of the top news items in the 
country that summer, she saw that the mob was having a chilling effect on 
the coverage.33 
 
To be friends with Lee, or even to publicly entertain the idea that he might not be 
thoroughly undeserving of friendliness, was to make of oneself a target.  In the face 
of his ill-repute, justified or not, friendship with Daniel Lee became increasingly 
impossible. 
 Perhaps most striking, however, is the effect of reputation on courage.  In 
an ordeal like Lee’s, such a cardinal trait either becomes impossible to exhibit, or 
must be always displayed to a superhuman degree.  That is, Lee’s life had reached a 
point where he had to live in a nearly constant state of fear.  Both he and his family 
received anonymous threats.  Merely leaving his house was to invite ridicule and 
verbal assault.  Everyone he met was potentially an enemy.  As the saying goes, 
“Just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not out to get you,” and in 
Lee’s case, many of them really were out to get him.  Aristotle describes 
courageous acts as done “for the sake of what is fine,”34 but that should not have to 
include the mere possibility of going about one’s daily existence.  With his whole 
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life a source of justified fear, it could not help but destroy even much of the 
courage he used to possess.  As related above, Lee had never before experienced 
stage fright, nor struggled to perform for a crowd.  The sheer scale of the assault 
against him had served to cripple his well-deserved former confidence, rendering 
his once impressive abilities all but gone.   
  
Reputation as Social Good 
The importance of reputation, then, is much understated if we consider it 
merely in terms of reward, or even insofar as it is required for justice.  It is an 
essential underpinning of the ability to possess and exercise virtue.  Furthermore, 
virtue is by its nature public.  The virtuous person not only flourishes him- or 
herself, but also so acts as to effect the well-being of others.  Positive standing in 
the eyes of the community is necessary in order for this beneficence to be possible.  
In other words, one’s reputation is not only an individual but a social good—a point 
which Robert Bellah emphasizes in relation to modern cases of libel: 
Yet in a recent study of some 900 libel cases between 1974 and 1984, 
Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski report that of the 114 libel plaintiffs they 
interviewed, only about twenty-five percent reported that they brought suit 
primarily to win money damages.  Most of these libel plaintiffs were public 
persons, highly visible to their communities, more than half of whom had 
lived in their communities for more than thirty years.  ...As Bezanson et al. 
make clear, the purpose of the suit for most plaintiffs was to vindicate the 
plaintiff’s reputation.  The outcome, including financial reparation, was 
secondary.  As they put it, few plaintiffs “sue to win”; rather, they “win by 
suing.” 
 What these facts suggest is a rather different and, partly at least, less 
individualistic meaning of reputation among those in public life.  It is true 
that their career chances would be damaged by libel; yet, their chief concern 
is with their standing in the community, as their public effectiveness is 
 
 120
dependent on the favorable reputation they enjoy in their communities.  One 
should not, of course, discount purely egotistical motives, among which a 
desire to be reelected is obviously central.  Nevertheless, if they have any 
desire to carry out their public trust in an effective way, as many public 
officials obviously do, then favorable reputation is an essential resource in 
effective performance.  Such favorable reputation is thus a public good, not 
merely a private possession.35 
 
This insight exposes a key flaw in Plato’s thought experiment.  Note that when 
Glaucon insists on denying good reputation to the just man, it is because “a 
reputation for justice would bring him honor and rewards, so that it wouldn’t be 
clear whether he is just for the sake of justice itself or for the sake of those honor 
and rewards.”36  But this stipulation at least partially mischaracterizes not only the 
function of others’ esteem, but the desire for it.  Since to be truly virtuous is to 
manifest goodness not only in one’s own life but also toward the world at large, it 
is not only necessary to possess, but right to value, a good reputation.  Given this 
fact, we can see that what Glaucon has removed from the just man is not only, as 
intended, a potentially ulterior motivation, but also inadvertently the opportunity to 
exercise justice itself, insofar as it can no longer be really expressed.  As Williams 
notes:  
The members of the lower classes in the city, we are eventually told, do not 
have self-supporting motivations of justice; only the Guardians, who have 
attained the self-revealing state of knowledge, have those.  If the other 
classes could ethically survive at all when not subjected to the actual power 
of the Guardians—and that is a deeply ambiguous issue in the Republic—
they would need an internalized other: an inner Guardian.37 
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Our just but misunderstood man, then, is in effect a moral Cassandra; possessed of 
righteousness and concern for the good of others, but doomed to fail in his attempts 
to benefit, inspire, or lead them.  It is not a thing that he has lost, but a connection: 
“although we think of a person as “having” a reputation, reputation is not a 
property or possession of individuals—it is a relation between persons.”38  
Understood in these terms, we can see that some of the objections to a strong 
emphasis on reputation are undermined by the realization that, like Darcy, we may 
be at fault for placing too little importance on the perception of others.   
 
Integrity, Reputation, and the Significance of Moral Self-Conception 
Still further, it becomes clear that an individual’s character, far from being 
antipathetic to our moral deliberations, must form an essential part of them.  In that 
regard, an imagined scenario by Edmund Pincoffs is illuminating:   
I have made a promise, one of those promises encountered so frequently in 
the literature and so infrequently in life.  It is to meet a friend to attend a 
concert.  That is to say, I have solemnly averred, using the words, “I 
promise”, that this time I will not disappoint him, as I did the last time; and 
that I will indeed be on hand at eight at the theatre.  Meantime (back at the 
ranch) a neighbour calls to remind me of my agreement to attend an eight 
o’clock school board meeting to argue that a proposed desegregation plan is 
inadequate.  What is the correct thing to do?  How shall I decide?  What is 
and is not relevant in my deliberations?  Roughly: What is supposedly 
relevant is the agreements I have made; and what is supposedly not relevant 
is any personal wants or desires or characteristics I may have.  …What is 
relevant must have nothing to do with me, but only with the situation: a 
situation in which anyone could find himself.39 
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Thus we again see the typical picture of modern theories, in which the ideal moral 
agent is supposed to act not according to reasons which depend on anything 
particular to him, but only for reasons which might equally apply to anyone.  In 
contrast to this picture, however, Pincoffs continues: 
Suppose that I have devoted my life to the cause of desegregation: that all 
of my spare time and energy and means are devoted to it.  Suppose that I 
have taken a particular interest in the development of school policy in my 
town.  Suppose that it is simply a part of my self-conception, and a part of 
the conception that others have of me, that I could not miss an opportunity 
to press the cause of desegregation: that if I did so I would have to question 
my own integrity as a person.  Suppose that I know that this particular 
meeting of the school board is a crucial one: one at which the final decision 
on a plan will be made.  Suppose that I am recognized as the chief 
spokesman for the cause of meaningful desegregation.  Suppose that I have 
built a deserved reputation with others and with myself for persistence and 
courage in the face of obstacles, for being a man of principle, for sensitivity 
to the needs of others.  Then what would be right for anyone in a situation 
in which a solemnly given promise conflicts with an agreement to attend a 
meeting might well not be right for me.  If my personal ideals and my 
conception of myself as a moral person are to be excluded from 
consideration as merely personal; if nothing is to remain but considerations 
which have to do with the situation as it would appear to anyone regardless 
of his former character; then the decision-process has been distorted in the 
interest of a mistaken conception of ethics.40 (Italics mine) 
 
There is much to be said in light of this claim, and I want to begin by approaching 
it in terms of an example of my own.  Once game shows become reasonably well 
established, they tend from time to time to have “celebrity” episodes.  Unlike 
regular contestants, the actor, singer or whoever plays on behalf of the charity of 
his or her choosing, with a brief time given toward explaining who will be 
benefited should each of the contestants win.  Most of us have seen such game 
shows, and perhaps some of us have also at times found ourselves—initially, at 
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least—thinking something like the following: “Oh, that’s what she’s playing for?  
That’s nice, I guess, but aren’t there a lot more important causes?”  The sentiment 
is that it’s all well and good to, for instance, fund after school art programs, but 
surely it’s more important that we find a cure for cancer or feed the homeless.  So, 
the thought continues, perhaps if the celebrity were truly being responsible, she’d 
be playing on behalf of something else.   
What are we to make of this kind of reaction?  Viewed from a purely 
neutral position, one might indeed conclude that some ills are more serious than 
others, and hence that whatever resources we have ought first to be devoted to the 
most severe types of maladies.  In this instance the idea is cashed out as a function 
of utility, but it is part of the broader claim that what ought to guide our aims 
morally are features of life or a given situation that bear on any potential agent 
equally.  From that standpoint, there is obviously a sense in which the above 
criticism seems entirely reasonable.  With Pincoffs, however, I contend that this is 
a wrong-headed way of looking at things.  Even aside from the practical difficulty 
of truly ranking the relative importance of goods (if such is even possible in any 
meaningful way) there are several reasons why this is so.  First is that this view of 
the ideal agent as characterless seems to deprive a human life of much of its 
meaning and purpose.  What I mean should become clear in light of some further 
hypothetical considerations.  Suppose our celebrity conveys that in a time of 
darkness, she found in painting a path back to spiritual and mental tranquility.  
Alternately, perhaps she herself, or one of her loved ones, was stricken with a 
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certain disease, giving her firsthand knowledge of its specific kind of suffering.  
Maybe one of her siblings or cousins has a particular type of disability, or she lost a 
friend to an uncommon form of a normally less serious condition.  Or, perhaps she 
even merely recognizes the fulfillment and joy she received from a pastime like 
horseback riding, and wants to give others the chance to experience it, too.  I 
maintain that these are not only reasons, but good reasons, for her to support those 
causes in particular.  More generally, features of individual character matter, 
morally.  It is not only that there are a multitude of various goods and ills that may 
attend a human life, and that they are not neatly commensurable.  These and other 
things are part of what for each of us makes me who I am, part of what gives my 
life identity and meaning.  I have a special relationship to those factors that have 
shaped me and my time on Earth, which in turn represent disparate types of value 
which may attend a human life.  To fail to accord weight to these differences in 
favor of a homogenous non-subjectivity, is to lose sight of the distinctive goods of 
individual persons.  Along those same lines, to do so could not help but to largely 
exclude certain kinds of good from consideration.  If the ideally charitable agent 
contributes to medical research rather than art programs, then morality would seem 
to require us to systematically ignore art as a source of value, and therefore to deny 
something important to human well-being.  (In fact, in terms of the poor emphasis 
on the arts in most public schooling, this particular example is sadly not even all 
that hypothetical.)  There are a variety of goods which comprise well-rounded life 
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and experience, and this standpoint would tend in a practical sense to rule many of 
them out.   
Most significantly, however, there is an important insight to be gleaned in 
the way that individual character affects and influences others within the 
community.  We have seen in much of the preceding remarks how important 
reputation is for one’s own good.  It is also in many ways crucial to the good of 
others, insofar as one may bring that good about.  Specifically, there is a link 
between one’s moral self-conception and one’s reputation as such, in terms of 
moral influence, inspiration, and leadership.  By choosing to live in some ways and 
not others, each person’s life is implicitly a statement about what it means to be a 
human being, an expression of what is or is not of value.  To stand for certain 
principles and ideals, to hold some types of commitments as crucial for human 
good, is not simply an expression of individual will.  It is a claim and an illustration 
of what one takes to be a model for a well-lived life, a call on others to emulate us 
insofar as our own traits and actions are worthy of a person of excellence.  In the 
quote from Pincoffs above, I have emphasized not only that it is part of the 
speaker’s self-conception that he is dedicated to desegregation, but also, 
significantly, that he is recognized as such by others.41  Why this is so important I 
will address partly in terms of another example. 
Let us imagine that a piece of legislation comes before Congress, relating to 
regulations of the use of animals in laboratory testing.  Now, suppose that PETA 
makes no statement whatsoever concerning the bill in question.  In this scenario, I 
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think we should rightly convict PETA of a moral lapse.  By dedicating itself to 
animal welfare, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals has taken upon it a 
certain role in society, in which its members stand not only for the importance of 
that cause, but as a call upon others to embrace it as well.  To give no public 
assessment of a bill which bears so directly on that issue would constitute a failure 
of integrity on its part as an organization.  Two further points are of interest in this 
regard.  First is that it would not necessarily be a failure of integrity in others—
there is a duty that attaches to PETA in particular because of what it is and stands 
for.  Second is that, nevertheless, the particularity of such a duty is compatible with 
the moral precept in question being universally applicable.  That is, while certain 
kinds of duties, sources of value, and even excellences may attach specifically to 
some individuals or organizations because of who and what they are, this need not 
entail that the good in question is not universal in scope.   
Returning to Pincoffs’ example, the speaker has a particular duty to attend 
the meeting because he is a champion for the cause of desegregation.  This fact is, it 
would seem, due to his own choice in dedicating his life to that ideal, and insofar as 
he has done so, he is the locus of any movement toward desegregation in his 
community.  Hence, he has a special duty to advocate desegregation, but 
desegregation is also a cause which all people ought to adopt.  Cheshire Calhoun 
suggests similar points as she rightly describes the social and not merely individual 
nature of integrity: 
To the extent that integrity is, indeed, a personal virtue, this account of the 
significance of standing by one’s principles and values rings true.  What 
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drops out of these accounts, however, is the centrality of standing for 
principles and values that, in one’s own best judgment, are worthy of 
defense because they concern how we, as beings interested in living justly 
and well, can do so.  …not standing up for one’s best judgment about what 
would be just or what lives are acceptable forms of the good suggests that it 
does not really matter what we as a community of reasoners endorse.  The 
person of integrity, one might plausibly think, is precisely the person who 
thinks this does matter.  Integrity here seems tightly connected to viewing 
oneself as a member of an evaluating community and to caring about what 
that community endorses.  That is, it seems to be a social virtue.42 
 
In this way we begin to see the connection between pride, social role, 
integrity, and reputation.  Additionally, by now it should be clear that the last of 
these is far from a selfish preoccupation or morally irrelevant indulgence, but rather 
can bear a crucial importance for both one’s own good and the moral welfare of 
society in general.  In chapter one I suggested that honor’s perceived failings tend 
to arise when its constituent aspects are fractured from one another.  Here we find 
part of the reverse—when these features are united, we can see the person of honor 
as right to take seriously how others perceive him.  He acts so as to illustrate and 
embody how one ought to live as a human being—a task in which he views himself 
as co-constructor with others.  Thus, to reject reputation as morally irrelevant may 
often be, as Ewin recognizes, “to draw a crude distinction between appearances and 
reality; in the important sense, these appearances are part of reality.”43  Here Ewin 
was again referring to Mr. Darcy in Pride and Prejudice, but the point is generally 
applicable.  The favorable regard of others is something we ought to care about for 
specifically moral reasons, because it enables one to engage and lead those others 
in the quest for greater human excellence.  As with the man perceived as the chief 
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advocate for the value of desegregation, the connection between one’s self, one’s 
values, and others’ recognition of the same, is critical to furthering the public 
virtue.   
  
Pride and Worth in One’s Self and Peers 
This connection can also operate in the other direction, in terms of one’s 
regard for other people insofar as they likewise embody ways of being which are 
worthy of respect.  That is, their approval or disapproval is valuable not simpliciter 
or for mere esteem, but because it reflects an assessment of oneself in terms of what 
is taken to be truly noble and worthwhile.  Jonathan Lear describes this 
phenomenon as it pertains to the Crow Indians:44 
Courage requires that one be able to regulate a sense of honor and shame.  
In a traditional community like the Crow, the standards of honor and shame 
were rooted in the community’s values—and in ritual practices of ridicule 
and honor.  In terms of ridicule, it was typical for a person from one’s 
father’s clan to be assigned as one’s personal joker.  …By the time a 
courageous person emerges in the society, the standards of courage have 
become standards of self-regulation.  The courageous Crow warrior didn’t 
avoid shameful acts because he was afraid of getting caught and shamed by 
his fellow tribesman.  He avoided them because they were shameful.  Part 
of what it is to be a courageous person is to have an internal sense of what is 
shameful—and to rule out such acts as impossible.  That is, one needs good 
judgment about which acts are fine and which are disgraceful.  In 
philosophical terms, one needs to be tracking shame; but one also needs to 
be internally motivated to turn one’s back on the shameful.  This is one’s 
second nature: the ability to recognize the shameful, find it repulsive, and 
rule it out as impossible helps to constitute what it is to be a courageous 
person.45 
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accordance with the preference of the Crow themselves (n. 1). 
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This internalization of the standards of pride and shame, then, points to the value 
placed on actually being worthy of honor, rather than a focus on appearance as 
such.  What matters is that one’s life expresses what is fine, and that those who 
might observe one—whether actually or hypothetically—would be correct in their 
favorable assessment.  The failure to understand this relationship lies behind what 
Williams categorizes as a “silly mistake” in analyzing pride and shame: 
Suppose someone invites us to believe that the Homeric Achilles, if assured 
he could get away with it, might have crept out at night and helped himself 
to the treasure that he had refused when it was offered by the embassy: then 
he has sadly misunderstood Achilles’ character… If everything depended 
on the fear of discovery, the motivations of shame would not be internalised 
at all.  No one would have a character, in effect, and, moreover, the very 
idea of there being a shame culture, a coherent system for the regulation of 
conduct, would be unintelligible.46 
 
Achilles must refuse the embassy, because material loss or gain was never what 
was at issue.  The true stakes were much higher, because at its core the conflict 
between Agamemnon and Achilles concerned matters of personal worth.  We can 
see this clearly, first in Agamemnon’s complaint:  
Agamemnon—furious, his dark heart filled to the brim,/ blazing with anger 
now, his eyes like searing fire./  With a sudden, killing look he wheeled on 
Calchas first:/  “Seer of misery!  Never a word that works to my advantage!/  
Always misery warms your heart, your prophecies—/never a word of profit 
said or brought to pass./  Now, again, you divine god’s will for the armies,/ 
bruit it about, as fact, why the deadly Archer/ multiplies our pains: because 
I, I refused/ that glittering price for the young girl Chryseis./  Indeed, I 
prefer her by far, the girl herself,/ I want her in my own house! I rank her 
higher/ than Clytemnestra, my wedded wife—she’s nothing less/ in build or 
breeding, in mind or works of hand./  But I am willing to give her back, 
even so,/ if that is best for all.  What I really want/ is to keep my people 
safe, not see them dying./  But fetch me another prize, and straight off, too,/ 
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else I alone of the Argives go without my honor./  That would be a disgrace.  
You are all witness,/ look—my prize is snatched away!”47  
 
Secondly, in his boasting and threats toward Achilles: 
 
What do you want?  To cling to your own prize/ while I sit calmly by—
empty-handed here?/  Is that why you order me to give her back?/  No—if 
our generous Argives will give me a prize,/ a match for my desires, equal to 
what I’ve lost,/ well and good.  But if they give me nothing/ I will take a 
prize myself—your own, or Ajax’/ or Odysseus’ prize—I’ll commandeer 
her myself/ and let that man I go to visit choke with rage!/  …I will be there 
in person at your tents/ to take Briseis in all her beauty, your own prize—/so 
you can learn just how much greater I am than you/ and the next man may 
shrink from matching words with me,/ from hoping to rival Agamemnon 
strength for strength!”48 
 
And finally in Achilles’ many invectives against him: 
“My honors never equal yours,/ whenever we sack some wealthy Trojan 
stronghold—/my arms bear the brunt of the raw, savage fighting,/ true, but 
when it comes to dividing up the plunder/ the lion’s share is yours, and I go 
back to my ships,/ clutching some scrap, some pittance that I love,/ when I 
have fought to exhaustion./  …Staggering drunk, with your dog’s eyes, your 
fawn’s heart!/  Never once did you arm with the troops and go to battle/ or 
risk an ambush packed with Achaea’s picked men—/ you lack the courage, 
you can see death coming./ Safer by far, you find, to foray all through 
camp,/ commandeering the prize of any man who speaks against you.”49 
 
Achilles portrays Agamemnon as a coward and a bully who fails to give other men 
their proper due.  That this assessment is probably accurate is made more likely by 
the fact that, initially, Achilles was objecting not to Agamemnon’s treatment 
toward him, but was actually speaking on behalf of others: 
But the swift runner/ Achilles answered him at once, “Just how, 
Agamemnon,/ great field marshal… most grasping man alive,/ how can the 
generous Argives give you prizes now?/  I know of no troves of treasure, 
piled, lying idle,/ anywhere.  Whatever we dragged from towns we 
plundered,/ all’s been portioned out.  But collect it, call it back/ from the 
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rank and file?  That would be the disgrace./  So return the girl to the god, at 
least for now./  We Achaeans will pay you back, three, four times over,/ if 
Zeus will grant us the gift, somehow, someday,/ to raze Troy’s massive 
ramparts to the ground.”50 
 
Agamemnon subsequently takes his anger out on Achilles, but this was in response 
to Achilles’ defending the need to maintain the status of the “rank and file.”  Thus, 
while Agamemnon does personally wrong Achilles in particular, there is a deeper 
conflict in terms of what it means to be worthy of honor, and the recognition or 
lack of recognition accorded to one’s compatriots.  What Agamemnon is really 
guilty of, among other things, is the vice of vanity: 
Those who lack virtue but have these other goods are not justified in 
thinking themselves worthy of great things, and are not correctly called 
magnanimous; that is impossible without complete virtue.  However, they 
become arrogant and wantonly aggressive when they have these other 
goods.  For without virtue it is hard to bear the results of good fortune 
suitably, and when these people cannot do it, but suppose they are superior 
to other people, they despise everyone else, and do whatever they please. 
 They do this because they are imitating the magnanimous person 
though they are not really like him.  They imitate him where they can; 
hence they do not do actions expressing virtue, but they despise other 
people.  For the magnanimous person is justified when he despises, since 
his beliefs are true; but the many despise with no good reason.51 
 
Agamemnon plays at being greater than he is, and his further willingness to ignore 
or sacrifice the deserved status of others is what leads Achilles to rightly describe 
him as “armored in shamelessness.”52  A true sense of shame ought to have 
prevented him from dishonoring others, and two features of the conflict and his 
eventual attempt to regain Achilles’ favor are worth noting in this regard.  First is 
that in trying to pay off Achilles with bounty, Agamemnon is essentially offering 
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the same bargain that he himself had earlier refused.  As quoted above, Achilles 
offered on behalf of the army to repay Agamemnon three or four times over for his 
loss, once Troy was sacked and there was new treasure to allot.  Secondly, this 
parallel is dissimilar in that no man was responsible for depriving Agamemnon of 
his prize; giving her up was necessary to appease Apollo and save the army from its 
plague.53  Thus, Agamemnon’s offer is implicitly another assertion of Achilles’ 
inferiority; he deemed such a proposal beneath himself, but it is supposed to be 
good enough for Achilles.  Add to this the fact that Agamemnon committed an 
outrage against Achilles and the army specifically, whereas Achilles had not 
initially sought to dishonor Agamemnon, and it is clear that for Achilles to accept 
the offer would be unthinkable.  To do so would be to place a price on his own self-
worth.  Achilles’ refusal to accept Agamemnon’s attempted peace offering of gold 
and treasure, then, constitutes a certain kind of integrity.  Its relationship to how 
one is perceived by others also serves to vindicate the other dimension of this 
aspect of honor; the nature of pride.  For viewed in terms not of an individual 
contrasted with others, but as an example of excellence within a community, its 
operations become expressive not of a self-centeredness antagonistic to morality, 
but the insistence on proper respect for what is truly deserving of value. 
 In this way the concern for one’s reputation, and the essence of one’s pride, 
springs from the reality of who and what one is.  For instance, what our 
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aforementioned Crow warrior cares about is not to be thought courageous whether 
in fact he is or not, nor a baseless regard which is unattached from his own being.  
His aim is to be a good member of his community; to exercise the virtues of a 
Crow.  In Aristotelian terms, there is no difference between the function of a Crow 
and the function of a good Crow, and he strives to be a model of the shared 
conception of that kind of excellence.  One’s reputation is important here in the 
sense that one takes pride in being the sort of person that other people can respect, 
for the right reasons, and where the other people are themselves worthy of respect 
for those same reasons.  The specification that the other people are themselves 
respectable is significant, and further justifies the place of reputation in moral 
deliberation.  Part of the objection to considering the view of others morally 
relevant depends on the notion that it represents a basically unqualified popularity.  
But Williams rightly points out the importance of  
the identity, and attitudes, of the other whose gaze is in question.  Shame 
need not be just a matter of being seen, but of being seen by an observer 
with a certain view.  Indeed, the view taken by the observer need not itself 
be critical: people can be ashamed of being admired by the wrong audience 
in the wrong way.  Equally, they need not be ashamed of being poorly 
viewed, if the view is that of an observer for whom they feel contempt.  
Hector was indeed afraid that someone inferior to him would be able to 
criticize him, but that was because he thought the criticism would be true, 
and the fact that such a person could make it would only make things worse.  
The mere fact that such a person had something hostile to say would not in 
itself necessarily concern him.  Similarly, on the Greek side of the war the 
opinions of Nestor carried weight, and those of Thersites did not.54 
 
This observation has brought us back to one of the problems raised at the beginning 
of the chapter, but with an added wrinkle.  It seems entirely reasonable that if 
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someone reprehensible scoffs at my behavior, it may well be a cause for pride, let 
alone not productive of shame.  If I strive toward excellence, it is the regard of the 
excellent that counts.  That being said, however, could not a hero and a villain both 
assess me in the same way?  Whether in theory or in practice, if each makes the 
same claim, then it must be equally accurate or inaccurate whichever one happens 
to convey it.  This was the point of the earlier example of Achilles and Thersites.  If 
we take the same criticism of Agamemnon seriously when uttered by the former, 
but dismiss it when heard from the latter, is this not to commit the genetic fallacy?  
How can we reconcile this worry with the seemingly correct notion that in terms of 
shame, the identity and worth of the one who praises or disparages me ought to 
matter? 
 
Pride, Shame, and the Moral Community  
I think the answer lies in certain features of hypocrisy.  Discussing the 
nature of that vice, Christine McKinnon notes that: 
Moral assessments are things we take seriously, and we do so, I contend, 
because they provide content to our notion of the perfectibility of man and 
to the idea of human excellences towards which persons ought to strive.  
Part of what is involved in the concept of human excellence is an 
understanding of what traits are worth cultivating and what things are worth 
desiring.   
 …The reasoning of the hypocrite is incompatible with her being a 
genuine member of a moral community in which judgements presume 
certain minimal connections between desires, intentions, and actions.  By 
divorcing motive and action the hypocrite distorts the psychology of action 
and the kind of reasoning employed in such a moral community, and by 
manipulating the evidence upon which judgements are based the hypocrite 
shows contempt for its practitioners.55 
                                                 




All this is indeed true of Thersites who, if nothing else, seems to be at least as bad 
if not worse a man than Agamemnon.  Homer conveys how while most of the army 
was brought back to order under Odysseus’ urging: 
one man, Thersites, still railed on, nonstop./  His head was full of 
obscenities, teeming with rant,/ all for no good reason, insubordinate, 
baiting the kings—/anything to provoke some laughter from the troops./  
…Achilles despised him most, Odysseus too—/he was always abusing both 
chiefs, but now/ he went for majestic Agamemnon, hollering out,/ taunting 
the king with strings of cutting insults./  The Achaeans were furious with 
him, deeply offended.56    
 
Again, though, we may ask, does this matter?  As aforementioned, should not his 
assessment of Agamemnon stand or fall on its own merits?  In an important sense, 
however, his and Achilles criticisms are not really the same.  When Achilles 
disparages Agamemnon, it is as one who shares a conception of excellence for a 
warrior, and he convicts Agamemnon of not living up to standards that putatively, 
at least, they both accept.  His motivations concern worth and recognition, 
according to shared ideals that both men take seriously.  Thersites, on the other 
hand, is motivated only by the desire to cause trouble, sow chaos, and get a laugh.  
He is not an ally of Achilles, a champion for anyone’s deserved recognition, nor 
even concerned as a soldier.  Thus, he is not really insulting Agamemnon, or more 
precisely, he is not insulting only Agamemnon, and not for the reasons he 
professes.  Rather, his actions display contempt for the entire Greek army, and 
serve not only to undermine its cohesion as a unit, but to denigrate the values its 
members stand for.  When Achilles rages at Agamemnon it is motivated by a 
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respect for martial virtues, whereas Thersites’ own remarks trade on their 
disparagement.  On this last point, then, when Odysseus says “Who are you to 
wrangle with kings, you alone?/  No one, I say—no one alive less soldierly than 
you,” it is actually quite telling, and justifies the reaction toward him.57  What 
Odysseus rejected was not the justified outrage of a sincere but low-ranking soldier, 
but an attempt to sow discord and insubordination from a man who disgraced the 
station of warrior and tried to incite others to do likewise.     
 In similar fashion we may also find Lancelot in the earlier example to be 
less blameworthy than he initially appeared.  I noted before the seemingly skewed 
priorities involved in his concern for his own shame as compared to the fact of the 
slain damsel.  This type of objection to shame is aptly described by Jennifer C. 
Manion:  
Shame is often classified as a narcissistic emotion.  Since the “object” of 
concern is the entire self or entire aspects of the self… Theorists surmise 
that shame not only locates but locks attention on the self so that others, and 
one’s effect on others, drop out of consideration.58 
 
While that certainly appears to be what takes place in this example, it should be 
remembered that Lancelot’s initial rebuke concerned not his own honor per se, but 
that of knights in general.  His claim is that by attempting to kill the lady, “thou 
doest shame to thyself and all knights,” (italics mine) and we might be curious how 
this is meant to be so.  Why should the actions of some other knight reflect badly 
on Lancelot, let alone all knights everywhere?  The reason becomes clear once we 
understand the two men as embodying a certain role, with specific duties and goals 
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related to the well-being of the larger society.  Felicia Ackerman describes how in 
addition to fighting for their lords and king, knights of the Round Table were  
quasi policemen and keepers of the peace, who prevent and investigate 
crimes, rescue victims and potential victims, pacify rebels, and (unlike 
policemen in our society) lawfully sometimes mete out summary, even 
capital punishment.  …The goals of upholding the kingdom, doing justice 
with honor and without brutality, and protecting the vulnerable are vitally 
important.59 
 
As essential as those duties are, the knights’ role takes on an even greater 
importance with the understanding that they were obligated not only to enforce 
justice, but in a sense to actually create it: 
Nowadays we are apt to take for granted our modern system of criminal 
justice, where the guilt or innocence of someone is determined by 
presenting evidence to an impartial jury of his peers.  In Arthur’s kingdom, 
however, guilt or innocence is determined in a trial by battle between the 
accuser (or a knight fighting on his behalf) and the accused (or a knight 
fighting on his behalf).  In a sense, the judge is God, who is expected to 
“speed the right” by providing victory to the side of the accused if he is 
innocent and to the side of the accuser if the accused is guilty.60 
 
She notes, however, that while it was generally expected that God would indeed 
speed the right, such was by no means a foregone conclusion, nor did any delusion 
prevail that it was one.  Bouchard similarly states of both history and literature that: 
The problem with trial by battle, as everyone in fact knew even at the time, 
was that the wrong man might win.  Even in the romances the “right” 
person did not always win; in [The Song of] Roland Ganelon almost had to 
be freed because no one dared face his formidable champion.  The church 
hierarchy, indeed, withdrew all support of trials by ordeal, including trial by 
battle, in the thirteenth century.  But in spite of the doubts raised both in 
literature and in real judicial discussions, there was a sense throughout the 
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late Middle Ages that he who won must have right and probably God on his 
side, not just his strength and his sword.61 
 
For a knight to knowingly fight on the wrong side, then, is more than a personal 
failing.  It is in effect a subversion of all truth and righteousness, as a knight’s 
strength of arms is supposed to be not only the instrument but the guarantor of 
goodness, justice, and God’s will on Earth.  Hence, one who forsakes or ignores 
this responsibility instigates villainy which is not merely local, but systemic and 
far-reaching:  
The possibility of such wrongful victory in Malory’s world is part of what 
makes the oath’s final stricture a stricture against an offense that is more 
dangerous socially than merely wasting time and energy in a futile battle.62 
 
The oath in question, in fact, explicitly outlines the duties and station and their 
connection to the end of a harmonious society.  Early on in Malory’s tale, he writes 
that King Arthur 
…charged them never to do outrageousity nor murder, and always to flee 
treason; also, by no means to be cruel, but to give mercy unto him that 
asketh mercy, upon pain of forfeiture of their worship and lordship of King 
Arthur for evermore; and always to do ladies, damosels, and gentlewomen 
succour, upon pain of death.  Also, that no man take part in no battles in a 
wrongful quarrel for no law, nor for no world’s goods.  Unto this were all 
the knights sworn of the table Round, both old and young.  And every year 
they swore at the high feast of Pentecost.63 
 
As such, it begins to become clear why a knight’s individual action bears 
implications for the status and abilities of both other knights and the citizenry at 
large.  Like the aforementioned modern figures who need the public trust in order 
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to effectively carry out their duties, knights must have a reputation for both fairness 
and strength.  Unless they are seen, as a class, to possess both the good faith of 
acting for what is right and the power to enforce it, then the community cannot 
depend on the provision of justice or order, and the fabric of society breaks down.  
Hence, Sir Pedivere’s disgraceful actions have consequences for knights in general 
and Lancelot specifically.  Given the nature of a knight’s duties, the confidence of 
the populace in counting on their deeds and abiding by their words is an essential 
condition of the excellence particular to their role.     
 Further to that point, we can see that Lancelot’s initial words function in 
much the same way as the “Marines don’t do that” rebuke discussed in chapter two.  
What Lancelot tries to evoke in Sir Pedivere is the realization that his rage-born 
action is incompatible with who and what he is.  He is—or at least, can and should 
be—something better than that; one whose power is wielded in service of justice 
and prosperity, not as a means to overpower the defenseless.  Even were he right 
about his wife’s lack of fidelity (and while the text is compatible with that 
possibility, it seems we are meant to believe that he is not) he would still be in the 
wrong by seeking to slay her himself.  He was clearly beyond the point of caring 
whether it was wrong to kill his wife, as evidenced by the fact that he was trying to 
kill her at all.  But he might yet have been brought back to his senses by the notion 
that he was doing something shameful in general.  Hence, Lancelot’s focus on the 
disgraceful nature of Pedivere’s activities, and even the fact that the latter has 
wronged him personally, need not be indicative of self-centeredness or a lack of 
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regard for the lady.  The crime against her is what makes Pedivere’s actions 
shameful.  Rather, it is an attempt to induce Pedivere to view himself in the larger 
context of what knighthood represents: first to inspire him to give up his unworthy 
course of action, and later in response to an outrage committed against more than 
just his intended victim.  Pedivere had violated the ideals of knighthood almost as 
completely as possible, and the story ends with him no longer a knight but doing 
penance as a hermit instead.  As Lancelot declares, “In a shameful hour wert thou 
born,” for Pedivere had utterly failed to live up to what he should have been, the 
excellence for both self and society embodied by his former role.64 
 Thus, we have seen the importance of pride, reputation, and a sense of 
shame in the moral life, as well as the connection between those concepts and the 
integrity born of one’s social role.  What the preceding discussion has made clear is 
that an ethics which places emphasis on how one is perceived need not for that 
reason be narcissistic, deliberatively heteronymous, nor concerned with appearance 
over reality.  In contrast, once we recognize the social nature of integrity and the 
requirement of good reputation in exercising virtue, the force of these objections 
begins to fall away.  While these may be real dangers, they arise contingently, and 
not as an inevitable component of honor.  One who cares not for moral excellence 
to begin with will of course want to hide his wickedness beneath a veneer of 
acclaim, exhibiting the vices described.  But the truly honorable person rightly 
cares about being viewed favorably, both in terms of his own good, and because he 
cares about the values his life stands for and their relation to the good of other 
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people.  That is, he wants other people to recognize the genuine virtues that his life 
displays.  Just as Plato’s perfectly just man could not actually demonstrate his 
justice with a reputation for injustice, so too is the esteem of others necessary for 
our own virtuous activity.  To be honorable is to care about expressing and 
endorsing true human excellence, and to value a good reputation is a necessary  
pre-requisite of that endeavor.  Some further questions concerning models of such 
excellence will provide the backdrop for the final chapter of this treatise on honor. 
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Chapter 5: Heroes Only Need One Reason 
 
 In the preceding chapters I have emphasized that honor is an ethics of 
being, and argued that one of its strengths is its connection to a sense of moral 
identity.  To be a person whose life and role embody something worthwhile 
generates an integrity which links moral worth and self-worth, justifying both pride 
in what one is and a concern for reputation among others.  The person of honor, I 
have argued, stands as a model of excellence to which others might also aspire.  
Some questions remain, however, and to conclude the picture of honor it is 
necessary now to address them.  In developing this treatise, I have held up a 
number of examples both fictional and historical, as putative illustrations of what a 
sense of honor entails.  Given my argument that we ought thus to be inspired by 
these examples and adopt an honor-based ethics ourselves, then, there are three 
difficulties that must be addressed concerning their suitability.  If the identity in 
question is tied in part to one’s role, how do we handle cases where societal change 
renders that role either impossible or irrelevant?  Furthermore, does an ethics of 
being require that its exemplars be fully virtuous, or at least free of serious defect?  
Finally, are fictional cases such as ones I have presented appropriate models for the 
behavior of real people?  I will defend the notion that we can derive genuine moral 
illumination from both real and literary examples, and that such examples can 
illustrate aspects of honor in spite of the moral flaws of past societies.  
Additionally, the insights provided can fruitfully inform and transform our own 
lives, despite changes in the world which alter or remove the place of a given social 
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role within it.  These related points are also connected through the nature of 
heroism, understood in terms of transforming oneself and one’s world for the 
better. 
 
The Crow: Honor Amidst Societal Collapse 
We have previously analyzed the life of honor in terms of maintaining an 
identity, where what one is both embodies and demands a continued excellence.  
There is a given ideal of greatness for an individual situated within his or her 
community, and the challenge is to continue to be the sort of person who lives 
within that ideal.  In those terms we saw a conception of what it was to be a 
warrior, through the lens of what it meant to fail to be one.  That is, the successful 
warrior exhibits a personal virtue sufficient to meet the challenges that his or her 
role requires.  On these grounds the question of honor is in an important sense 
straightforward.  It is primarily a function of one’s own uprightness, fortitude, and 
resolve; success or failure in continuing to be honorable is determined by one’s 
own character.  We encounter a problem, however, when we consider a different 
sense in which one may fail—a sense in which “fail” is not even a wholly accurate 
term, because it largely bypasses personal virtue altogether.  The problem arises 
when the world itself changes such that the role one embodied is no longer 
comprehensible.  We have seen small glimpses of this difficulty previously in the 
case of the samurai, when waning opportunities to fight for one’s lord amid relative 
peace and stability led to frustrated warriors seeking excuses to fight over foolish 
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matters.  Nevertheless, the model of rendering service to one’s lord remained, and 
the concept of duty which the samurai class embodied was still possible to display.  
Therefore, it also remained possible to criticize the samurai for failing to live up to 
that duty, along the same dimensions upon which they would have been judged 
before, and according to values they continued to accept.  The problem I want to 
address now, however, is different and worse, because it involves the dissolution of 
a very framework of values.   
This holistic kind of calamity is what Jonathan Lear describes as having 
happened to the Crow.  As he relates, the Crow were nomadic hunters and warriors, 
for whom battle and courage served as a focal point for all aspects of society:  
During the period of vibrant nomadic life, everything was somehow related 
to hunting and war.  All the rituals and customs, all the distribution of 
honor, all the day-to-day preparations, all the upbringing of the children was 
organized toward these ends.1   
 
As such, an observer of Crow community might fairly conclude that 
 
every event in Crow life—even cooking a meal—gained its significance 
within the larger framework of Crow meaning.  Such a witness would insist 
that in traditional Crow life there was no such thing as the bare cooking of a 
meal.  Every meal was in effect the cooking-of-a-meal-so-that-those-who-
ate-it-would-be-healthy-to-hunt-and-fight.  …in traditional Crow life, 
everything counted either as hunting or fighting or preparing to hunt and 
fight.2 
 
The specific form which Crow honor in battle took related to the concepts of coups 
and coup sticks.  “Counting coups” referred to both the performance of, and post 
facto retelling of, exploits demonstrative of bravery.  These included striking an 
enemy in battle before harming him (letting him know in advance that he was 
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doomed), taking an enemy’s weapons while he was still alive, striking the first 
enemy to fall in battle; and similar deeds in war.  The coup sticks themselves 
represented a metaphorical line which an enemy could not cross; by planting it in 
the ground a warrior eliminated retreat from the realm of what was possible.  A 
Crow who planted his coup stick thereby committed himself to hold that ground or 
die.3  Thus, warfare and bravery provided the basis for honor and meaning in Crow 
society, and coups formed the basis of warfare and bravery. 
 The tragedy that befell the Crow, however, was reaching a point where their 
old way of life, as well as the former sources of honor and self-understanding, were 
no longer possible.  From 1851 – 1882 the beleaguered Crow found their enemies 
encroaching, the buffalo disappearing, and their lands diminished through 
treaties—first to thirty-three million acres, then eight million, then only two 
million. Eventually,  
In the period 1882-1884 the Crow—their resources depleted, threatened by 
disease, cold, and starvation—moved to a reservation.  Intertribal warfare 
was forbidden by the U.S. government.  Hunting became impossible, both 
because all the beaver and buffalo had been killed and because the Crow 
were now forbidden to pursue a nomadic life.  There was also devastating 
mortality.  As Hoxie points out, nearly one-third of the 2,461 Crow 
recorded in the 1887 census died in the 1890s, as a result of a confluence of 
poor sanitation in new conditions of confinement, lack of ability to resist 
diseases spread by white settlers, and malnutrition.  The younger generation 
was all but wiped out.  Not surprisingly, those who survived suffered 
massive disorientation.  Ambitious young men, wishing to establish 
themselves in the tribe, could think only in terms of warfare—but warfare 
had been forbidden.  There were sporadic intertribal attacks, but overall the 
young men had a sense that they had come too late to participate in the 
Sioux wars.4 
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The most telling part of this account is the observation that the young men had no 
way to establish themselves in the tribe.  As alluded to above, they did not face a 
challenge to their abilities, where failure would result if they were found lacking 
but success would follow on the heels of skill and bravery.  What confronted the 
young and old Crow alike was the lack of a way to even test that ability.  A sad 
example of this changed reality surrounds an incident centered around a young man 
named Wraps His Tail:  
In the summer of 1887, members of the Blackfeet tribe had stolen horses 
from the Crow, thus inflicting a tribal insult.  A group of young Crow, led 
by Wraps His Tail, set out to get revenge and count coup.  On September 30 
they returned exultant: they had captured Blackfeet horses and were 
parading them through the camp.  On some earlier occasion, this would 
have been a classic example of counting coups.  There was, apparently, 
much shouting and shooting of guns into the air.  At one point, Wraps His 
Tail, who was then twenty-five, rode up to the agency interpreter, Tom 
Stewart, and stuck a gun into his belly.  He then pulled it away, and fired 
into the air.  In another time, and if the whites had been their enemy, this 
would have counted as a further coup.  It is not clear whether the much-
hated agent, H. E. Williamson, came out to confront the crowd or whether 
Wraps His Tail rode up to him; but in any case, shots were fired in his 
presence, going over his head, over the rooftops of the houses, but hitting 
the bricks of a chimney.  The young men then rode away.   
 What began as a traditional celebration to count coup went badly 
wrong.  Williamson reacted to this outburst by declaring that the original act 
of taking horses from the Blackfeet was “horse-stealing,” and he ordered the 
young men arrested.  …Wraps His Tail was angry about the overall threat 
to the Crow way of life, but he was also upset about meaning: “They call us 
‘thieves’… They, the palefaces, who make treaties only to break them, who 
have stolen our buffalo and our land, they call us ‘thieves.’ 
 
Thus, the Crow lost not only land or certain types of opportunities, but in an 
important sense a meaning.  The kinds of actions which had previously served as 
the grounds of excellence could no longer be intelligible as such.  That is, the 
categories by which Crow excellence had traditionally been derived had seemingly 
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ceased to exist.  Counting coups was no longer possible—not because of a lack of 
brave men, but because the kinds of acts which traditionally exemplified bravery no 
longer possessed that significance.  There was no place for that form of life in the 
world in which the Crow now found themselves.  Tragically, Crow excellence was 
essentially circumvented altogether.  As Lear continues, the threat concerned the 
very nature of Crow identity: 
If the traditional Crow experienced devastation in things they might do, 
they also experienced a terrible attack on what they might be.  If we 
consider a vibrant culture, it is possible to distinguish: 
 
1.  Established social roles.  These will include socially sanctioned forms of 
marriage, sexual reproduction, family, and clan; standard social positions 
such as warrior, squaw, medicine man, and chief; ceremonial rituals, and so 
on. 
 
2.  Standards of excellence associated with these roles.  These give us a 
sense of a culture’s ideals: what it would be, say, to be really outstanding as 
a chief, as a squaw, as a warrior, as a medicine man.   
 
3.  The possibility of constituting oneself as a certain sort of person—
namely, one who embodies those ideals.  I shall call such a person a Crow 
subject.  This is what young Plenty Coups aspired to: to be a chief, to be 
outstanding as chief, and thus to be a living embodiment of what it was to 
be a Crow.5 
 
Similarly, the question must arise whether an ethics of honor is equipped to deal 
with the possibility of changes such as what happened to the Crow.  Honor is an 
ethics of being, where one’s sense of worth and moral motivation stem from the 
value inherent to what one is.  But the type of calamity described above threatens it 
in every facet.  For example, one’s reputation is important, we have seen, because it 
allows one to lead and inspire others to greater excellence.  But if the criteria of 
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excellence are no longer comprehensible, then both esteem and moral inspiration 
fall away as well.  If the world changes such that the place one had in the world no 
longer truly exists, then it is unclear what it can mean to maintain one’s self as what 
one is.  Thus, for honor as an ethics of being to be a viable ethical conception, it 
must be possible for a sense of honor to transcend the local character in which it 
may be based. 
 In the case of the Crow, this is exactly the challenge that had to be met by 
Plenty Coups.  His achievement consisted of discovering and creating a new 
paradigm of being excellent as a Crow, in a way which nevertheless utilized and 
paid homage to traditional Crow values.  In particular, he sought wisdom through 
the medium of dreaming.  As a mere boy, he had experienced a dream which was 
taken by the tribe to be oracular in foretelling the coming of the white man and the 
end of the Crow way of life, but also providing instruction on how to survive: 
In the dream, Plenty Coups was visited by a Buffalo-bull person who turned 
into a Man-person.  It was this Man-person who pointed out to him the 
radically new future he would have to face.  The Man was a teacher figure, 
who exposed Plenty Coups to a new world and asked him whether he 
understood it.  Whatever the ultimate spiritual source of this Man-person, 
we need to think of him as one of plenty Coups’s internalized others. 
 …The Man-person gave specific though enigmatic advice: listen to 
the Chickadee person!  The Chickadee-person has that special capacity to 
listen to others and learn from them.  “He is willing to work for wisdom.”  
He is thus the bird-philosopher—in the sense that Plato gave that term: he 
knows that he lacks wisdom, but he yearns for it; and thus he is led to seek 
it from others.  In psychological terms, the internal figure of the Man-
person instructed young Plenty Coups to cultivate the development of the 
Chickadee-person as a new, but crucial, ego-ideal.  Suppose young Plenty 
Coups were to succeed at this imaginative task.  Then he would have an 
internalized other under whose gaze he would never feel shame when 
learning from others.  Indeed, it would be an ego-ideal who would be 
encouraging him to listen and never miss a chance to learn with others.  
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Suppose, too, that in these radically disruptive circumstances courage 
required one to face this new culture with openness and a willingness to 
learn.  If that were the case, then young Plenty Coups would have dreamed 
himself into the new virtue of courage.  And he would have done so using a 
traditional icon, the chickadee.6 
 
In large part because of this dream, the Crow decided to ally with the U.S. 
government against other tribes.  This was the way of the chickadee—they would 
learn from the white man, use his knowledge in order to go forward, and in so 
doing survive the cultural devastation and form new ways of being for the Crow.  
While they did still suffer some losses as a result of this partnership, history seems 
nevertheless to have vindicated their decision.  As Lear conveys: 
And the U.S. government did treat the Crow as an ally.  This fact did not 
stop the United States from repeatedly revising treaties at will and from 
encroaching on Crow lands.  But, unlike other tribes, the Crow were not 
displaced from their lands, they were not put on a forced march, they did 
not have to walk a “trail of tears”—and they could correctly say of 
themselves that they were never defeated.7 
 
Additionally, from 1917 – 1920, the Crow led delegations which eventually 
resulted in the Crow Act of 1920, which protected their lands, allowed them to 
retain the mineral rights to it, and prevented further attempts to allot it, ending 
seventy years of government land grabs.  Additionally, Plenty Coups himself was 
instrumental in preventing further land sales of the Pryor and Big Horn mountains8, 
fostering the development of a new, closer school for Crow children to attend9, and 
setting his home as a national park in Montana for both Crow and white people.10 
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 Perhaps most significantly, Plenty Coups led his people in a transformation 
of identity, where amidst an irrevocably altered world they could find new ways of 
being, which nevertheless continued to embody distinctively Crow ideals.  As 
mentioned, the wisdom of the chickadee is instrumental to this process in a general 
sense, and Plenty Coups admonished his people to utilize its virtue. 
Plenty Coups laid down an enduring collective ideal for the tribe as it faced 
new challenges.  He drew upon ancient tribal beliefs—the chickadee has 
long been respected among the Crow—and put them to new use.  He 
insisted that his people learn the white man’s ways, but he idealized neither 
the white man nor his own tribe.  …At feasts, he would lecture them: “You 
who were once brave have turned into pigs.  I am ashamed of you.  Self-pity 
has stolen your courage, robbed you of your spirit and self-respect.  Stop 
mourning the old days, they are gone with the buffalo.  Go to your 
sweatlodges and cleanse your bodies… then clean out your dirty lodges and 
go to work!”  Yet he hoped that a new generation would be able to hold 
onto traditional Crow values and customs while synthesizing them with a 
white man’s education.11 
 
More specifically, he was able to translate the warrior virtues specific to Crow life 
and integrate them into a new conception in the changed world: 
Plenty Coups was also able to preserve some of the traditional warrior 
ideals in this radically new context.  As we saw in the first chapter, at the 
dedication ceremony of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Plenty Coups 
laid down his coup stick and his headdress.  But he also declared a new role 
for the Crow warrior… If one visits the Veterans’ Memorial at the Crow 
Agency today one will see a list of distinguished Crow veterans who have 
served with or in the U.S. Military from the original Sioux wars, through 
World Wars I and II, the Korean War, Vietnam, Panama, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq.  On the wall there is a plaque, “Warrior’s Homecoming” …There 
follows a description of how to perform the ceremony as well as advice 
about how to think about its meaning in these new historical circumstances.  
Thus a direct link is made between the ancient warrior values and the new 
and available role of combat veteran.  And Plenty Coups’s words paved the 
way.12 
 
                                                 
11 Lear 139 – 140. 
12 Lear 153 – 154. 
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As we have seen, then, what Plenty Coups was able to accomplish is to retain the 
meaning and power of traditional Crow excellence, transformed into a new 
incarnation for a world that had changed around his people.  While events beyond 
the Crow’s control threatened to bypass and undermine the grounds by which 
excellence was measured, that did not have to mean that the old roles were entirely 
lost, nor irrelevant in the face of the future.  Despite some loss—even great loss—
and some necessary alteration, there were still ways to maintain themselves as 
Crow, and thus to found ideas of excellence in terms of a pride and worthiness of 
maintaining what they were.  An ethics of being was still possible, and still 
possessed vital power despite the collapse of the world to which the roles in 
question were initially attuned. 
 
Honor Real and Fictional 
 Plenty Coups’ example shows us that a sense of moral identity can survive 
and remain applicable to times and contexts beyond its original incarnation.  As 
such, there is an additional significance to be seen in its relation to the realm of 
mythology.  Joseph Campbell writes in The Hero With a Thousand Faces that  
The hero, therefore, is the man or woman who has been able to battle past 
his personal and local historical limitations to the generally valid, normally 
human forms.  Such a one’s visions, ideas and inspirations come pristine 
from the primary springs of human life and thought.  Hence they are 
eloquent, not of the present, disintegrating society and psyche, but of the 
unquenched source through which society is reborn.  The hero has died as a 
modern man; but as eternal man—perfected, unspecific, universal man—he 
has been reborn.  His second solemn task and deed therefore (as Toynbee 
declares and as all the mythologies of mankind indicate) is to return then to 
us, transfigured, and teach the lesson he has learned of life renewed.  
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…Whether presented in the vast, almost oceanic images of the Orient, in the 
vigorous narratives of the Greeks, or in the majestic legends of the Bible, 
the adventure of the hero normally follows the pattern of the nuclear unit 
above described; a separation from the world, a penetration to some source 
of power, and a life-enhancing return.13  
 
It is perhaps striking to note both that Campbell’s words describe precisely what 
Plenty Coups seems to have actually done (seeking a source of power through 
dreaming, and transforming the conception of what it meant to be a Crow through 
the otherworldly figure of the chickadee) and that they were written as a point 
about narratives.  Only “perhaps” striking, because the resemblance between life 
and literature would be unremarkable if, in fact, life embodies the same forms and 
structures that characterize story-telling.  Campbell himself certainly stressed that 
connection.  MacIntyre, too, sees stories as fundamental to both human life and 
self-concept: 
I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior 
question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’  We enter human 
society, that is, with one or more imputed characters—roles into which we 
have been drafted—and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to 
understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt 
to be construed.  It is through hearing stories about wicked step-mothers, 
lost children, good but misguided kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, 
youngest sons who receive no inheritance but must make their own way in 
the world and eldest sons who waste their inheritance on riotous living and 
go into exile to live with the swine, that children learn or mis-learn both 
what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the 
drama to which they have been born and what the ways of the world are.  
Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious 
stutterers in their actions as in their words.  Hence there is no way to give us 
an understanding of any society, including our own, except through the 
stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources.  Mythology, 
in the original sense, is at the heart of things.  Vico was right and so was 
Joyce.  And so too of course is that moral tradition from heroic society to its 
                                                 
13 Joseph Campbell, The Hero With a Thousand Faces 19-20, 35. 
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medieval heirs according to which the telling of stories has a key part in 
educating us into the virtues.14    
 
In illustrating honor, I have made both implicit and explicit use of such a thesis.  
Examples of each of its parts have come at times from real life, but have in addition 
drawn heavily from the domain of fiction.  Such examples have included tales of 
knights and samurai, fiction conceived for both adults and children, movies, and 
even a cartoon version of a comic-book character.  In so doing I have depended on 
the premise that such stories are legitimate sources of genuine moral knowledge 
and illumination; such characters appropriate exemplars of what it means to exhibit 
honor.  It is necessary now to defend that claim against some potential objections.  
Still further, I will argue that stories possess a power which in many ways makes 
them more suited to enlightenment than are non-fiction forms of inquiry.  Seeing 
through these characters an example of how we might be, we can find in the 
heroism of stories a model for honor in life. 
First, however, I want to briefly speak to a basic type of objection to the 
idea that literature can be a source of knowledge, moral or otherwise.  Specifically, 
this objection concerns the metaphysical status of its components.  Much ink has 
been spilled in disputation of whether fictional entities exist, what it means to refer 
to them (if, indeed, they can be referred to meaningfully), whether and what sorts 
of properties they have, and whether statements about them can rightly said to be 
true or false.  For instance, Van Inwagen spends considerable effort in specifying 
just how “creatures of fiction” and their properties are to be understood in terms of 
                                                 
14 MacIntyre 216. 
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predicate logic,15 and Plantinga devotes several pages of The Nature of Necessity to 
the status of fictional characters across possible worlds.16  My own view is that 
these sorts of endeavors tend to obfuscate rather than illuminate, and that they have 
little bearing on the question of literature’s ability to edify.  Although his interest 
does lie in the former types of questions moreso than the latter, Urmson’s remarks 
are of note in this regard: 
Let us suppose I tell a story to a child and begin in one time-honored style; 
“There was,” I say, “many years ago a little girl who lived with her 
grandmother on the edge of a forest.”  One can scarcely deny that this, if 
anything, is fiction, but is it false?  Perhaps we do not know for certain, so 
let us ask ourselves whether it is likely that many years ago a little girl lived 
with her grandmother on the edge of a large forest.  If we do ask ourselves 
the question, the only answer can be that there is an overwhelming 
statistical probability that it is true. …But it is surely too clear to need 
argument that in raising the question of truth, and resorting to statistical 
probabilities as the only way of answering the question, we have fallen into 
utter absurdity.  If you ask me whether it is true that a little girl lived many 
years ago with her grandmother on the edge of a forest, I shall say “true” 
rather than “false”; but in the imagined context the question should not be 
raised.  …If a story is told and it is asked whether it is true there are three 
possible answers: “It is true,” “It is false,” and “It is fiction,” and the third 
answer is a way of saying that the question does not arise.17 
 
Urmson states from the outset that he is not concerned with the sorts of truths about 
life that fiction may impart, but the observation is nevertheless important to 
understanding that end.  To modify his example somewhat, imagine that I tell a 
group of children the story “The Three Little Pigs,” and afterward ask them, “Now, 
which little pig made the wisest choice in building his house?”  Suppose that a 
child replies: “That is a meaningless question—none of that really happened, and 
                                                 
15 Peter Van Inwagen, “Creatures of Fiction.” 
16 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity sections 3 and 4 of chapter 8. 
17 J.O. Urmson, “Fiction” 155. 
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moreover, pigs can neither talk nor build houses and wolves can’t blow houses 
down.”  While we might be impressed that the child could make such an 
observation in the first place, still we would surely conclude that she had missed 
the point.  The pigs illustrate some truths about life; the importance of hard work, 
the dangers of taking shortcuts, and so on.  Unlike our hypothetical child, most 
children and adults throughout history have learned such lessons in just this way: 
Reading stories and contemplating virtue are, in a manner of speaking, 
intertwined from the outset, not only in the history of literature, but also in 
the experience of beginning readers.  We are recruited into the practice of 
reading fiction from the start, so to speak, under the presumption that 
tracking virtue is an appropriate aspect of appreciating fiction.  There are no 
grounds to think that this alertness to virtue ever disappears in our reading 
or that it should disappear.18 
 
In a similar vein, Carroll also reminds us, “it is probably no accident that we use 
the same word—“character”—to refer to fictional beings and the ensemble of 
virtues of existing persons.”19  Stories enlighten and tell us about ourselves in the 
world, and we can find examples of truth and honor amidst the verses and pages of 
fictional imaginings. 
 Carroll identifies three typical arguments against the idea that literature is a 
source of moral knowledge and education.  The banality argument argues that the 
kinds of truths implied and conveyed by works of literature are, on the whole, 
trivial and already known by the audience.  The no evidence argument claims that 
fiction provides either no or insufficient evidence for the putative truths it is 
supposed to convey.  What evidence there is is either a too small number of cases 
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19 Carroll 16. 
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to make generalizations, or such that the fictional cases have been contrived in 
advance so as to support some thesis or other, and thus are unreliable as examples.  
The no-argument argument objects that artistic works merely present themes 
without actually arguing for them; they exist to provide unity to the piece, not for 
the purpose of discussion and knowledge-building.  Hence, determining the truth or 
falsity of the claims in literature is not part of literature’s function, and so literature 
itself has little to do with imparting knowledge.20  
 Each of these arguments is flawed, and in what follows I will make some 
specific observations of why they fail.  Before turning to those points, however, 
Carroll’s own argument against all such arguments collectively is instructive: 
Rather than confronting these skeptical arguments one at a time, I would 
like to introduce a consideration that simultaneously problematizes each of 
these arguments in different ways.  These arguments, we must remember, 
are philosophers’ arguments.  And yet it is extremely peculiar that 
philosophers should raise these particular objections against literature, since 
philosophy employs a gamut of techniques to produce knowledge and 
learning that are analogous to those found in literature.  What I have in 
mind here specifically are thought experiments, examples, and 
counterexamples that are often narrative and generally fictional in nature.  
Such devices are frequently employed by philosophers to defend and/or to 
motivate their claims, moral and otherwise.  Thus, if these strategies are 
acceptable forms of knowledge production in philosophy and literature 
contains comparable structures, then if philosophy conducted by means of 
thought experiments is an adequate source of knowledge and education, 
then so should literature be.21 
 
Thought experiments clarify our intuitions, instantiate theoretical claims, and show 
us something that we are otherwise only told.  Similarly, stories show us something 
about ourselves, suggesting and revealing truths in an important sense from the 
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inside out.  We see ourselves in stories, as we for a time inhabit their world and 
experience it along with their characters.  In so doing, we are confronted with 
decisions, ideas, and pictures of the world on a level that is often more powerful 
than what is conveyed by “pure” argument.  A striking example is the visit of the 
prophet Nathan to King David, in the wake of David’s great transgression.  David 
has committed adultery and impregnated another man’s wife, attempted (and 
failed) to cover up the deed, and then arranged the man’s death by sending him to 
the front lines of battle to be abandoned.  These events are the backdrop against 
which Nathan tells David a tale: 
 1 The LORD sent Nathan to David. When he came to him, he said, 
“There were two men in a certain town, one rich and the other poor. 2 The 
rich man had a very large number of sheep and cattle, 3 but the poor man 
had nothing except one little ewe lamb he had bought.  He raised it, and it 
grew up with him and his children. It shared his food, drank from his cup 
and even slept in his arms. It was like a daughter to him.  4 “Now a traveler 
came to the rich man, but the rich man refrained from taking one of his own 
sheep or cattle to prepare a meal for the traveler who had come to him. 
Instead, he took the ewe lamb that belonged to the poor man and prepared it 
for the one who had come to him.”  5 David burned with anger against the 
man and said to Nathan, “As surely as the LORD lives, the man who did 
this must die! 6 He must pay for that lamb four times over, because he did 
such a thing and had no pity.”  
7 Then Nathan said to David, “You are the man! This is what the 
LORD, the God of Israel, says: ‘I anointed you king over Israel, and I 
delivered you from the hand of Saul. 8 I gave your master’s house to you, 
and your master’s wives into your arms. I gave you all Israel and Judah. 
And if all this had been too little, I would have given you even more. 9 Why 
did you despise the word of the LORD by doing what is evil in his eyes? 
You struck down Uriah the Hittite with the sword and took his wife to be 
your own. You killed him with the sword of the Ammonites.’”   
…13 Then David said to Nathan, “I have sinned against the 
LORD.”22 
 
                                                 
22 2 Samuel 12: 1 – 9, 13 NIV. 
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Presumably, in a propositional sense David knew already that what he had done 
was wrong.  The impact of the parable, however, lies in having forced him to truly 
confront that fact and, more importantly, to see himself as he was.  A story 
simultaneously imparts both a subjectivity and an objectivity that are otherwise 
absent: subjectivity in that we immerse ourselves in the story’s world, vicariously 
living it along with its characters; objectivity in that going in, we don’t know who 
those characters are and can judge them free of the rationalizations which so often 
color our views of ourselves.  Although the story in question here was recited orally 
rather than read, Nussbaum’s description is fitting when she says that we 
“read for life,” bringing to the literary texts we love (as to texts admittedly 
philosophical) our pressing questions and perplexities, searching for images 
of what we might do and be, and holding these up against the images we 
derive from our knowledge of other conceptions, literary, philosophical, and 
religious. (Emphasis mine).23 
 
David’s reaction to the character of the rich man is an immediate and heartfelt 
outrage, illustrative of his base level moral commitments.  Upon learning that he is 
that character, he cannot avoid the condemnation—leveled by himself, upon 
himself—of what he was.  The power of stories is to engage us on the fundamental 
level of our questions, and putative answers, of what it is to be a (good) human 
being.  What David saw—as so many others have seen—was his true ethical face 
reflected in a fictional mirror. 
 With this phenomenon in mind, I would like to return to the objections 
presented above.  According to the banality argument, the sort of truths imparted by 
literature are such as are already known by the reader, and thus are trivial.  
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However, in addition to what has already been said, there are at least two reasons to 
reject this idea.  Both Carroll and Nussbaum emphasize that there is an important 
distinction to be made in determining what is trivial.  Carroll reminds us that “What 
the philosopher discounts as trivial may in fact be revelatory to the plain reader 
and, for that very reason, can have a fair claim to being informative and educative 
for the intended audience.”24  Nussbaum takes the point further as she argues for 
the place of literary style in philosophical discourse: 
Most professional philosophers did not, I found, share the ancient 
conception of philosophy as discourse addressed to nonexpert readers of 
many kinds who would bring to the text their urgent concerns, questions, 
needs, and whose souls might in that interaction be changed.  Having lost 
that conception they had lost, too, the sense of the philosophical text as an 
expressive creation whose form should be part and parcel of its conception, 
revealing in the shape of the sentences the lineaments of a particular sense 
of life.25 
 
If we as philosophers are serious about the value of our discipline in improving the 
world, then we must be careful not to dismiss as trivial such truths as may be 
meaningful and newly-realized to the general public, our students, or others for 
whom we hope a similar love will be kindled.  Beyond that observation, however, 
we must also be careful not to take this distinction too far, nor assume that, as 
philosophers, we are immune to blind spots or self-deception.  Just as David saw 
through the vehicle of the parable a truth he on some level knew already, so we too 
may find in stories an unexamined facet of our lives or ethical insight.  Hence, I by 
no means wish to suggest that the banality argument fails simply in relation to  
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non-philosophers, although that is an important observation.  It also fails because 
the literary form is particularly suited to the expression and examination of certain 
important kinds of ideas.   
 The beginning of Fear and Trembling is a notable illustration of just this 
point, and Kierkegaard motivates the work by employing a narrative structure on 
two levels: 
There once was a man: he had learned as a child that beautiful tale of how 
God tried Abraham, how he withstood the test, kept his faith and for the 
second time received a son against every expectation.  When he became 
older he read the same story with even greater admiration, for life had 
divided what had been united in the child’s pious simplicity.  The older he 
became the more often his thoughts turned to that tale, his enthusiasm 
became stronger and stronger, and yet less and less could he understand it.  
Finally it put everything else out of his mind; his soul had but one wish, 
actually to see Abraham, and one longing, to have been witness to those 
events.  …What he yearned for was to accompany them on the three-day 
journey, when Abraham rode with grief before him and Isaac by his side.26 
 
“Johannes de Silentio” is attempting to understand the story of Abraham, but that 
attempt can only be made from within the structures of story itself.  What he 
endeavors to provide us is not just a question or an argument, but an experience—
or rather, multiple attempted experiences of Abraham, of which one is reproduced 
below: 
It was early morning.  Abraham rose in good time, embraced Sarah, the 
bride of his old age, and Sarah kissed Isaac, who had taken her disgrace 
from her, was her pride and hope for all generations.  So they rode on in 
silence and Abraham’s eyes were fixed on the ground, until the fourth day 
when he looked up and saw afar the mountain in Moriah, but he turned his 
gaze again to the ground.  Silently he arranged the firewood, bound Isaac; 
silently he drew the knife.  Then he saw the ram that God had appointed.  
He sacrificed that and returned home… From that day on, Abraham became 
old, he could not forget that God had demanded this of him.  Isaac throve as 
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before; but Abraham’s eye was darkened, he saw joy no more. …In these 
and similar ways this man of whom we speak thought about those events.  
Every time he came home from a journey to the mountain in Moriah he 
collapsed in weariness, clasped his hands and said: ‘Yet no one was as great 
as Abraham; who is able to understand him?’27 
 
Could the same point have been made, the same sense of dread and confusion 
conveyed, the same sense of what it would have been to be Abraham have been 
imparted in a different style?  I submit that it could not, that Kierkegaard’s stylistic 
choice was necessary in order for the reader to grapple with the questions asked at 
the appropriate level.  To truly ask what it was to do what Abraham did, to take on 
the dreadful burden—that  requires us to go with Abraham, as Johannes tried to do, 
and to similarly collapse with weariness after returning from the mountain.  
Nussbaum writes that “any style makes, itself, a statement… about what is 
important and what is not, about what faculties of the reader are important for 
knowing and what are not.”28  In these examples we can see the truth of that claim, 
as well as a way in which the no-argument argument above is undermined.  The 
story of Johannes and, more importantly, the imagined versions of Abraham and 
Isaac, of course provide themes and unity to the work.  But in their form of so 
doing they also say something, something which would be lost in another form of 
speaking to us. 
     In similar fashion, the heroes of tales such as those I have appealed to and 
others also speak to us, and they engage our ethical reflection by providing pictures 
of what it means to live well.  In this sense, it is unimportant whether a story is 
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fictional rather than historical, because what matters is the ideals with which a 
character either explicitly or implicitly asks us to identify.  French advocates this 
position overtly: 
Modern warriors can forge admirable models for their own behavior by 
picking and choosing the best from among these historical and mythical 
warrior ideals.  It makes little difference whether the men and women they 
hope to emulate ever lived and breathed.  Some warriors of today may even 
feel that they have more in common with fictional figures such as Sigurd or 
Sir Gawain than with certain of their real-life civilian counterparts.29 
 
Several points are notable in this regard.  First is the inadequacy of the no evidence 
argument above.  By standing for a way of living and meeting challenges, by 
confronting the question of what is worthy or shameful of a human being, these 
characters are the evidence.  As Nussbaum notes, “literature can show us in rich 
detail, as formal abstract argument cannot, what it is like to live in a certain way.”30  
Stories paint a picture of life and what it is to live it as a particular type of person, a 
picture that we must accept or reject.  Most significantly, they suggest to us a sense 
of what is admirable, and if we find their characters to be so, we are answering for 
ourselves a question of what it means to live as a worthy human being.  Reflection 
on our heroes has a direct and intimate implication to the question of what we shall 
choose to be.   
 In this regard I am reminded of two examples.  The first will likely seem 
surprising, as it comes from a modern sitcom: the television show “The Big Bang 
Theory.”  In the scene in question, Sheldon—an extremely devoted superhero fan 
who is wearing a Superman T-shirt—is chatting with Penny in the laundry room. 
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Suddenly, Leonard comes to tell them that their friend Howard’s mother has had an 
accident, and they all need to meet him at the hospital.  Leonard and Penny start to 
leave, and notice that Sheldon is just standing there. 
 Leonard:  Come on, Sheldon, let’s go! 
 
 Sheldon:  To a hospital?  Full of sick people?  Oh, I don’t think so. 
 
Penny:   Okay, well, your friend and his mother are there.  We’re 
going. 
 
 Sheldon:   I can’t. 
 
 Penny:   Oh, don’t tell me you’re afraid of germs. 
 
Sheldon:   Not all germs.  Just the ones that can kill me.  The same way 
I’m not afraid of all steak knives—just the ones that might be 
plunged in my thorax. 
 
Leonard: Uh, fine, I’ll just tell Howard that you won’t come because 
you’re more concerned about your own well-being than his. 
 
Sheldon: I would think he would know that! 
 
Penny: Okay, you know what?  You are unbelievable.  You buy all 
these superhero T-Shirts, but when it’s time for you to step 
up and do the right thing, you just hide in the laundry room! 
 
Sheldon: …Fine.  I’ll go.31 
 
Now, this scene and subsequent ones are of course played for laughs, and in a 
general sense “The Big Bang Theory” is not a work I would posit as a source of 
great moral insight.  Nevertheless, Penny’s argument and fictional appeal from 
within the show exemplifies the way in which fictional characters connect to our 
sense of what moral and personal commitments we hold, and whether our conduct 
                                                 




truly bears these values out.  Penny argues that if Sheldon really admires the 
characters whose emblems so often adorn his chest, then his own conduct should 
reflect that fact insofar as their standards are applicable to his life.  Essentially, she 
shames him into acting by pointing out a dissonance between his endorsement of 
ideals of brave action in service of others, and his own willingness to allow fear to 
keep him from supporting a friend.  Thus Sheldon is motivated to moral 
improvement, through values he in some way already accepts, personified in the 
form of characters whose lives he holds as worthy of emulation.   
 It is this same sort of appeal that we can see in the second and presumably 
less surprising example, namely Socrates’ defense at his trial.  He cites the 
character of Achilles as a justification for his own conduct, as well as an 
admonishment to some of the jury members, lest they believe that his status as 
capital defendant shows that he ought to be ashamed: 
But perhaps someone will say, Do you feel no compunction, Socrates, at 
having followed a line of action which puts you in danger of the death 
penalty? 
 I might fairly reply to him, You are mistaken, my friend, if you 
think that a man who is worth anything ought to spend his time weighing up 
the prospects of life and death.  He has only one thing to consider in 
performing any action—that is, whether he is acting rightly or wrongly, like 
a good man or a bad one.  On your view the heroes who died at Troy would 
be poor creatures, especially the son of Thetis.  He, if you remember, made 
light of danger in comparison with incurring dishonor when his goddess 
mother warned him, eager as he was to kill Hector, in words such as these, I 
fancy: My son, if you avenge your comrade Patroclus’ death and kill 
Hector, you will die yourself—‘Next after Hector is thy fate prepared.’  
When he heard this warning, he made light of his death and danger, being 
much more afraid of an ignoble life and of failing to avenge his friends.32  
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Socrates makes an overt reference to someone widely regarded as heroic, charging 
the jury members to examine him and themselves with respect to their views of 
Achilles.  His listeners may well have believed Achilles to be a historical, rather 
than mythical figure; Socrates’ own view is perhaps less clear.  But it is worth 
noting that the question is irrelevant in regard to the value of the claim.  In citing 
The Iliad, he makes use of a story that forms part of the collective consciousness of 
his community; its values and arcs serve to shape and delineate the moral and 
intellectual categories by which he and his listeners understand themselves and the 
world.  Thus again, we see moral argument and justification proceeding along the 
most fundamental levels of self-conception.  In the sense described by MacIntyre 
above, Socrates sees himself as part of a story in which one must stand at one’s 
post, doing one’s duty to god and man   The image of who he is, based in the story 
he sees his life as embodying, is the well-spring for notions of what is worthy 
according to the role he inhabits. 
  
A Justification of Roles and Exemplars 
Is this how we should view our lives, however?  Samantha Vice is 
amenable to the idea that art can mirror life, positing that “all good art tells us 
something about ourselves and the world we live in.”33  Nevertheless, she worries 
about thinking of ourselves as characters and objects to MacIntyre’s conception 
specifically: 
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Rather than thinking of myself as an author, I may think that I am a 
character in a story already written for me, that I have a certain ‘role’ to 
play because the ‘plot-lines’ of my life are set down.  In thinking in this 
way, we risk mythologising, restricting possibilities, misinterpreting events 
and people as we see them as irrevocable elements of a larger story of 
which we are protagonists.  But stories are, precisely, artificial; their 
elements are arranged in the interests both of verisimilitude and aesthetic 
form.  We may give our lives such form retrospectively, but it is far from 
apparent that we really do so as we live them, or that we should.34 
 
She reinforces this sentiment by remarking of roles: 
...it is arguably a sign of maturity to outgrow ‘role-playing’, to stop defining 
ourselves essentially with any role we may happen to take on and to become 
comfortable with or resigned to the kind of person we broadly are and to 
our inescapable limitations.  Thinking of ourselves as if we were characters 
in stories presses us to think of ourselves in ways that are potentially 
dehumanizing and falsifying.  Human beings are not always predictable; 
they do not fit into patterns, they are not exhausted by roles or plots.35 
 
However, it seems to me that Vice’s concern is misguided, and furthermore, that it 
is not entirely coherent.  Part of her objection seems to be founded on an emphasis 
on freedom; a fear that the narrative view entails a pre-definition of a person’s life 
into an externally generated box.  She wants to preserve the possibilities and 
potential in a life that by her lights the narrative view must preclude.  But how is 
that motivation captured by the idea that we ought to become “resigned to the kind 
of person we broadly are and to our inescapable limitations?”  This would seem 
merely to replace a feared tyranny of a plot-line with a (not feared?) tyranny of 
chance, circumstance, and what is simply given—an inevitability of how I find 
myself, rather than what I choose.  In addition, her closing remark warns us that 
The narrative view wishes us to think about ourselves in lesser, rather than 
greater works of fiction.  In so doing we risk seeing ourselves and others 
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falsely, of ignoring their irreducible individuality and ultimate 
impenetrability, through the consoling veil of our need for unity and 
meaning.36 
 
However, the lines immediately prior to this claim tell us a hallmark of the greatest 
kind of literature: 
Characters that move us the most, that we care about most deeply, are those 
that transcend their role in the plot, that break into personhood despite the 
artifice of the world.  We forget that that they are not actually persons 
because they remain mysterious, they grow beyond the words on the page 
and live on beyond their written end.  I suggest that such characters are ‘true 
to life’; that great art does, in he end, imitate life.37 
 
While she is indubitably correct in this assessment, it is unclear how it can fit with 
the worry she has been describing.  If characters have the power to transcend their 
roles in the plot in this way, to achieve a reality in spite of a constructed world, then 
the same considerations should apply to a real person viewed under the narrative 
conception.  That is, if this possibility can be realized by fictional characters, then 
viewing one’s real life as a story or one’s self as a character need not be a 
straitjacket either.  While some roles may be such that we are born into them, we 
can realize a greater potential by choosing to take on others. 
 We might see her, then, as protesting a narrative self-conception as 
antithetical to being one’s true self.  Specifically choosing to embody certain 
attributes is problematic, she writes, because 
if we really do try to think of ourselves as characters, we run the same risk 
as Isabel [from Henry James’ The Portrait of a Lady], of too consciously 
‘moulding’ or ‘fashioning’ our characters and decisions in a way that is not 
always conducive to real virtue or authenticity.  The aim to be a certain kind 
of person, one that is aesthetically interesting or ethically commendable, 
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may have tragically unintended results.  The logic of motivation is such that 
self-consciously trying to be virtuous is not the same as being virtuous and 
such attempts may have the paradoxical consequence of undermining 
virtue.  To try to have character is certainly not necessarily a bad thing but 
can, with the purest of motives, impair virtue.  It is a matter of bad moral 
luck for the morally conscientious, that certain positive character traits may 
require spontaneity and self-forgetfulness, rather than self-awareness and 
conscious moral fashioning.38 
 
Vice provides no examples of the kind of traits she has in mind (although a sense of 
humor may be a probable candidate; someone deliberately trying to be funny 
seldom actually is).  Aside from that oversight, there are several reasons to reject 
this idea.  While it is true that trying to be virtuous is not the same as being 
virtuous, this truth is part and parcel of the classical view that virtue must be 
cultivated.  That is, simply performing a virtuous act or even a number of virtuous 
acts is not identical to acting from virtue, which requires practical wisdom and 
habitual activity.  The fact that this process takes time, however, in no way entails 
that the seeker of virtue is inauthentic; he or she deliberately tries to develop traits 
of character in order to become an authentically good person.  Thus, Vice’s worry 
is similar to a mistake that is sometimes made about moral exemplars.  By trying to 
emulate the exemplar, it is argued, we live someone else’s life instead of our own, 
undermining our autonomy.  However, this objection misunderstands the nature of 
emulation.  The exemplar helps us to recognize virtuous traits, but those traits are 
expressed in ways particular to one’s own life, abilities, and role.  Socrates’ 
commitment to practicing philosophy despite the threat of execution was akin to 
but not identical with Achilles’ commitment to avenging Patroclus despite foretold 
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demise.  Sheldon’s supporting his friend despite his fear of hospitals is inspired by, 
but not identical to, the actions of the superheroes he admires.  And a modern 
warrior such as French discusses who sees a model in Sir Gawain can embody a 
sense of courtesy and justice without seeing himself literally as a knight-errant.   
 In a similar sense, in taking on roles we do not thereby ignore or subvert our 
true selves, but choose what our true selves are going to be.  We have seen in the 
previous chapter that integrity and pride in a role are compatible with one’s having 
individual projects and commitments.  By choosing to live in that particular way, 
one makes a statement about what sorts of things have value to a life well-lived, 
and what we should hold as important.  Insofar as a fictional character inspires this 
choice, it is because through participating in his or her story we are led to reflect 
upon our own: 
The ethical effects of engaging with narratives are felt by everyone, not just 
some special group of victims or beneficiaries.  No human being, literate or 
not, escapes the effects of stories, because everyone tells them and listens to 
them.  …The questions we ask about such stories, and the innumerable 
other kinds that fill each day—Should I believe this narrator?  Am I willing 
to be the kind of person that the storyteller is asking me to be?  Will I accept 
this author among the small circle of my true friends?—these might well 
have been asked about any story from the beginning of time.  And whether 
or not a given culture ever asks the questions openly, their implicit answers 
have determined to a surprising degree what that culture was to be.39 
 
To return to Nussbaum’s phrase, we are searching for images of what we might do 
and be, and in the heroes of such stories we find a call to excellence.  An honorable 
character, whether fictional or not, can and should be the inspiration for the type of 
story we write ourselves. 
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The Challenges of Ignorance and Relativism 
In noting these effects, however, we are brought to a final difficulty.  Our putative 
examples of honor may be such that, while admirable in some regards, we cannot 
help but find aspects of them or their culture to be morally objectionable.  Thus a 
question arises as to whether they are truly suited to providing moral guidance, or 
still stronger, whether the attribution of honor to them might be fundamentally 
undermined.  French raises but swiftly dismisses a version of this issue, arguing 
that the flaws of past warriors need not impede our adoption of their genuine 
virtues: 
Some educators, politicians, and members of the media fear that 
encouraging young warriors to associate themselves with the warrior 
traditions of the past will somehow lead them to become mindless, Rambo-
like brutes with various outrageous bigotries and out-of-date values.  
Granted, some of the qualities that ancient warriors or warrior archetypes 
possess do not play well in the twenty-first century.  But is it really so great 
a challenge to separate the wheat from the chaff?  The key is to select for 
preservation only what is consistent with the values cherished by 
contemporary warrior cultures.  Modern American warriors should only 
resurrect those traditions that cohere with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution they have sworn to uphold and defend.  For example, they can 
emulate the humility, integrity, commitment to “might for right,” courtesy, 
and courage of a Round Table knight without taking on board his 
acceptance of an undemocratic, stratified society (where most of the 
population is disenfranchised and women and serfs are treated as property) 
or his dedication to “pursue infidels.”40 
 
However, we might wonder whether the objection can be resolved this quickly and 
simply.  I have advanced the claim that a hallmark of honor is its holistic nature.  
The honorable person sees his self-worth and moral worth as linked throughout all 
areas of his life, and rejects the idea that the realm of the moral is separable from 
                                                 
40 French 232. 
 
 171
the rest of his endeavors.  Consequently, a person’s excellence in embodying a 
given role is not independent of whether he is virtuous or vicious within other 
domains.  If this is the case, then it seems that insofar as a warrior or his culture 
holds certain values and institutions that we find unjust, we would either have to 
conclude that to that extent he is not honorable, or else be committed to some form 
of relativism.   
 However, I believe that this is a false dichotomy, and we need not accept 
either of those conclusions.  Michael Slote has raised a similar concern about virtue 
generally, suggesting that it may be a mistake to view anyone as virtuous in light of 
certain historical realities.  For example, most people in Aristotle’s time (including 
Aristotle himself) took slavery for granted, which we now view as horribly unjust.  
But if those subject to slavery were treated with such gross injustice, it hardly 
seems correct to attribute justice, and by extension, virtue, to Aristotle and his 
contemporaries.41  Importantly, however, Slote does not apply this reasoning only 
to past societies, but to our own as well: 
I have no intention of being thus smug about current values and conceptions 
of morality.  I have, for example, harped on the wrongness of slavery and 
the unavailability of that moral fact, and others, to the ancients, but I too 
admire Greek moral philosophy, and that very admiration causes me to 
wonder whether virtue is any more accessible nowadays than it was in 
classical antiquity.  I assume that we now see aspects of right and wrong 
that the ancient world missed; may we not also fail to see things that the 
Greeks were able to see, and, more significantly, may there not be other 
moral issues on which both the ancients and ourselves are blind?42 
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It seems to me that this is the correct way to approach the issue, in that our task as 
human beings is to draw from the collective understanding—and challenges to that 
understanding—of all stages and places of our mutual quest to realize the good of a 
human being.  To ask whether it is correct to ascribe full virtue to a given person or 
society at any stage of history is undoubtedly to yield a negative response, but this 
does not mean that we cannot recognize the extent to which they do approach 
virtue, nor that in praising such aspects we must condone the ways in which they 
do not.  In our own case, one can believe in an objective and holistic morality while 
recognizing the likelihood that some of our moral beliefs and actions stand in need 
of revision.  In the same way, we can recognize the moral insights of past 
exemplars without committing ourselves either to relativism or undue criticism.  As 
MacIntyre writes of rival moral traditions: 
It will thus sometimes at least be possible for adherents of each tradition to 
understand and to evaluate—by their own standards—the characterizations 
of their positions advanced by their rivals.  And nothing precludes their 
discovering that these characterizations reveal to them features of their own 
positions which had hitherto gone unnoticed or considerations which by 
their own standards they ought to have entertained, but have not.  Indeed 
nothing precludes the discovery that the rival tradition offers cogent 
explanations of weaknesses, of inabilities to formulate or solve problems 
adequately, of a variety of incoherences in one’s own tradition for which the 
resources of one’s own tradition had not been able to offer a convincing 
account.43 
 
The recognition that a life well-lived is one in which we strive toward a true 
conception of human excellence is one that of necessity acknowledges the 
possibility of imperfections in that striving, yet seeks to reform and strengthen itself 
through the example of other aspirants to that virtue. 
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Heroes Only Need One Reason 
In this way, an ethics of honor reforms and strengthens our modern 
conceptions of ethics by reintroducing a number of abandoned links in our moral 
understanding.  To remember the concepts we have lost is to repair not only our 
moral ideas, but our moral selves.  As I have argued, honor comprises pride, 
integrity, social role, and reputation, unified in terms of a whole life conceived as a 
narrative.  In this way, the person of honor embodies a kind of heroism—the sense 
of one’s self as both character and author of a story in which one’s being is  
self-consciously a statement of what it is to be excellent.  As previously mentioned 
about the word “character,” the word “hero” is similarly used to denote both the 
protagonist of a story and one who exemplifies great virtue.  To live with honor is 
to collapse these two definitions.  Conceiving of ourselves in this way, we no 
longer wonder why we should be moral, because morality is rightly seen as derived 
from the good of a human being, rather than as an external system superimposed 
onto something with no essential nature.   
The honorable person embodies one or more roles within a community of 
persons for whom seeking the good is a shared project.  Some of these roles we are 
born into, some we take upon ourselves, as frameworks within which that good 
may be realized.  As we have seen, there are rational standards on what can count 
as such a role; what can be legitimately conceived as a good description of what I 
am.  As such, to answer that question well gives rise to an integrity born of moral 
identity, and a pride in one’s specific expression of the good for a human being.  
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Both of these are possible because of the conceptual link between who I am as a 
person, my good as an individual, and the good of society as a whole, of which I 
am a part.  In that respect, reputation is both an individual and a public good.  
Individual in that it is necessary to effectively exhibit virtues and to sustain certain 
classes of goods; public in that it allows one to inspire others to emulate oneself 
insofar as one’s life contains genuine excellence.  As part of an evaluative 
community for whom our answers to questions of value matter, our mutual task is 
to live in a way that stands for our best and most defensible conceptions of what is 
admirable in a human being.  To do so is to abandon the illusory divide between 
moral and non-moral, and recognize the inseparability of moral worth and self 
worth.  In that way we write of a unified life, as a protagonist who is worthy of 
imitation.  Once we strive so to ascend, we are heroes, great and small—we are 
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